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 Tijdens het aanvatten en afleggen van mijn tocht tot de (tijdelijke) bestemming waar 
ik nu ben aangekomen, hebben heel wat mensen mij aangemoedigd en in de richting van 
deze bestemming gegidst. Tijdens deze tocht heb ik heel wat bezienswaardigheden mogen 
aanschouwen, sommigen om levenslang in herinnering mee te dragen. Deze tocht kende 
ook hier en daar een (onverwachte) wending en wordt dan ook gekenmerkt door een 
assortiment aan ‘soundtracks’. Hoe kan het dan ook anders om enkele mensen even op de 
voorgrond te plaatsen met een aangepaste songtekst. 
Graag wil ik starten met het bedanken van mijn promotor Prof. dr. Lesley Verhofstadt en 
co-promotor Prof. dr. William Ickes om me te introduceren in het onderzoek naar 
empathische accuraatheid. Het is en blijft een onderwerp die me boeit en me heeft overtuigd 
van het onderzoeksveld. Bedankt Lesley om me te vertrouwen in het aangaan van een 
uitdagend onderzoeksproject, om mijn steeds verder uitdijende gedachten tijdens het 
schrijven te structureren, en mijn ideeën en visies te relativeren en nuanceren. Bill, thank 
you to guide and supervise me while conducting an ingenious paradigm in which I had to 
make a dozen of decisions, and to welcome me into your team at the University of Texas. 
Ook tot de leden van mijn begeleidingscommissie, Prof. dr. Liesbet Goubert, Prof. dr. 
Maarten Vansteenkiste en Prof. dr. Gilbert Lemmens, wil ik een woordje van dank richten 
voor hun methodologische, statistische en klinische suggesties, hun kritische blik die me 
stimuleerde om te blijven sleutelen aan verbetering en hun bevestigende woorden 
gedurende mijn traject. 
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Verder wil ik de participanten van dit onderzoek en de masterproefstudenten die een 
onmisbare rol speelden in de dataverzameling van dit doctoraat, oprecht bedanken. 
Daarnaast ook een woordje van dank aan Prof. dr. Geert Crombez en Prof. dr. Rudi De 
Raedt, voormalig en huidig vakgroepvoorzitter van de PP05. Enerzijds om me de kans te 
geven lid te worden van deze boeiende vakgroep; anderzijds om me mijn steentje te laten 
bijdragen in de verschillende raden en op verschillende domeinen, waaronder het Party 
Comité, waarvoor ik ook Ama, Nele en Annabel wil bedanken voor de leuke afwisseling! 
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‘Den – ondertussen welgekende – bureau’ verdient een speciaal plekje gezien dit toch de 
grote constante was tijdens mijn tocht en dan ook één van de mooiste herinneringen zal 
blijven tijdens het vervolg van mijn tocht. Vanaf dag 1 deelden Marieke en ik een – 
weliswaar tijdelijke – bureau; we sprongen samen in het grote avontuur en werden later 
ook samen geïntroduceerd in ‘den echten bureau’. Samen met Elia, Gaëlle en Joke werden 
we het hechtste team ooit gekend in de PP05 en dit werd alleen maar versterkt toen ook 
Charlotte den bureau kwam vervoegen. Het codewoord van deze hechte collega- en 
ondertussen vriendengroep is ‘samen’. Samen gemotiveerd in een nieuw project vliegen, 
samen frustraties ‘afzagen’ op elkaar maar nog meer ‘afeten’, samen lachen wanneer ‘per 
ongeluk’ geheimen worden verklapt over zwangerschappen, geslachten, babynamen, 
verjaardagsverrassingen,… samen op congres, samen op preconference workshop, samen 
samen samen… en hopelijk blijft ‘samen’ altijd een stukje bestaan ook al zullen onze 
wegen uiteindelijk allemaal scheiden. 
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Maar niet enkel ‘den bureau’ is gekend, ook het ruimere Family Lab staat ondertussen 
bekend als een leutige bende waar niet enkel gelachen en gezeverd wordt, maar waar ook 
een inspirerende mix van getalenteerde, collegiale en vooral aangename onderzoekers aan 
de slag is. Ik wil dan ook het volledige team bedanken! Een beter team had ik me niet 
kunnen wensen. En ook het Causa-team wil ik bedanken. Pieter (en Melanie en Bregwin), 
bedankt om mij de kans te geven mee te draaien in de praktijk; sinds de start is het een 
aangename en verrijkende uitdaging om naast mijn onderzoekstraject ook werkzaam te zijn 
in de klinische praktijk. Het heeft niet alleen een nieuw perspectief geboden aan mijn 
onderzoeksbevindingen, het heeft me ook leren relativeren en als mens doen groeien.  
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Maar niet enkel mensen op de werkvloer dienen bedankt te worden, ook mijn familie en 
enkele vrienden mogen even in de spotlight. Bedankt aan mijn ouders, aangezien zij mij 
sedert het begin de kans gegeven hebben om te studeren, me mijn eigen keuzes te laten 
maken en er altijd in geloofd te hebben dat ik het tot een goed einde zou brengen. Mama, 
het is niet altijd gemakkelijk geweest, maar intussen zijn wel al heel wat verder geraakt en 
we mogen er best trots op zijn! Ook bedankt aan meme, pepe (en mammie) om af en toe 

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bevestigd te worden door hoe trots jullie zijn en de ruimere (schoon)familie om deze trots 
te bevestigen. Maar ook Anouk, Mieke, en het GoudenNestje verdienen een speciale 
dankjewel voor de continue warme vriendschap (ook al was het niet altijd simpel om elkaar 
regelmatig te zien).  
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Als laatste wil ik ook mijn gezinnetje bedanken! Het heeft mij deugd gedaan om tijdens het 
doctoraatswerk ook te kunnen bouwen aan een huis waar het altijd terug thuis komen is. 
Hoewel het zeker niet altijd makkelijk is om elkaar te begrijpen – ook bij ons is empathische 
accuraatheid een reële uitdaging – vinden we altijd wel onze weg om elkaar te doen lachen 
en terug gerust te stellen. In onze drukke gemeenschappelijke agenda die uitpuilt van 
repetities, klinische praktijk, opleiding, optredens, … is er altijd een plaatsje voor ons en 
onze ‘kleine’ beer, Senna. Kleine kadee, je zal het dankwoord van mijn doctoraat 
waarschijnlijk wel niet lezen, hoogstens eens kapotbijten, maar je voelt ongetwijfeld hoe 
onmisbaar je bent geworden in ons gezinnetje. 
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͝ Based on Hinnekens, C., Verhofstadt, L. L., Vanhee, G., & Ickes, W. (2015). Weet ik wat jij denkt 
en voelt? Een overzicht van het onderzoek naar empathische accuraatheid en implicaties voor de 
klinische praktijk. Tijdschrift Klinische Psychologie, 45(1), 15-29. 
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Empathic accuracy is defined as the extent to which an individual can accurately 
infer another person's unspoken thoughts and feelings. The general introduction of this 
dissertation provides an overview of the existing – sometimes contradictory – evidence 
regarding the dispositional and situational predictors of empathic accuracy and its 
(un)favorable outcomes. This introduction starts with the conceptualization and 
operationalization of the concept of empathic accuracy by presenting an overview of 
fundamental research in the area of understanding and perspective-taking. We begin by 
introducing the Rogerian perspective on the importance of empathy in psychotherapy, 
which can be considered as the origin of the concept of empathic accuracy. Then, an 
overview of the empirical research on empathic accuracy – a field with its own research 
tradition that was founded in 1990 – will be provided. The second part will focus in greater 
detail on several important features of empathic accuracy, namely the manageability of 
accuracy, and the role of motivation. The third part will summarize the existing research 
on empathic accuracy in intimate relationships. We will conclude this general introduction 
with a discussion of the main gaps in the research on empathic accuracy, and the resulting 
objectives and research questions of the current dissertation. 

 
 
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Accurately assessing thoughts and feelings of clients appears to be a key factor in 
clinical psychotherapeutic practice and is frequently cited as one of the most important 
predictors of successful client-centered psychotherapy (Greenberg, Watson, Elliot, & 
Bohart, 2001). Carl Rogers suggested that accurate empathy – in addition to the factors 
authenticity and unbiased care for the client – is a necessary characteristic of a good 
therapist (Rogers, 1957). Other psychotherapy schools have also emphasized the 
importance of perspective-taking skills, or in other words, the ability of the therapist to 
perceive themselves and others as social beings with subjective states of mind and internal 
mental processes (e.g., mentalization-based treatment; Allen & Fonagy, 2006). 
Additionally, empirical research has highlighted the importance of empathic accuracy in 
our everyday lives while interacting with significant others, including our partners and 
family members. 
Hence, these statements raise all kinds of questions including how accurate are 
people when “reading” each other's mind, and are some individuals better at understanding 
other people’s thoughts and feelings than others? For example, do clinicians have better-
developed empathic abilities or is empathic accuracy a matter of possession of a given 
characteristic? Empirical studies have shown that the average empathic accuracy score 
when meeting a stranger is around 22 percent, meaning that 22 percent of the empathic 
inferences are correct (Ickes, Stinson, Bissonnette, & Garcia, 1990). The lower limit of this 
score is five percent and reflects the average accuracy score based on chance. The best 
"mind-readers" – those who are rather exceptional – score about 55 percent, meaning that 
they are still far from perfect at inferring the emotions of their interaction partner. Looking 
at this, we could start wondering whether our empathic efforts might seem rather hopeless 
or futile. It might be possible, however, to train psychotherapists or partners to become 
͝  
͠

“experts of the inner life” and through this improve the accuracy of their assessments of 
the other’s thoughts and feelings. These and other questions will be discussed in this general 
introduction, which aims to summarize the research literature on “daily mind-reading” or 
empathic accuracy.  

For decades, individuals’ levels of accuracy while assessing other people's 
psychological states or personality traits have been subject of scientific research on 
interpersonal perception. The investigation of empathic accuracy fits within the context of 
the most recent of four interrelated research traditions in psychology, i.e., within the latest 
stage of a clear evolution or shift from the assessment of relatively stable dispositions such 
as personality traits (e.g., Funder and Colvin, 1988), to the perception of less constant and 
more temporary states in particular personal beliefs, values, self-concepts (e.g., Sillars & 
Scott, 1983) and then emotional states (e.g., Watson, 1972), to a final focus on the inference 
of episodic thoughts and feelings (e.g., Ickes, 1993). 
Empathic accuracy is a phenomenon that has been examined in an interdisciplinary 
manner, which originates in the contexts of clinical and consulting psychology. Rogers 
(1957) defined the term accurate empathy as the therapeutic ability to be sensitive to the 
contents of the sequential thoughts and feelings of a patient. He referred to a complex 
process in which a therapist is eager to observe and understand the inner perceptual world 
of the client. This means that in addition to the client’s explicit communication, the 
therapist should also be able to accurately evaluate the client’s continuous flow of internal 
cognitive and emotional interpretations. Roger’s concept accurate empathy can be seen as 
a precursor to the concept of empathic accuracy defined by Ickes et al. (1990), with the 
main difference being that Rogers stressed the empathic process itself while Ickes stressed 
 
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the degree of accuracy as an outcome of this process. Therefore, empathic accuracy is 
defined as “the extent to which perceivers understand a target’s episodic thoughts and 
feelings as they appear spontaneously during the course of a natural interaction” (Ickes, 
1993, p. 588). 
It should be emphasized that empathic accuracy is conceptualized as an 
interpersonal, multidimensional and situation-specific process between a target (the person 
who is experiencing the thoughts and feelings) and a perceiver (the person who infers the 
target’s thoughts and feelings). Hence, empathic accuracy is a dyadic process in which two 
individuals interact with each other and both take the roles of target and perceiver, or in 
which two interaction partners (targets) are observed by a third party (perceiver) who is not 
participating in the interaction. The perceiver attempts to achieve an accurate assessment 
of the inner experiences of the target through various dimensions, such as observation, 
memory, cognition, and reasoning (Ickes, 1997). Therefore, the perceiver must detect, and 
assimilate the available informational cues from the target, and integrate them into both the 
situation-specific context of the interaction and the already-existing cognitive schema they 
have that contains information of previous interactions (if the interaction partners have a 
shared history). 
Ǥ In accordance with the above mentioned distinction between Rogers’ 
and Ickes' definitions, it is important to note that empathic accuracy does not equate to 
'empathy'. A clear definition of empathy is not available because empathy has evolved as a 
multi-dimensional phenomenon with no clear definitional consensus (Eisenberg & Miller, 
1987). The most frequently used conceptualization of empathy is the one that distinguishes 
between affective empathy and cognitive empathy. Affective empathy refers to the 
emotional response of a perceiver to the experiences and emotions of their target. This 
reaction can consist of parallel empathy (experiencing feelings that are similar to or the 
͝  
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same as the target; Davis, 1994), or empathic concern (a specific emotional response that 
expresses compassion or concern for the other person; Batson, 1991). Cognitive empathy 
refers to the process by which a perceiver tries to imagine the psychological perspective of 
their target, but this process does not necessarily lead to an emotional response. Empathic 
accuracy can therefore be considered as the outcome of this process of perspective-taking 
(Verhofstadt, Buysse, Ickes, Davis, & Devoldre, 2008).

Before 1990, research on the measurement of empathic accuracy was mainly 
situated in the context of training programs for students in clinical psychology or 
psychotherapy. These studies examined how accurately students inferred clients’ thoughts 
and feelings during (simulated) therapy sessions. Although these studies were very 
enriching for the clinical practice of the students and their tutors, they proved of rather 
limited scientific value as the inferences made by the student (perceiver) were usually not 
compared with actual thoughts and feelings reported by the client (target), but rather with 
inferences that were made by the supervising psychotherapist (Ickes, 2003). Therefore, 
these empathic accuracy scores reflected faith in the expertise of the supervisor rather than 
an objective measurement of perspective-taking performance.  
Kagan (1977) introduced the standard stimulus paradigm (SS-paradigm) in which 
participants had to observe a standard set of videos in which two targets participated in an 
(un)structured interaction. More specifically, the participants were asked to observe videos 
of therapeutic sessions that were paused each time the client had reported thoughts or 
feelings. During these breaks, participants had to make an assessment of the observed 
client’s thoughts and feelings by using multiple choice options. In this paradigm, the 
accuracy of the inference was thus calculated based on the empathic accuracy criteria 
 
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reported by the client him/herself. However, the SS-paradigm did not require the perceiver 
to generate the inferred thoughts and feelings, as there was a choice of predetermined 
options provided.  
Based on this research, Ickes and colleagues (1990) developed the so-called dyadic 
interaction paradigm (DI-paradigm), which allows measurement of empathic accuracy in 
a more naturalistic setting, and in an objective and reliable manner. The original DI-
paradigm (also known as the standard empathic accuracy assessment procedure) includes 
two interacting partners who are both perceiver and target. In a first stage the two 
participants spontaneously interact with each other in a room where they are alone but 
secretly being videotaped. During the second phase, both participants – independently – 
observe their videotaped interaction and report when and what kind of thoughts and feelings 
they had during the interaction. In the next phase they watch the videotape for a second 
time while at particular moments (when the target partner indicated having had a thought 
or feeling) the video is paused and the perceiver is asked to infer the thoughts and feelings 
of their interaction partner. Finally, the agreement between the actual and the inferred 
thoughts and feelings is rated by independent coders resulting in an empathic accuracy 
score between 0 and 100. Variations on the paradigm mainly concern the relationship 
between the interaction partners (e.g., strangers, friends, partners; Thomas & Fletcher, 
2003) or the conversation type (e.g., spontaneous conversation, therapy session, support 
and conflict interactions).  
Hence, the DI-paradigm differs in a significant respect from the SS-paradigm in 
which participants only take the role of perceiver. This distinction is important because all 
the participants in the SS-paradigm observe the same targets which allows researchers to 
compare the accuracy scores of the different perceivers for the same target, or inversely, 
for the same perceiver over various targets. 
͝  
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Perspective-taking is possible by the development of two specific neural 
mechanisms. The first is self-consciousness which refers to the ability to be conscious of 
one’s own internal mind or mental state (e.g., intentions, opinions, perceptions, emotions). 
Over time, we as humans develop the ability to reflect on our own internal state or to see 
ourselves from a meta-position, which in turn enables us to form a self-perspective or self-
image (Vogeley et al., 2001). Second, humans develop an ability to attribute an internal 
mind or mental state to other people. This means that our awareness of other people having 
their own mental state becomes more and more engaged from childhood through 
adolescence, prompting us to infer the thoughts and feelings of others (mind-reading; 
Baron-Cohen, 1995; mentalizing; Frith & Frith, 2003). A very important body of research 
on this topic is the so-called theory of mind literature (TOM; e.g., Fletcher et al., 1995), 
which has introduced several TOM-paradigms. The capacities described by theory of mind 
develop over childhood and consist of several developmental steps (Sodian & Kristen, 
2010), for example, a two and a half year old infant can understand the association between 
someone’s desires and emotional outcomes (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995), whereas false 
belief understanding (i.e., the understanding that a person’s mental representation of reality 
can differ from reality) emerges at the age of four years and older (Sodian & Kristen, 2010). 
At the age of six, children develop an increasing understanding of interpretive frameworks 
(e.g., understanding of the role of social prejudice when interpreting a specific action; 
Pillow, 1991). However, a full grasp of theories and interpretive frameworks for the social 
environment develops continuously through adolescence and even adulthood (Bullock, 
Sodian, & Koerber, 2008). 
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Research has demonstrated that there are various sources from which one can 
extract the necessary information to achieve accurate inferences of a target’s thoughts and 
feelings. Verbal cues – literally spoken words – are the main source of empathic accuracy 
(Hall & Mast, 2007). Non-verbal cues such as body language, facial expressions, tone of 
voice, etcetera can be considered as additional clues. A possible explanation for this finding 
is that people are generally not very good at understanding nonverbal cues as these are often 
misinterpreted, or that people pay attention to the wrong cues (Hartwig & Bond, 2011). 
However, non-verbal cues are particularly important during everyday conversations when 
the target is silent, or trying to hide his or her emotions (e.g., sadness; Ickes, 2006). Within 
the category of non-verbal cues, vocal cues (e.g., voice volume) are the most important for 
empathic accuracy, while visual non-verbal cues (e.g., gesticulation) are of the least use. 
Of course, the individualized knowledge about the target also plays an important role. 
Friends and partners certainly prove to be more accurate than strangers (Stinson & Ickes, 
1992). After all, people develop a person-specific schema that gives them insight into the 
structure and content of the memories of their interaction partner, which facilitates 
accuracy. Perceivers are more accurate for schema-consistent thoughts (e.g., women who 
think of fashion) than for schema-inconsistent thoughts (e.g., women who think of football) 
(Gesn & Ickes, 1999). Additionally, social cognitions or schemas about one’s self, others, 
one’s own interaction behavior, social roles, and stereotypes are also a source of empathic 
accuracy as they facilitate the interpretation of (non-)verbal cues, especially when 
interacting with an unknown target (Ickes & Hodges, 2013). 
 
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 
In everyday life, it is often said that some people are better than others in inferring 
a target’s thoughts and feelings. This assumption suggests that empathic accuracy is either 
a stable trait inherent to certain individuals or an ability that develops over time. Hence, 
empirical evidence for this assumption should be found in the possibility to generate a list 
of characteristics inherent to a “good” perceiver. Therefore, we will present a brief 
exhaustive review of the research findings on this subject, classified by perceiver and target 
characteristics (see Hodges, Lewis, & Ickes, 2015 for an overview). 
Ǥ
. Even though one would expect that perceivers who score 
high on measures of interpersonal sensitivity should also achieve higher levels of empathic 
accuracy, studies have generally found some contradictory results. For example, one study 
found that there were no significant associations between empathic accuracy measured by 
the DI-paradigm and a subject’s performance on the Diagnostic Analysis of Nonverbal 
Accuracy (DANVA; Nowicki & Duke, 1994) – in which individuals have to assign 
emotions to facial expressions – or the Interpersonal Perception Task (IPT; Costanzo & 
Archer, 1989) – in which one must evaluate interactions based on (non-)verbal cues (Lewis 
& Hodges, 2009). The Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1983), one of the most 
frequently used self-report questionnaires measuring empathy, has also been found to not 
be unambiguously correlated with empathic accuracy. The subscales that are conceptually 
most in line with the concept of empathic accuracy, namely perspective-taking and 
empathic concern, are either not correlated with or enjoy an ambiguous relationship with 
empathic accuracy (Stinson & Ickes, 1992). Scores on the Balanced Emotional Empathy 
Scale (BEES; Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972), which measures the degree of empathy for 
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emotions, are merely predictive of higher levels of accuracy measured in the SS-paradigm, 
even though targets showed a relatively high degree of expressiveness (Zaki, Bolger, & 
Ochsner, 2008). In summary, these self-report measures are not consistently related with 
levels of empathic accuracy. The most obvious explanation for these findings is that people 
seem rather poor at assessing their own ability to accurately infer others’ minds. 
   ǤThe investigation of the link between intelligence 
quotient (IQ) and empathic accuracy also yielded mixed results. On the one hand, IQ and 
academic performance were found to be significant predictors of empathic accuracy in 
students (Ickes et al.,1990; Ponnet, Buysse, Roeyers, & De Clercq, 2008), but other studies 
have found no or a limited association (e.g., Ponnet, Roeyers, Buysse, De Clercq, & Van 
der Heyden, 2004). A further study by Ickes et al. (2000) found that verbal intelligence is 
a potential predictor of empathic accuracy but only in men. 
  Ǥ In line with the assumption that certain people are more 
empathically accurate than others, another dominating (gender) stereotype is that women 
are more empathic than men. A review article (Hodges, Laurent, & Lewis, 2011) claims 
that although some studies have found significant gender differences in empathic accuracy 
in favor of women, others have failed to find such differences. However, men have not 
performed better than women in any of the studies of gender differences. Another important 
remark is that women generally seemed more accurate than men if the gender stereotype 
was triggered or explicitly evaluated. This motivates women – but not men – to put more 
effort in to making accurate inferences and trying to meet the expectations of the female 
gender role (Ickes, Gesn, & Graham, 2000). Women do appear to be better at inferring the 
emotional significance of non-verbal cues (Hall, 1984), but this is only one component of 
empathic accuracy. Taken together, we can conclude that there are no generally accepted 
͝  
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gender differences in empathic accuracy because the significant findings are rather limited, 
and the differences appear to be mainly motivational in nature. 
In summary, the search for perceiver characteristics predicting empathic accuracy 
has yielded mixed results. On the one hand, some promising studies have found 
characteristics that can explain up to 60 percent of the variance in empathic accuracy, but 
these findings could often not be replicated and more recent studies have often found 
contradictory results. It is noteworthy here that most studies that have found significant 
results have measured empathic accuracy using the SS-paradigm, whereas few or no 
perceiver characteristics have been found to be significant when using the DI-paradigm. 
Ǥ
The lack of evidence for stable and unambiguous perceiver characteristics led to a 
shift from a search for predictors stemming from the perceiver to the investigation of 
potential target characteristics. This research focused on individual differences between 
targets that might help determine how easy or difficult it is for a perceiver to infer the 
thoughts and feelings of that particular target. 
ǤThis concept refers to the fact that the perceiver’s accuracy largely 
depends on how “readable” or transparent the target’s thoughts and feelings are in 
comparison to other targets. Several studies have operationalized this readability by using 
an objective index that rates how difficult it is to infer a target’s thoughts and feelings (i.e., 
the inferential difficulty measure; e.g., Marangoni, Garcia, Ickes, & Teng, 1995). This 
index is determined by independent observers who rate the clarity of the (non)verbal cues 
emitted by the target (e.g., verbal content, facial expression). This readability index has 
been found to significantly correlate with empathic accuracy, suggesting that some targets 
are less/more transparent than others. Readability had an impact on empathic accuracy that 
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was most significant for interaction partners who did not know each other in advance and 
thus could only rely on the target’s cues as a basis from which to make empathic inferences 
(because there is no prior information or knowledge about the target). 
ǤAn interesting but rarely examined question concerns the existence 
of gender differences in the readability of targets. Hall (1984) found that women emit more 
obvious nonverbal cues than men, but, in contradiction with this, a study of Simpson et al. 
(2011) found that men were easier to read. A suggested explanation for these contradictory 
findings is that men might compensate for their lack of expressiveness and self-disclosure 
by showing greater consistency between their verbal cues and mental content (thoughts, 
ideas, etcetera). 
In summary, the study of target characteristics has produced more promising 
findings than the study of perceiver characteristics. Moreover, the target-variance has 
proved to be significantly bigger than the perceiver-variance, which indicates that certain 
features of the target are more influential to a perceiver’s empathic accuracy than 
characteristics of the perceiver (Ickes et al., 2000). Nevertheless, the discussed results need 
to be replicated, generalized and extended. 
Ǥ 
In addition to the stable perceiver- and target characteristics discussed above, 
research has also described situational, and in particular motivational, aspects as being 
predictive of the level of empathic accuracy. The extent to which a perceiver is motivated 
to accurately infer the thoughts and feelings of their interaction partner influences the level 
of accuracy, independently of other factors. 
͝  
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  Ǥ The situational motives that have been explored in 
experimental research include money, the prospect of success with attractive women, social 
recognition, etcetera. Although one would expect a logical and straightforward connection 
between motives and the level of empathic accuracy, this research has also revealed mixed 
results. For example, Klein and Hodges (2001), found that a financial reward led to greater 
accuracy in the DI-paradigm; this finding is in contrast with another study that found no 
effect of rewards including monetary incentives (Hall et al., 2009). A potential explanation 
for these contradictory results can be found in the operationalization of empathic accuracy. 
If the DI-paradigm is used, the interaction partners generally seem to base their empathic 
inferences on verbal cues, in contrast to other accuracy paradigms in which nonverbal cues 
have more salience and need to be interpreted. The interpretation of non-verbal cues can be 
considered as a process that is predominantly subconscious and automatic, in contrast to 
the processing of verbal cues. If an individual is motivated to make accurate inferences to 
obtain a reward, the interpretation of non-verbal cues may become more conscious, which 
possibly decreases its efficiency and consequently leads to a decrease rather than increase 
in levels of empathic accuracy (Hall, 2011). 
ǦǤ The motivation of the perceiver appears to depend partially on 
their personality and attachment style. Individuals who have a higher need to belong to a 
social group and to feel connected with others perform better on the SS-task (Need to 
Belong Scale; Pickett, Gardner, & Knowles, 2004). This might be because being sensitive 
and receptive to thoughts and feelings of others is important in order to create and maintain 
social relationships. Anxiously attached women have also been found to be more accurate 
at detecting the thoughts and feelings of their partners in relationship-threatening situations 
(e.g., when the partner is being interviewed by a physically attractive women; Dugosh, 
2001; more details on the influence of threat are described below). Conversely, securely 
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attached women seemed less accurate when placed in threatening situations; possibly 
because an (unconscious) motive triggers inaccuracy for their partner’s threatening 
thoughts and feelings in order to protect and maintain the relationship (Simpson, Oriña, & 
Ickes, 2003). People with an avoidant attachment style were generally found to be less 
accurate, independent of the situation (Simpson et al., 2011). 
Ǥ Accuracy also appears to increase if the target interaction partner 
is of the opposite sex and physically attractive. Presumably, this is because the perceiver 
might be more motivated to get to know such a target, resulting in greater empathic 
accuracy (Ickes et al., 1990). However, research in this area has been relatively limited to 
date, although other target variables such as a challenging level of intelligence or 
charismatic personality have also been suggested to have a positive influence on the 
motivation of the perceiver to be accurate (Ickes & Hodges, 2013). 
 Ǥ Research on relationship motives distinguishes between 
short-term or proximal motives such as understanding the partner during conflict 
(Kilpatrick, Bissonette, & Rusbult, 2002) or supporting the partner in stressful periods 
(Verhofstadt, Davis, & Ickes, 2011), and long-term or distal motivators such as 
commitment to the partner and the relationship and long-term stability of the relationship 
(Simpson et al., 2003). Especially in the pre- and early relationship phases, empathic 
accuracy is important to establish and strengthen the relationship by enabling the partners 
to get to know each other and to accurately estimate each other’s interest and commitment 
(Hodges et al., 2015). Hence, not all relationship motives result in increased levels of 
empathic accuracy. For example, empathic accuracy and relationship duration appeared to 
be negatively correlated, presumably because partners develop a partner-specific schema 
over the course of a relationship and, therefore, start making automatic inferences based on 
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͝  
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this schema, paying less attention to the actual cues. In addition, a negative correlation 
between empathic accuracy and relationship satisfaction was found, but only in relation-
threatening contexts (see Ickes & Simpson, 2001; more information below). 
These findings lead to the conclusion that perceivers can in some ways control or 
manage their empathic accuracy, dialing it up or down depending on the proximal or distal 
motives and goals at play given the situation or context (see Smith, Ickes, Hall, & Hodges, 
2011). 

Theory and research suggest that partners must be relatively accurate when inferring 
the specific content of each other’s thoughts and feelings if they want to effectively 
coordinate their individual and shared actions, and maintain a satisfying and stable 
relationship (Ickes & Hodges, 2013). Therefore, a lot of research on empathic accuracy has 
been conducted within the context of intimate relationships. In what follows, four important 
lines of empathic accuracy in intimate relationships research will be discussed, concluding 
with the identification of important unanswered questions on this matter.
ǯ
On a daily basis, partners are faced with stressors that have their source either 
outside or inside the relationship (Bodenmann, 2005). How couples deal with these daily 
challenges (i.e., partner’s daily coordination) has been studied within two distinct research 
fields. The first of these has involved the examination of couples’ support processes, which 
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can be divided into positive or negative forms of support, and individual or dyadic efforts. 
The second area refers to how couples solve stressors that lead to disagreement or conflict. 
During both support and conflict episodes, partners need to coordinate their (shared) 
actions in order to cope successfully with these daily stressors – actions that have a greater 
chance of succeeding if partners achieve higher levels of empathic accuracy. Indeed, 
partners’ level of empathic accuracy, as measured during an interaction in which a personal 
problem experienced by one of the partners was discussed, appeared to be positively 
associated with the provision of instrumental support (e.g., giving advice) and negatively 
associated with the provision of negative types of support (e.g., criticizing the partner, 
minimizing the problem) (Devoldre, Davis, Verhofstadt, & Buysse, 2010; Verhofstadt et 
al., 2008; 2016). Additionally, the level of empathic accuracy also seemed to play an 
important role in adequate problem-solving during partners’ conflict interactions. Partners 
need to be accommodating – suppressing destructive impulses and transforming them into 
constructive behavior – in order to find a solution and to avoid further escalation of conflict 
(Rusbult, Verette, Whitney, Slovik, & Lipkus, 1991). Both men and women exhibit more 
accommodative behavior if they are more empathically accurate during conflict 
interactions with their partner (Kilpatrick et al., 2002). 
Although this previous research suggests that empathic accuracy may help partners 
to demonstrate accommodative pro-relationship behavior during interactions, it seems 
reasonable to assume that people might also be motivated to accurately infer their partners’ 
current thoughts and feelings for more “personal reasons”. But why so? Because accurate 
insight into the thoughts and feelings of a partner during conflict might enable someone to 
predict what kind of reaction to anticipate and which “buttons to push” in order to convince 
or influence their partner, thus achieving a better (personally desired) outcome. However, 
͝  
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to the best of our knowledge, research identifying a possible link between the ways in which 
partners demand change and their level of empathic accuracy, has not yet been conducted.   

Throughout the discussions touched upon in our introduction, it appears that most 
of the previous research in this field has supported the intuitive belief that mutual 
understanding plays a crucial role in intimate relationships, and more specifically in 
relationship well-being (e.g., Neff & Karney, 2005; Pollmann & Finkenauer, 2009) and 
adjustment (e.g., Laurenceau, Barrett, & Pietromonaco, 1998; Lemay, Clark, & Feeney, 
2007; Noller & Ruzzene, 1991; Swann, 1984). However, Pollmann and Finkenauer (2009) 
suggested that combining the results of these studies overlooks an important distinction, 
namely the difference between actually being understood (i.e., actual understanding, 
referring to the perceiver’s accuracy at inferring the specific content of their partner’s 
thoughts and feelings) and feeling understood (i.e., perceived understanding, referring to a 
target’s subjective rating of the degree to which they feel understood by their partner). More 
specifically, some studies have measured mutual understanding within relationships by 
documenting partners’ subjective self-reports whereas other researchers have relied on 
objective performance measures of actual understanding (e.g., empathic accuracy). Only a 
few studies have investigated the particular importance of perceived understanding and 
demonstrated a positive association with beneficial relationship outcomes such as 
adjustment, intimacy and trust. Perceived understanding has also been found to be 
predictive of long-term relationship well-being (Pollman & Finkenauer, 2009; Reis, Clark, 
& Holmes, 2004).  
However, there has been no corroborating research exploring the association 
between actual and perceived understanding. To date, no answer has been provided to the 
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following questions: Is someone’s perception of being understood by their partner based 
on the partner’s level of actual understanding? What is the unique contribution of both 
actual and perceived understanding to positive relationship outcomes?  

Another important question is: How well are partners able to actually understand 
each other? Previous research has tried to answer this question by investigating 
understanding as a function of specific relationship characteristics (e.g., duration, 
satisfaction; Thomas, Fletcher, & Lange, 1997) and in several relational contexts (e.g., 
support interactions; Verhofstadt et al., 2016). These studies have indicated that partners 
are, at best, only moderately good at inferring the other partner’s thoughts and feelings. 
According to Ickes (2011), empathic accuracy averages around 30-35% for married 
partners. Other research has found even lower empathic accuracy among partners, 
averaging around 20% (Verhofstadt et al., 2008; 2016). Logically, this means that partners 
are incorrect 65-80% of the time when they are inferring the other’s thoughts and feelings. 
Additionally, clinical observation has revealed that couples seeking therapy frequently 
complain about a lack of mutual understanding and “misreading” in their relationship 
(Gurman, 2008).  
A few questions that lead on from this are: How are these misunderstandings 
created? Why are partners “misreading” each other to this extent? The communication 
literature provides us with some indications of why certain “misreadings” or 
misunderstandings between partners may occur. One of the basic axioms of communication 
is that all communication has both a content and a relationship meaning (Watzlawick, 
Beavin-Bavelas, & Jackson, 1967), with the former referring to declarative content and the 
latter to relational states (e.g., respect, distance, antagonism) implied by the act of 
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communication. The axiom suggests that partners will not only think about the explicit 
topic of disagreement (e.g., cleaning, work commitments, sex), or what Watzlawick and 
colleagues have called the content level of communication, they will also think about the 
process of interaction and what it implies about the relationship. A common difference in 
partner perspectives during couple conflict, referred to as content-process confusion 
(Sillars, Roberts, Leonard, & Dun, 2000), occurs when one partner interprets the interaction 
in terms of the ostensible content or topic while the other partner thinks about the process 
of interaction and associated relational meanings. Furthermore, misunderstandings may not 
only occur at the thematic level, as some indications for misunderstanding at the affective 
level were also identified. Sentiment override theory suggests that the general feeling of 
relationship (dis)satisfaction has a significant impact on situational perceptions and 
emotions (e.g., Fincham, Garnier, Gano-Phillips, & Osborne, 1995; Verhofstadt, Buysse, 
Ickes, De Clercq, & Peene, 2005; Weiss, 1980). More specifically, a general perception of 
the relationship develops over time and establishes a cognitive relationship schema, which 
in turn influences thoughts and feelings during interactions in a self-confirming fashion 
(e.g., Fincham, 2001; Holtzwordth-Munroe & Jacobson, 1985). Therefore, a partner’s 
ongoing thoughts and feelings during interactions will be affected by their general 
relationship (dis)satisfaction and will also affect the inferred affective tone of their partner’s 
thoughts and feelings. To date, however, no research has been conducted on the 
misunderstandings underlying empathic inaccuracy. Therefore, little is known about why 
partners are only capable of low-to-moderate accuracy when inferring each other’s thoughts 
and feelings. 
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As discussed in the section about motivational aspects, research has found that 
situational, and in particular motivational, aspects are predictive of the level of empathic 
accuracy. The extent to which a perceiver is motivated to accurately infer the thoughts and 
feelings of their interaction partner influences the level of accuracy independently of other 
factors. Furthermore, previous research has suggested that empathic accuracy has both the 
potential to harm as well as the potential to harmonize a relationship. These observations 
were the basis of a model developed by Ickes and Simpson (1997), and their theoretical 
framework stimulated further research in this area with the intention of verifying the 
underlying assumptions and predictions stemming from their model. In what follows, the 
studies considered as forming the basis of the model will be briefly discussed. Afterwards, 
the model will be explained and illustrated with empirical research leading to the 
identification of some important assumptions requiring further investigation. 
     
Ǥ In the understanding literature – preceding the introduction of research on 
empathic accuracy and the DI-paradigm by Ickes and colleagues (1990) – a positive trend 
between relationship adjustment and understanding was observed (see Sillars & Scott, 
1983). In this overview, the assumption that congruency between partners’ perceptions 
(i.e., presence of a shared perceptual reality) is central to relationship adjustment is well 
documented. The authors refer to studies that had found positive associations between 
adjustment and understanding of the partners’ attitudes, expectations, and self-perceptions 
(e.g., Christensen & Wallace, 1976; Corsini, 1956; Dymond, 1954; Ferguson & Allen, 
1978; Guthrie & Noller, 1988; Laing, Philipson, & Lee; 1966; Luckey, 1960; Stuckert, 
1963). Subsequently, a dominant narrative of advice concerning couples’ communication 
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strategies emerged, emphasizing the importance of self-disclosure to facilitate mutual 
understanding (Bochner, 1981). Furthermore, studies of distressed or less-adjusted 
relationships have further elaborated upon this advice as they have found that partners’ 
perceptions of communication and attributions about each other are biased and likely to be 
incongruent with their intentions, suggesting that distressed partners are either unable to 
express their intended meanings or are biased in reporting their intentions (Gottman, 
Markman, & Notarius, 1977; Madden & Janoff-Bulman, 1981). Thus, the general claim of 
these studies states that more understanding is good for relationships.   
     
ǤAlthough this general claim has been endorsed by many practitioners and 
researchers, some authors expressed their concerns. They suggested that increasing 
openness and reducing benevolent misconceptions by both partners might also have a 
downside (Bochner, 1981; Parks, 1981). Several studies have indeed reinforced this 
concern by identifying conditions in which understanding is associated with conflict and 
dissatisfaction (e.g., Sillars, 1981; 1985; Sillars & Parry, 1982; Sillars, Pike, Jones, & 
Redmon, 1983; Sillars & Scott, 1983). First, empathic accuracy might expose 
irreconcilable differences between partners’ perspectives, a condition in which further 
understanding will not lead to the convergence of these perspectives but will instead 
increase the levels of conflict or dissatisfaction. Secondly, empathic accuracy might also 
reveal benign misconceptions that should be maintained as they have the intention of 
stimulating positive feelings or stability. And last of all, empathic accuracy might disclose 
crude or harmful truths held by the target that can appear as an immediate or implicit threat 
to the perceiver’s self-image or relationship. These conditions feed the assumption that the 
illusion of similarity (e.g., projection; Sillars, 1985; Sillars, Weisberg, Burggraf, & Zietlow, 
1990; assumed similarity; Kenny, 1994) and the illusion of understanding (e.g., perceived 
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empathic effort; Cohen, Schulz, Weis, & Waldinger, 2012; perceived understanding; 
Pollman & Finkenauer, 2009) may have more positive effects in certain circumstances than 
actual understanding. For example, perceived agreement has been positively associated 
with relationship satisfaction, consensus, and affection whereas actual understanding was 
negatively associated with these relationship outcomes in the same study (Sillars et al., 
1983). Hence, should we abandon the assumption that actual understanding is beneficial 
for relationships? Ickes and Simpson (1997; 2001) have presented a nuanced model that 
takes into account both the partners’ motives and the expected outcomes of empathic 
accuracy given the situation, which enables us to integrate the findings on both the positive 
and negative effects of actual understanding. 
ȋȌǤAs shown in Figure 1, the model depicts 
several pathways that predict the level of empathic accuracy, as well as the expected short-
term effects on the perceiver’s individual and relationship well-being. The central aspect 
that determines whether empathic accuracy might have the potential to strengthen versus 
destabilize individual and relationship short-term well-being is the threat-potential of the 
given situation (i.e., potential “danger zones”, as questioned in the first step of the model). 
If the situation is not identified as a danger zone then the perceiver will generally not feel 
threatened, the levels of empathic accuracy will be average to high, and they will generally 
positively affect well-being. However, if the situation is perceived as potentially 
threatening, empathic accuracy might have unwanted implications depending on how 
ambiguous the target’s thoughts and feelings are (cf. readability). Unambiguous thoughts 
do not require a lot of empathic effort to infer; hence, empathic accuracy will be moderately 
high (e.g., if a partner confesses he or she has cheated, the harmful content of this 
individual’s thoughts cannot be neglected by being less accurate). The model indicates that 
a perceiver who feels highly threatened – which will probably be the case in the previous 
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example – will achieve a moderately high level of accuracy and consequently, both 
individual and relationship well-being will drop (e.g., instability of self-esteem and/or 
relationship, distress, feelings of anxiety, anger or sadness). Perceivers who feel moderately 
threatened by their target’s unambiguous thoughts or feelings will be highly empathically 
accurate and consequently, this might also have a distressing or destabilizing effect on their 
individual and relationship well-being, although this effect might not be as prominent as 
for the highly threatened perceivers. The last pathway of the model describes a situation in 
which motivated empathic inaccuracy should be most evident as the target’s mind is 
ambiguous. In this context, the role of empathic accuracy as a protective mechanism 
becomes clear as the target’s thoughts and feelings can be avoided (i.e., if the perceiver 
makes no effort to accurately infer these ambiguous thoughts they will remain unclear). 
Therefore, when a perceiver feels highly threatened his or her level of empathic accuracy 
will drop, which may protect their individual and relational well-being in the short term. 
When the perceiver feels less threatened, however, his or her level of empathic accuracy 
will be moderate which may result in a short-term experience of distress.  
In summary, the model succeeded at integrating the complex findings about the 
mixed effects of empathic accuracy on short-term outcomes without denying the important 
role of accurate understanding in close relationships, especially for the long-term well-
being and stability of the relationship. Some nuance in the mainly positive image of 
empathic accuracy was achieved by identifying the moderating effect of the threat-potential 
of a given situation on the association between empathic accuracy, and situational well-
being. The most innovative aspect of this model is the introduction of empathic inaccuracy 
as a short-term protective mechanism that implies that perceivers might be motivated to be 
inaccurate – without making statements about how conscious and autonomous these 
motives are. However, research explicitly testing the assumptions that underlie this model 
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has not yet been conducted. Therefore, further investigation is needed to test whether (a) 
partners’ levels of empathic accuracy are indeed manageable, (b) perceived threat is linked 
to partners’ levels of empathic accuracy (dialing it up or down), and (c) empathic 
inaccuracy may have a protective function for partners’ short-term well-being. 

The complexity of the role of empathic accuracy in intimate relationships revealed 
by previous research underscores the need to gain a more in-depth understanding of the 
concept. Therefore, a large-scale observational study called the “UGent Family Lab Couple 
Study” was designed for the purpose of the current dissertation. The study combined an 
extensive set of online questionnaires and an observational session consisting of an 
observed dyadic interaction task and a video-review task. The reasons to opt for one large-
scale study instead of multiple smaller studies are both practical as well as 
theoretical/methodological in nature.  
First, we wanted to investigate our research questions within a large sample of 
couples to meet the often encountered power-issue (due to a smaller sample size; e.g., see 
Verhofstadt et al., 2008; 2016). Second, the current dissertation is mainly explorative in 
nature as there is no previous research available that has clearly mapped the determinants 
and outcomes of empathic accuracy. This limited empirical basis implies that we only have 
a few indications on which variables (not) to include in our studies, and confirmatory 
research is not at issue given the fact that there is quasi no previous research to replicate. 
The same reasoning also accounts for our third argument as there is also no overarching 
theoretical model concerning the role of empathic accuracy or understanding in general, 
during times of conflict in couples, nor any other similar model that could guide our 
͝  
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predictions. Finally, an observational study provides detailed, representable, objective data 
on an abundant amount of highly relevant individual/couple characteristics, but is also 
labor-intensive, costly, and time-consuming.  
Furthermore, our study is not limited to an observational paradigm only, but used a 
multi-method approach (i.e., a combination of global self-reports, observational data, 
behavior ratings, and interaction-based reports) which integrates both general and 
situational measures of the variables of interest. An important downside of working with 
one large sample is the matter of generalizability of the findings that will emerge, as we 
cannot rule out the fact that our findings represent sample-characteristics rather than 
universal associations. However, providing an answer to our research questions (see below) 
is an necessary explorative first step in order to encourage and stimulate further research 
regarding the current topic.  
We chose to study empathic accuracy in the context of couples’ conflict for four 
reasons. First, as outlined in the first line of research, disagreements and conflicts are 
inevitable in intimate relationships because each partner has his or her own expectations, 
goals, needs, and perspectives. Conflict arises when one person pursues these goals in such 
a way that it interferes with the other partner’s goals (Lewin, 1948). How partners behave, 
think, and feel during relationship conflict has been an important topic of psychological 
investigation for many decades, as conflict is an important domain of interaction that occurs 
on a mundane basis (see Bradbury & Karney, 2014 for an overview). Although it has been 
intensively studied, some important aspects remain to be investigated, such as the role of 
empathic accuracy on partners’ conflict behavior. Second, understanding each other is 
crucial for partners to coordinate their daily actions, especially in the context of conflict. In 
order to effectively discuss and resolve a conflict, partners must achieve a shared focus on 
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the ‘heart of the matter’ of their disagreement, and they should be able to take each other’s 
perspective in order to understand the other partner’s reasoning on the topic. However, 
previous research has suggested that this process can prove challenging during conflict. So, 
our third reason for studying the context of conflict is the apparent discrepancy between 
the need to understand each other to solve the conflict on the one hand, and the fact that 
conflict as a context tends to facilitate misunderstanding on the other. Finally, relationship 
conflict can create an opportunity to reconcile differences in partners’ goals or opinions, 
although, due to these conflicting goals and opinions, conflict may also trigger high levels 
of relationship- or self-threat, which will, again, hinder perspective-taking processes.   
Taken together, the context of couples’ conflicts appears to be ideal to study our 
research questions, as actual understanding (i.e., empathic accuracy) seems both crucial 
and challenging in this context. In what follows, the specific objectives of the current 
project will be situated in the relevant chapters within this dissertation and discussed in 
greater detail.
 ͝ Ǧ       
ǯ
The first objective of the current dissertation was to examine the association 
between partners’ empathic accuracy and their conflict behavior, especially looking at the 
degree to which they display demanding behavior during conflict interactions with their 
partner. As outlined above, previous research has already indicated that the level of 
empathic accuracy plays an important role in adequate couple-focused problem-solving 
(i.e., accommodative behavior; Kilpatrick et al., 2002; social support; Verhofstadt et al., 
2016). However, more individual-focused problem-solving efforts might also benefit from 
higher levels of empathic accuracy. 
͝  
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Individuals who desire particular changes in their partner’s behavior, opinions, and 
values or in the status quo of their relationship, are likely to initiate a conversation to work 
towards this desired change. Generally, these conversation-initiating partners are found to 
show more demanding behavior, as they are motivated to reach their intended goal 
(Christensen & Pasch, 1993; Eldridge & Christensen, 2002). Furthermore, as discussed 
above, research has demonstrated that it might be adaptive to adjust the level of empathic 
accuracy depending on characteristics of the situation, assuming that someone might be 
motivated to be more or less accurate when inferring the feelings of their partner depending 
on the occasion. So, because the conflict initiator’s demanding behavior is driven by a 
strong motive to confront the source of a problem/disagreement and to resolve it by 
changing their partner, the relationship, the situation, or any combination of these elements, 
it seems likely that this motive might lead to an attempt to accurately infer the partner’s 
current thoughts and feelings about the issue(s) at the heart of the conflict. Consequently, 
partners who have more demanding interaction styles might therefore be more likely to 
attempt to “read” their partner’s minds in ways that enable them to exert more influence on 
their partner and thereby achieve a better outcome for themselves. Even in satisfying 
intimate relationships, partners who are more motivated to resolve a conflict by effecting 
the change they desire, should find this strategy useful.  
In Chapter 2, the assumptions that (1) partners who display more demanding 
behavior will be more empathically accurate, and (2) both demanding behavior and 
empathic accuracy are two behavioral indicators of a shared underlying motivation by the 
conflict initiator to reach a certain goal, were tested by the means of two empirical studies 
consisting of an observed conflict interaction and subsequent video-review task. The first 
study tested our assumptions in a subsample of previously collected data consisting of 26 
cohabiting/married partners. The second study tried to replicate the findings of the first 
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study in the sample collected for the purpose of the whole dissertation, which consisted of 
155 cohabiting/married couples. 
 ͞ Ǧ       

The second objective of the current dissertation focused on the association between 
empathic accuracy and perceived understanding. As stipulated above, there is no previous 
research that has examined whether an individual’s feeling of being understood by their 
partner (i.e., perceived understanding) is (partially) anchored in or based on reality. If this 
were to be the case, we should be able to find that an individual’s empathic accuracy 
percentage (i.e., actual understanding) is related to his or her partner’s scores on measures 
of perceived understanding. Previous studies that have tested a similar assumption 
regarding support processes in intimate relationships found that perceived support is more 
strongly related to relationship satisfaction than actual provided support (e.g., Collins & 
Feeney, 2000; Cutrona, Hessling, & Suhr, 1997).  
In addition to someone’s perception of their partner’s actual understanding 
performance, a second issue is to what extent someone is aware of his or her own actual 
understanding performance. Previous studies have shown that people are not very 
proficient at estimating their own general capacity for perspective-taking, as is reflected in 
a lack of significant associations between perceivers’ levels of actual understanding (i.e., 
empathic accuracy) and questionnaires assessing the perception of their general capacity 
for empathy (e.g., Davis, 1980; Laurent & Hodges, 2009; Stinson & Ickes, 1992). These 
findings raise the question of whether people are equally bad at estimating how well they 
understand the situational thoughts and feelings of people with whom they interact, 
including their partners. So, on top of a partner’s level of perceived understanding, little is 
͝  
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also known about an individual’s level of assumed understanding in terms of their own 
subjective reporting of how well they assume they have understood their partner. 
In Chapter 3, it was examined if partners’ objective levels of understanding (i.e., 
empathic accuracy) were associated with estimates of their own understanding performance 
(i.e., assumed understanding) and with their partner’s reports of feeling understood (i.e., 
perceived understanding). Additionally, it was examined if both partners’ levels of actual 
understanding and perceived understanding were associated with their level of dyadic 
adjustment. These associations were tested in the sample of 155 cohabiting/married 
partners described above, by the means of an observed conflict interaction followed by 
post-interaction self-report measures and a video-review task. Actor-Partner 
Interdependent Modeling was used to test (1) the association between empathic accuracy 
and assumed understanding (actor-effect), (2) the association between empathic accuracy 
and perceived understanding (partner-effect), and (3) the unique contribution of actual and 
perceived understanding to dyadic adjustment (both actor and partner effects).  
 ͟ Ǧ       
ȋȌ
The third objective of this dissertation was to investigate the low-to-moderate levels 
of partners’ empathic accuracy scores described above, and potential misunderstandings 
underlying this score. More specifically, we wanted to provide an in-depth analysis of the 
content of partners’ thoughts in addition to a merely quantitative analysis of empathic 
accuracy (i.e., percentage score) by examining partners’ direct and meta-perspectives 
during a conflict interaction. Direct perspectives refer to an individual’s own on-going 
stream of thoughts whereas meta-perspectives refer to an individual’s inferences about their 
partner’s thoughts. Previous research on communication in intimate relationships has 
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provided some suggestions about potential misunderstandings associated with empathic 
inaccuracy. At the thematic level, Sillars and colleagues (2000) pointed out that content-
process-confusion may occur if one partner interprets the interaction in terms of the 
ostensible content or topic while the other partner thinks about the process of the interaction 
and its associated relational meanings. At the affective level, sentiment override theory 
(Verhofstadt et al., 2005; Weiss, 1980) suggests that partners’ own and inferred thoughts 
and feelings might be affected by their general feeling of relationship (dis)satisfaction. 
However, research involving content analyses of the cognitions of intimate relationship 
partners is very scarce.  
In Chapter 4, a content analysis of partners’ direct and meta-perspectives during 
conflict interactions was conducted by classifying partners’ thoughts into several categories 
based on the Interaction Cognition Coding Scheme (e.g., content thoughts, process 
thoughts). Afterwards, partners’ direct perspectives and their meta-perspectives were 
compared both at a thematic and an affective level. Thereafter, the association between the 
identified misunderstandings (at both levels) and empathic inaccuracy was investigated by 
the means of several multi-level models.  
͠Ǧ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The fourth objective of the current dissertation focused on the role of ability versus 
motivation in empathic (in)accuracy. As outlined above, motivated empathic (in)accuracy 
occurs when someone has “an incentive to (in)accurately infer what his/her interaction 
partner is thinking/feeling, resulting in an empathic accuracy score that is significantly 
lower/higher than those exhibited by others in the same situation” (Cuperman, Howland, 
Ickes, & Simpson, 2011, p. 216). In summary, both correlational and experimental data 
have shown that an important source of the variance in empathic accuracy is accounted for 
͝  
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by the perceiver’s (in)accuracy motivation. Furthermore, theories of social cognition 
assume that reasoning processes are guided by both an accuracy motive (i.e., motive to 
reach an accurate conclusion) and an esteem-regulatory motive (i.e., motive to reach a 
desirable/esteem-enhancing conclusion) (Kunda, 1990), which has been further elaborated 
upon in Ickes and Simpson’s empathic accuracy model (1997; see above). Additionally, 
the question has been raised of whether self-protection might also play an important role in 
this esteem-regulatory motive on top of the suggested relationship-protection motive 
described in this model. Therefore, we aimed to investigate if both motives play an equal 
role in the process of empathic (in)accuracy, above and beyond a partner’s perspective-
taking abilities. 
In Chapter 5, the last empirical study is described. This study attempted to draw 
conclusions about the role of partners’ abilities on the one hand, and the role of implicit 
(relationship- and self-protecting) motives, on the other, in empathic (in)accuracy. Ability 
was measured by rating partners’ baseline levels of empathic accuracy using the SS-
paradigm (where the target is an unknown interaction partner), and implicit motives were 
measured by comparing partners’ levels of empathic accuracy during non-threatening 
episodes and highly threatening episodes of conflict interactions utilizing the DI-paradigm 
(where the target is their own partner). Pre- and post-interaction self-reports were used to 
assess changes in partners’ situational relationship and personal well-being. Structural 
Equation Modeling (SEM) was used to assess the effect of empathic accuracy on short-
term well-being, allowing for correlations in the outcomes between men and women. 
Finally, Chapter 6 comprises a general discussion with an integrated overview of 
the main findings of the different studies. Limitations of the studies are discussed together 
with recommendations for future research. Implications for clinical practice as well as 
theoretical reflections are also outlined. 
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It should be noted that the present dissertation consists of several papers, which 
have been published, are under editorial review, or have been submitted for publication. 
Given that each of the papers should be able to stand on its own, the text of some of the 
chapters may partially overlap.
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1 Study 1 based on Hinnekens, C., Ickes, W., De Schryver, M., & Verhofstadt, L. L. (2016). Demand 
behavior and empathic accuracy in observed conflict interactions in couples. The Journal of Social 
Psychology, 156, 437-443. doi: 10.1080/00224545.2015.1115386 
Study 2 based on Hinnekens, C., Vanhee, G., De Schryver, M., Ickes, W., & Verhofstadt, L. L. 
(2016). Empathic accuracy and observed demand behavior in couples. Frontiers in Psychology, 7. 
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01370
͞

͜͡


The current studies sought to extend the research on motivated empathic accuracy 
by exploring whether intimate partners who are highly motivated to induce change in their 
partner during conflict will be more empathically accurate than partners who are less 
motivated. In Study 1, 26 committed couples provided questionnaire data and participated 
in a laboratory experiment which consisted of a videotaped conflict interaction and a video-
review task. The results partially confirmed our hypothesis as more blaming behavior was 
associated with higher levels of empathic accuracy, irrespective of whether one was the 
conflict initiator or not. The results also showed a two-way interaction indicating that 
initiators who applied more pressure on their partners to change were less empathically 
accurate than initiators who applied less pressure, whereas their partners could counter this 
pressure when they could accurately “read” the initiator’s thoughts and feelings. Study 2 
tried to replicate and extend these results by including a larger sample of 155 couples. A 
similar trend between the role of conflict initiator and blame behavior was found. 
Specifically, more blame behavior by the initiator was associated with less empathic 
accuracy, whereas this negative association was reversed when the participant was not the 
initiator. These results suggest that applying too much demand behavior when initiating a 
conflict may lead to an empathic disadvantage, and to a strong ‘counter-demanding’ 
reaction from the other partner who accurately understands the initiator’s thoughts and 
feelings. However, as we could not exactly replicate the findings of Study 1, some 
cautiousness is warranted when drawing conclusions. 
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Disagreements and conflicts are inevitable in intimate relationships because each 
partner has his or her own expectations, goals, values, and perspectives (Lewin, 1948). How 
partners behave, think, and feel during relationship conflict has been an important topic of 
psychological investigation for many decades (see Bradbury & Karney, 2014 for an 
overview). Although relationship conflict can be perceived as a threatening or stressing 
event, it can also be viewed as an opportunity to reconcile partners’ different goals or 
opinions, to expose personal needs or desires, or to express concern about the partners’ 
inappropriate behavior or the current status of the relationship. By raising a certain topic of 
disagreement, partners generally want to change the status quo of the relationship or to 
induce a certain change in their partner’s opinion or behavior (Eldridge & Christensen, 
2002). In the literature, this partner is referred to as the conflict initiator or the agent of 
change (e.g., Christensen & Pasch, 1993). This conflict-initiating partner often relies on 
demanding communication, which is defined as the tendency to demand change in a critical 
and blaming manner, for example, by nagging, complaining, criticizing, or “pressing” the 
other. The other partner may react by withdrawing, reflected in avoiding the other partner 
or by terminating or escaping from the conflict (Christensen, 1988).  
A certain level of demand-withdraw behavior is commonly observed during conflict 
interactions, even in satisfied couples (Baucom, McFarland, & Christensen, 2010; 
Eldrigde, Sevier, Jones, Atkins, & Christensen, 2007). However, a polarized pattern of 
demand-withdraw behavior can be associated with relationship distress, power differences 
– and even violence – within the relationship (Sagrestano, Heavey, & Christensen, 1999), 
as well as with relationship dissatisfaction in the long-term (Eldridge & Christensen, 2002).  
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Although some studies have reported a tendency for women to take the demanding 
role and men the withdrawing role (Christensen, 1988; Eldridge & Christensen, 2002), 
other studies have found that the role of initiating a disagreement or the conflict topic per 
se is more predictive of being in the demander role than is gender (Christensen & Heavey, 
1990; Eldridge et al., 2007; Heavey, Layne, & Christensen, 1993). For example, the results 
of a study by Christensen & Heavey (1990) demonstrated a significant women demand/men 
withdraw pattern when women initiated a discussion concerning a relationship issue, while 
another study found a reversed pattern when men selected the topic of discussion 
(Holtzworth-Munroe, Smutzler, & Stuart, 1998). 
Consistent with this conclusion, we assume that a partner who desires change on a 
particular topic is more likely to initiate a conversation to reach this desired change (i.e., 
the conflict initiator, also called the agent of change), and has generally been found to show 
more demanding behavior than the other partner who may react by withdrawing more.  

Empathic accuracy in couples refers to “the extent to which [partners] understand 
each other’s unspoken thoughts or feelings as they spontaneously occur during the course 
of their everyday interactions” (Ickes, 1993, p. 588). Although empathic accuracy refers to 
one’s understanding of the inner world of the other, which is a difficult process to 
operationalize, Ickes and colleagues succeeded in developing a paradigm (i.e., the 
unstructured dyadic interaction paradigm) to measure the interaction partners’ levels of 
empathic accuracy in an objective but naturalistic manner (Ickes, Stinson, Bissonette, & 
Garcia, 1990). Within this paradigm, the perceiver’s level of empathic accuracy is 
determined by coding the degree of similarity between the target’s reported 
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thoughts/feelings during an interaction and the perceiver’s inferences about each of the 
target’s thoughts/feelings.  
This paradigm has been frequently used in studies on the role of motivation in 
partners’ level of empathic (in)accuracy. The results of these studies have provided 
considerable evidence that different forms of motivation – either stable long-term motives 
or more transient, situational-specific motives – play an important role in the perceiver’s 
level of empathic accuracy (Ickes, 2011). This motivation might be relationship-promoting, 
as a certain level of accurate insight into each other is needed when partners want to 
effectively coordinate their individual and shared actions (e.g., in providing adequate 
support; Verhofstadt, Davis, & Ickes, 2011; in reinforcing perceived closeness; Simpson, 
Oriña, & Ickes, 2003; in accommodating behavior during relationship conflict; Bates & 
Samp, 2011; Kilpatrick, Bissonnette, & Rusbult, 2002). Motivation that stimulates the 
intention to be accurate might also stem from individual characteristics, such as being 
encouraged to comply with gender-role stereotypes (i.e., according to which women are 
more empathic; Ickes, Gesn, & Graham, 2000), or partners experiencing a sense of distrust 
reflected in an anxious attachment style (Dugosh, 2001).  
There are some cases, however, in which the perceiving partner is motivated to be 
less accurate, particularly when the other partner (i.e., the target) is likely to be harboring 
thoughts and feelings which, if accurately inferred, would threaten the relationship 
(Simpson, Ickes, & Blackstone, 1995; Simpson et al., 2003). It now appears that intimate 
partners are capable of “managing” their empathic accuracy, dialing it up or down 
depending on the demands of the situation or their own motivations (e.g., Ickes & Simpson, 
1997; Ickes & Simpson, 2001; Smith, Hall, Hodges, & Ickes, 2011). Our current study 
extends the research on motivated accuracy/inaccuracy by exploring the question of 
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whether intimate partners who are highly motivated to induce change in their partner during 
conflicts will be more empathically accurate than partners who are less motivated.  
Consistent with the empirical evidence described above, we expect that a partner 
who desires change on a particular topic is likely to initiate a discussion and behave in a 
way that allows him/her to accomplish this desired change (i.e., by demanding). This same 
individual might also be motivated to accurately infer the partner’s current thoughts and 
feelings about issue(s) at the heart of the conflict. Why? Because the conflict initiator’s 
demanding behavior is driven by a strong motive to confront the source of the 
problem/disagreement and to resolve it by changing the partner, the relationship, the 
situation, or any combination of these elements, it seems likely that this motive might lead 
first to an attempt to accurately infer the partner’s current thoughts and feelings about 
issue(s) at the heart of the conflict. As much as anything else, therefore, what is being 
“demanded” of the partner in this situation is insight into his or her thoughts and feelings.2 
Accurate insight into the thoughts and feelings of the partner during conflict might enable 
one to know what kinds of reactions to anticipate and which “buttons to push” in order to 
convince or change the partner. 

Because greater motivation to be accurate typically leads to greater empathic 
accuracy (Ickes, 2011), partners who have more demanding interaction styles might 
therefore be more likely to “read” their partner’s minds in ways that enable them to exert 
more influence on their partner and thereby achieve a better outcome for themselves. Even 
 
2 Although the primary motives for engaging in demanding behavior in conflict situations are to 
improve one’s own outcomes and relative power in the relationship, such behavior might also 
enhance empathic accuracy because of its potential to further these goals. 
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in satisfying intimate relationships, the partners who are more motivated to resolve a 
conflict by effecting desired change should find this same strategy useful. Consistent with 
this reasoning, we predicted that the partners’ levels of demanding communication during 
a conflict discussion, consisting of “blame” and “pressure for change”, would be positively 
associated with their own levels of empathic accuracy. We also explored whether this 
association was moderated by whether or not the perceiver was the person who initiated 
the conflict.  
Study 1 explored this prediction in a observational lab study in a sample of 26 
cohabiting or married couples. The aim of Study 2 was to replicate and extend the previous 
study by (1) examining a larger sample, (2) integrating the potential effect of gender and 
the corresponding three way-interaction effects as there is more power in Study 2, and (3) 
differentiating between empathic accuracy for feelings and empathic accuracy for thoughts, 
which made it possible to examine the assumed associations with empathic accuracy in a 
more fine-grained way.
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The present data were collected within a broader observational study on support and 
conflict in couples; some results of this study – unrelated to the present research questions 
– have already been published (Verhofstadt, Buysse, Ickes, De Clercq, & Peene, 2005).  
ǤThe recruitment of participants was twofold. First, a general call 
was placed in magazines and newspapers recruiting couples who were willing to participate 
in a research project on close relationships. Second, the research assistants approached 
͞

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
couples in public places such as shopping areas. The inclusion criteria stipulated that the 
participants had to have been in a heterosexual relationship for at least one year and either 
married or cohabiting for at least six months. Couples participated voluntarily and could 
withdraw from the investigation at any time. The sample consisted of 52 partners (age: 
MMen = 36.96 years, SD = 13.24; MWomen = 35.23 years, SD = 12.49) who represented 26 
cohabitating/married heterosexual couples (relationship duration: M = 10.64 years, SD = 
11.58).  
ǤThe couples who expressed an interest in being included in the study 
were informed about the project and were evaluated for their eligibility to participate. Each 
couple completed a set of relationship questionnaires and then participated in a videotaped 
conflict interaction task. The questionnaires that are relevant for the current study are 
discussed in greater detail below. Couples that completed the questionnaires were then 
asked to participate in a videotaped conflict interaction task that was followed by a post-
interaction video-review task. At the end of their participation, the couples were fully 
debriefed. 
Ǥ
. Relationship satisfaction was assessed with the Dyadic 
Adjustment Scale (DAS; Spanier, 1976; Dutch version by Buysse & Heene, 1997). The 
questionnaire consists of 32 items over 4 subscales (i.e. dyadic consensus, dyadic 
satisfaction, dyadic cohesion, and affective expression). The total scale score ranges from 
0 to 151 and is obtained by summing the scores of all the items. Table 1 presents the 
relationship satisfaction scores. DAS norms (Spanier, 1976) indicate an average 
satisfaction score of 114/115 for a married sample, thereby suggesting that our sample is 
comparable to an average group of married couples in terms of relationship satisfaction. 

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
The internal consistency in this sample was high for the DAS (Cronbach’s ĮMen = .89; 
ĮWomen = .87). 
  Ǥ The couples were invited to participate in a conflict 
interaction task that was similar to those used in previous studies of marital conflict (e.g., 
Fletcher & Thomas, 2000). The couples were escorted into a laboratory that was furnished 
as a living room and was equipped so that their interaction could be video-recorded. Both 
partners granted their permission for this recording by means of a written consent form. In 
advance of their conflict discussion, both partners rated the extent to which they had 
discussed a number of relationship problems or issues of which the source was either the 
partner or the relationship (e.g., childcare, household tasks), using a 5-point Likert scale. 
Accordingly, the partners selected the most salient problem (i.e., the one that received the 
highest frequency-of-discussion rating from either the man’s or the woman’s list). After 
this problem selection had occurred, the partners were randomly assigned to one of two 
conditions: initiator or not initiator. Operationally, this variable meant that the conflict 
issue which the designated initiator had selected was the one that the partners would discuss 
during their upcoming video-recorded interaction. 3  The initiator in each dyad was 
instructed to introduce the issue to the other partner so that they could discuss this problem 
together, up to a maximum time limit of 30 minutes. Both partners were instructed to act 
as much as possible as they would do at home when discussing a similar problem with each 
other.  
Ǧ Ǥ Immediately after the conflict interaction, both partners 
completed a video-review task similar to the one used in previous studies of empathic 
accuracy (e.g., Verhofstadt et al., 2005; 2016). The partners were seated in separate 
 
ϯThe topic selected the by partner who was randomly designated as not initiator was not discussed 
during the couple’s conflict interaction.
͞

ͤ͡

locations and asked to re-experience their interaction while they each viewed a video of 
their own interaction. At predetermined intervals during the videotaped interaction, the 
videotape paused automatically and the partners were instructed to (1) report their own 
thoughts/feelings during that point in the interaction, and (2) make inferences about their 
partner’s thoughts/feelings at that point in the interaction. A computerized procedure 
(VIDANN, video annotation system, De Clercq et al., 2001) served the purpose of selecting 
a number of random time samples from the interaction to ensure that we would obtain a 
comparable number of time samples for each couple. However, for the aim of the present 
study we only used the data of the first 10 minutes of the interaction. 
  Ǥ Following the recommendations of Ickes and 
colleagues (1990), five independent raters coded the degree of similarity between the 
content of the actual reported thoughts/feelings and the perceiver’s inferences using a 3-
point scale on which 0 = different content from the actual thought/feeling; 1 = similar, but 
not the same content as the actual thought/feeling, and 2 = essentially the same content as 
the actual thought/feeling. Overall empathic accuracy scores were then computed as a 
simple percentage measure of the number of “accuracy points” earned, divided by the total 
number of “accuracy points” possible and multiplied by 100.4 The empathic accuracy 
measure showed a high interrater reliability in both cases (ICCMen = .83; ICCWomen = .88).  
Ǥ The behaviors observed in this study were rated and 
analyzed using the Conflict Interaction Rating System (CIRS; Heavey, Gill, & Christensen, 
1998). These ratings resulted in scores on a 9-point Likert scale for two dimensions of 
demanding communication (see Appendix A for an example). Table 1 presents the 
descriptives of blame (i.e., accusations, criticism, and assignment of the partner as the 
 
4  The theoretical range of this percent-correct accuracy measure was 0 (none of the possible 
accuracy points was earned) to 100 (all of the possible accuracy points were earned). 

ͥ͡

causal agent for the problem) and pressure for change (i.e., positive/negative and 
implicit/explicit pressure for change in the partner). A high interrater reliability was 
achieved for both blame (ICCMen = .96; ICCWomen = .96) and pressure for change (ICCMen 
= .97; ICCWomen = .97).  
͝ 
Descriptive Statistics of the Study Variables 
 Men  Women 
 M SD Range  M SD Range 
Relationship satisfaction 115.31 13.05  87-140   117.50 14.27 83-142 
Empathic accuracy   12.00   7.34 0-25   13.95 12.21 0-43 
Blame    2.77   1.40    1-6.50     3.47   1.63    1-6.67 
Pressure for change    3.20   1.62     1-7     4.03   2.22     1-8 

Our predictions were tested by means of a Linear Mixed-Effects Model as 
implemented in the R-package lme-4 (http://lme4.r-forge.r-project.org/), with the 
perceiver’s empathic accuracy score as the dependent variable. The partners’ relationship 
satisfaction, their respective gender, each partner’s status as the conflict initiator (yes vs. 
no), and his/her amount of blame and pressure for change behavior displayed during the 
videotaped conflict interaction were entered as fixed factors. Besides these “main effect” 
terms, two two-way interactions (conflict initiator x blame behavior, and conflict initiator 
x pressure for change behavior) were defined and included in the model. As a random 
factor, a dummy variable was created that indicated membership in a particular dyad. Prior 
to model fitting, all continuous variables were standardized. Effect coding was used for 
͞

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
categorical variables. Table 2 reports the parameter estimates, standard deviations, and 
confidence intervals of the resulting analyses. 
͞
Results of the Linear Mixed-Effects Model Predicting Empathic Accuracy From Gender, Conflict 
Initiator, Blame and Pressure for Change and Controlled For Relationship Satisfaction 
Note. a This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant. CI = confidence interval. 
*p < .05, ** p < 0.01. 
 
After controlling for a significant effect of relationship satisfaction, Ȥ²(1) = 3.96, p 
= .05, the results of this analysis revealed a significant and positive main effect of the 
perceiver’s blame behavior on the perceiver’s empathic accuracy, Ȥ²(1) = 12.70, p < .01. 
Also, the two-way interaction of conflict initiator x perceiver’s pressure for change was 
significant, Ȥ²(1) = 4.14, p < .05. A closer inspection of the data indicated that partners who 
reported more relationship satisfaction were more empathically accurate during the conflict 
interaction. Also, partners who displayed more blame behavior during the videotaped 
Predictor ȕ SD 95% CI 
Gender    
Man              0.04   0.12 [-0.20 – 0.28] 
Woman              0a   0a  
Conflict Initiator    
No             -0.19   0.12 [-0.42 – 0.04] 
Yes              0a   0a  
Relationship Satisfaction              0.30*   0.15 [0.00 – 0.60] 
Blame              0.47**   0.13 [0.21 – 0.73] 
Pressure for Change              0.07   0.13 [-0.19 – 0.33] 
Conflict Initiator 
      x Blame 
           -0.11   0.13 [-0.36 – 0.14] 
Conflict Initiator 
      x Pressure for Change 
            0.26*   0.13 [0.01 – 0.51] 

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conflict interaction showed more empathic accuracy, independent of whether they initiated 
the conflict discussion or not. 
The conflict initiator x perceiver’s pressure for change interaction took the 
following form: When the perceiver participant was in the conflict-initiating role, the 
perceiver’s higher levels of pressure for change were associated with lower levels of 
empathic accuracy. Although this finding was not predicted, it is intriguing in its 
implication that the task of applying a high level of pressure to the interaction partner might 
impair the perceiver’s ability to achieve a high level of empathic accuracy. However, this 
observed negative relation between perceiver’s pressure for change and empathic accuracy 
was reversed (i.e., was positive) when the perceiver was not the conflict initiator, 
suggesting that perceivers who react to the initiator’s demand for change with strong 
counter-pressure for the initiator to change instead, may do so out of a clearer and more 
accurate understanding of why the initiator is pushing so hard for the change and why the 
initiator’s request is inappropriate. 

The results of this study were more complicated than we predicted, but they 
revealed some intriguing findings that in retrospect make sense. The analysis included 
partners’ relationship quality scores because this variable showed to be positively 
associated with empathic accuracy. The main effect of blame behavior suggests that 
partners who showed more blame behavior during the conflict interaction also were more 
empathically accurate, but this was regardless of them initiating the conflict or not. When 
a perceiver initiates a conflict discussion and puts a lot of pressure on the partner to change 
his or her behavior, this “heavy-handed” and confrontational perceiver appears to be less 
accurate in “reading” the partner’s thoughts and feelings, presumably because of the extra 
͞

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effort and attention that pressuring the partner requires. Interestingly, however, when the 
perceiver is the person who did not initiate the conflict discussion, but who reacts to the 
partner’s request for change by putting more pressure on the initiator to change instead, he 
or she was found to make more accurate inferences about the initiator’s thoughts and 
feelings. So, the pressure for change behavior of this assertive and non-intimidated 
perceiver seems to be associated with higher empathic accuracy scores. 
However, Study 2 was conducted to address the major limitations of the present 
study. First, our sample was relatively small, therefore Study 2 was designed to determine 
whether the Study 1 findings were robust. Furthermore, by using a larger sample, Study 2 
might be more likely to find interaction effects involving the perceiver’s gender, because 
during the preliminary analyzes, the present sample did not have enough statistical power 
to detect relatively subtle effects of this type. A second limitation of Study 1 is that the 
variable duration of the couples’ conflict interactions resulted in empathic accuracy scores 
based on a different numbers of thought/feeling inferences, a problem that the use of a 
percentage score of empathic accuracy does not completely correct. Study 2 rectified this 
shortcoming by using fixed points of inference during the video-review task, assuring that 
every participant makes the same number of inferences. 
͞

 
. The sample consisted of the 310 members of 155 
cohabiting/married heterosexual couples. The sample was recruited in the context of the 
“UGhent Family Lab Couple Study”. The recruitment strategy enlisted couples to volunteer 
for the study through posters and social media notices on the one hand and by masters’-

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
level students in clinical psychology recruiting couples in their own vicinity on the other 
hand.  
Couples who expressed an interest in participating were contacted, informed in 
general terms about the project, and evaluated to determine whether they met the inclusion 
criteria (i.e., being involved in their current intimate relationship for at least one year and 
being married/cohabiting for at least six months). Inadequate knowledge of the Dutch 
language and being member of a same-sex couple were used as exclusion criteria. 
Participants could withdraw from the investigation at any time and without giving any 
reason for their withdrawal. 
The first set of measures on the online questionnaire were demographic items. The 
responses to these items revealed that the average reported relationship length was 12.15 
years (SD = 11.76). The respondents’ average age was 36.30 years for men (SD = 14.05) 
and 34.21 years for women (SD = 13.60), with a range of 19 to 76 years.  
Ǥ After providing written informed consent, the partners in each couple 
independently completed an internet survey. Each partner was asked to fill out this 
questionnaire at home in advance of the second appointment and this at their own pace, as 
the questionnaire could be interrupted and resumed. The questions addressed both 
individual (e.g., attachment style, gender identity, general well-being) and relationship 
functioning (e.g., dyadic adjustment, communication patterns, dyadic coping). The 
questionnaires that are relevant to the current study are discussed in greater detail below. 
Couples who completed the questionnaires were then scheduled to attend a laboratory 
session in which they participated in an 11-minute videotaped conflict interaction task that 
was followed by a post-interaction video-review task. 
  
͞

͢͠

Ǥ
. See Study 1 for a description of this measure. Table 3 
presents the relationship satisfaction scores.  
. In the observational part of the study, the couples were 
invited to participate in a conflict interaction task that was similar to the interaction task 
used in Study 1. In advance of their conflict discussion, the partners were separately asked 
to select a problem or issue from a list of common conflict topics in intimate relationships 
of which the source was either the partner or the relationship, and which caused relationship 
distress or recurring disagreement. The topics (e.g., trust, intimacy, finances) were derived 
from previous work on sources of conflict within intimate relationships (Kurdek, 1994). 
After this problem selection had occurred, partners were again randomly assigned to one 
of two conditions: initiator or not initiator. Operationally, this variable meant that the 
conflict issue which the designated initiator had selected was the one that the partners 
would discuss during their upcoming video-recorded interaction. The initiator in each dyad 
was instructed to introduce the issue to the other partner so that they could discuss this 
problem together for 11 minutes. Both partners were instructed to act as much as possible 
as they would at home when discussing a similar problem with each other.  
Ǧ Ǥ Immediately after the 11-minute conflict interaction, both 
partners completed a video-review task similar to that used in Study 1. Again, the partners 
were seated in separate locations and asked to re-experience their interaction while they 
each viewed a video of their interaction on a laptop. The video presentation was controlled 
by an interactive software package specifically developed for the current study in order to 
facilitate the data collection (Hinnekens & Kimpe, 2014). Every 90 seconds, the video was 
paused and the same set of instructions appeared on the screen. Each partner was asked to 
(1) type the specific thought and feeling that s/he had at that point in the interaction in a 

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blank box that appeared in the context of an online questionnaire (this questionnaire 
included additional multiple choice items that are not relevant to the current study), and (2) 
to infer the specific content of each of their partner’s thoughts and feelings, and to type 
each of these inferences in the blank boxes that appeared on the online questionnaire 
(followed by parallel multiple choice items). The instructions for all of these questions 
emphasized that the answer should be based on the 10-second interaction interval that 
immediately preceded the tape stop. To help ensure that both partners based their answers 
on the same 10-second time interval, our custom software program gave the participants 
the option to re-observe the 10-second interval that occurred right before the tape stop.   
Ǥ Four independent judges rated the degree of similarity 
between the content of each actual thought or feeling that one partner recorded and the 
content of the corresponding inferred thought or feeling that the other partner recorded, 
similar to the coding procedure used in Study 1. However, in the current study the empathic 
accuracy scores were computed separately for the set of inferred feelings and for the set of 
inferred thoughts, so that each partner received an empathic accuracy score for feelings and 
for thoughts separately. The average empathic accuracy scores for the inferred feelings and 
the inferred thoughts are shown in Table 3. The empathic accuracy measure showed a good 
interrater reliability for both feelings (ICCMen = .70; ICCWomen = .74), and thoughts (ICCMen 
= .67; ICCWomen = .67).  
  Ǥ The behaviors observed in this study were rated and 
analyzed using the Conflict Interaction Rating System (CIRS; Heavey et al., 1998). There 
was a pool of six trained coders and each subsample of the dataset was rated by three of 
them. They rated the same two dimensions of demand behavior as in Study 1. High 
interrater reliabilities were achieved for the coders’ ratings of both scale dimensions (see 
͞

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
Table 3). High levels of interrater reliability for both blame (ICCMen = .75; ICCWomen = .71) 
and pressure for change (ICCMen = .77; ICCWomen = .77) were achieved.  
͟
Descriptive Statistics of the Study Variables 
 Men  Women 
 M SD Range  M SD Range 
Relationship satisfaction 119.50    12.93 86-149  118.11 13.45 69-148 
EA feelings  21.29 12.15 0-68   21.56 12.23 0-52 
EA thoughts  20.33 11.70 0-55   19.27 11.66 0-48 
Blame    2.17   1.42    1-8.67    2.52  1.73    1-7.67 
Pressure for change    3.15   1.65    1-8.67    4.04  2.08     1-9 

Our predictions were tested by means of a Linear Mixed-Effects Model as 
implemented in the R-package lme-4 (http://lme4.r-forge.r-project.org/), with the 
perceiver’s empathic accuracy for feelings (Model 1) and a person’s empathic accuracy for 
thoughts (Model 2) as dependent variables. In both models, the partners’ relationship 
satisfaction, their respective gender, each partner’s status as the conflict initiator (yes vs. 
no), and his/her amount of blame and pressure for change behavior displayed during the 
videotaped conflict interaction were entered as fixed factors. Besides these “main effect” 
terms, two two-way interactions (conflict initiator x blame behavior, and conflict initiator 
x pressure for change behavior) and two three-way interactions (gender x conflict initiator 
x blame behavior, and gender x conflict initiator x pressure for change behavior) were 
defined and included in the model. As a random factor, a variable was entered, indicating 
membership in a particular dyad. Prior to model fitting, all continuous variables were 

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
standardized. Dummy coding was used for categorical variables. Table 4 reports the 
parameter estimates, standard deviations, and confidence intervals of the resulting analyses. 
After controlling for relationship satisfaction, the analysis of the models revealed 
no significant effects at the .05 significance level. For the second model, the effect of the 
two-way interaction between agent of change and blame was marginally significant, Ȥ²(1) 
= 2.80, p = .09. This interaction suggests that the more blame behavior is showed by the 
partner that is not in the role of agent of change, the more – on average – empathically 
accurate he/she is. The observed positive relation between blame and accuracy seems to be 
reversed when the person is the agent of change.
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Although Ickes (2011) proved to explain the role of motivation in the process of 
empathic accuracy, and as we assumed that agents of change would be particularly 
motivated to initiate a certain change in the status quo of the relationship or in the behavior 
of the partner, Study 2 was not able to convincingly demonstrate the motivational intentions 
of partners initiating a discussion. After controlling for relationship satisfaction, the 
dimensions of demand behavior were no significant predictors of empathic accuracy for 
feelings. However, the results of the second model for empathic accuracy for thoughts 
showed a two-way interaction that approached statistical significance between the role as 
agent of change and blame behavior. This interaction suggested that the more blame 
behavior is showed by the participant that is in the role of agent of change, the less 
empathically accurate he/she is for the thoughts of his/her partner. The observed negative 
association between blame and accuracy for thoughts seems to be reversed when the 
participant is not the agent of change. So, a parallel interpretation can be made as in Study 
1, but as our finding was only marginal significant, we should be very cautious in drawing 
conclusions.  
Conclusively, we found some indications that when a perceiver initiates a conflict 
discussion and uses a lot of blaming behavior towards their partner, this accusing and 
confrontational perceiver appears to be less accurate in “reading” their partner’s thoughts, 
presumably because of the non-sympathizing or the more self-centered conflict style that 
blaming the partner requires. Interestingly, however, when the perceiver is the person who 
did not initiate the conflict interaction, but who reacts to the partner’s accusations by a 
“counter-attack”, he or she was found to make more accurate inferences about the initiator’s 
thoughts, as reflected in this non-intimidated perceiver’s higher empathic accuracy scores.  
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This pattern of results illustrates the potential risk of starting a conflict in which the 
initiator starts pressuring the partner too much. As the conflict initiator applies more 
demanding behavior to the partner, the initiator may find it more difficult to devote 
attention to inferring the target’s thoughts and feelings, and his or her empathic accuracy 
might therefore decline. Interestingly, the conflict initiator’s high-demanding approach 
might not only undermine his or her own empathic accuracy; it also has the potential to 
elicit a strong counter-response (i.e., strong counter-pressure or blame) from a partner who 
“reads” the conflict initiator’s feelings and motives accurately and thinks that the conflict 
initiator should be blamed or pressured to change instead. The irony, then, is that a conflict 
initiator who applies undue pressure to an interaction partner often winds up at an empathic 
disadvantage. According to our results, the more pressure the initiator applies to the partner, 
the more impaired the initiator’s empathic accuracy is likely to be. And, ironically, our 
results further suggested that the more the initiator pressures the partner to change, the more 
accurately the partner tends to understand the thoughts, feelings, and motives that are 
driving the initiator’s high-pressure offensive, and the more counter-influence the partner 
tends to exert on the initiator. In other words, conflict initiators who try to impose their will 
on others tend to be less sensitive to their interaction partners’ thoughts and feelings, 
whereas partners who accurately perceive the initiator’s actual thoughts and feelings seems 
to be more likely to resist their influence and may apply a strong counter-influence instead 
of succumbing to the initiator’s pressure. Nonetheless, some caution should be used when 
interpreting these results since the robustness of this finding could not be fully 
demonstrated. Although Study 2 showed a similar trend between empathic accuracy, the 
role of conflict initiator, and blame behavior (another dimension of demand behavior), we 
could not replicate the association with pressure for change (cf. Study 1). 
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The potential dynamics of this process should have important implications not only 
for marital conflict discussions but for negotiation discussions more generally (e.g., 
Druckman, 1977; Finnegan & Hackley, 2008; Hüffmeier & Hertel, 2012; Lewicki, Weiss, 
& Lewin, 1992). When partners (or parties) negotiate with each other to maximize their 
respective outcomes, they have to be careful to stop short of applying too much pressure to 
induce the other partner (or party) to change. Doing so not only may reduce one’s own 
ability to accurately “read” the thoughts and feelings of the other partner (or party), but 
may also motivate a self-assertive counter-response in the other party that is driven by a 
more accurate assessment of the initiator’s actual thoughts, feelings, and motives.   
A possible explanation for the fact that conflict initiators seem to achieve lower 
levels of accuracy might be due to a reduction of the available cognitive resources, given 
the fact that a conflict interaction seem to be a very demanding interpersonal process with 
some specific communicative features (Sillars, Roberts, Leonard, & Dun, 2000). These 
authors stated that communication during conflict is characterized by selective attention, 
continuous interpretation of intentions that give meaning to communication, routine and 
automatic inferences to keep up with the pace of interaction, a disorderly nature of 
communication, and (distressing) emotions. Taken together, if a conflict initiator is 
preoccupied with achieving his/her personally desired conflict outcome during this 
demanding communication process, then it is very likely that the cognitive resources get 
exhausted, and consequently little to no resources remain available to engage in accurate 
perspective-taking. 
These are fascinating effects, and although they are more complex than we initially 
expected, they have the potential to open up a new and promising line of research. We 
strongly encourage additional research on this topic, in the context of both couples’ conflict 
and negotiation discussions. 
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First, in the current studies we used samples that included generally satisfied 
couples but relatively few dissatisfied/distressed couples, thereby limiting the 
generalizability of the results. Future research should use samples that are more diverse in 
terms of relationship satisfaction. Second, the usual recommended caution should be 
exercised in inferring causality from our results, because the hypothesized temporal 
ordering of the variables could not be established due to the cross-sectional design. Future 
research needs to resolve this causality issue as well. Finally, the hypothesized positive 
association between empathic accuracy, and demand behavior is mainly based on the 
common underlying aspect of motivation, assumed when partners initiate a conflict. 
However, this motivation could be questioned given the fact that partners were randomly 
designated as conflict initiator (in contrast to spontaneously initiating a conflict), and the 
presence and/or amount of motivation was not explicitly measured. Future research should 
take this limitation into account, and include an explicit measure to operationalize this 
underlying motivation. 
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Ǥ The husband (who had been designated as the conflict initiator) thinks that 
his wife takes too much time to complete her household tasks during the day and that this 
is due to the fact that she is sleeping too much. The husband starts the discussion with a 
remark on his wife’s sleeping habits. This example is an excerpt that has been translated 
from a Dutch conflict interaction. 
 
H: “You don’t have to react like that, [yet] you always react this way.” 
W: “My reaction is normal.” 
H: “No, your reaction isn’t normal – you’re pissed off” 
W: “But you started it; your reaction was a sarcastic one. You said “You were lucky you 
were already awake.” 
H: “I just said that. You always get immediately pissed off when I say something. You 
always argue. It is always a fight. I’m sick of all this.” 
 
  Ǥ The wife (who had been designated as the conflict 
initiator) starts a conversation about the car driving behavior of her husband. She is upset 
because they got lost when driving to the building for their research appointment. He 
responds with frustration because in his opinion she always distracts him by starting a 
conversation and asking him questions while he is driving. The wife starts the conflict 
discussion with a question about his driving behavior. This example is an excerpt that has 
been translated from a Dutch conflict interaction. 
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W: “You know you had to drive straight ahead and yet you turned left. Why?” 
H: “We aren’t talking about this again, are we?” 
W: “But you always get lost…” 
H: “You shouldn’t distract me.” 
W: “Not distract you? You shouldn’t get distracted then…” 
H: “You start this conversation, and yet you already know what you should do… You 
should be quiet in the car. Just let me, just let me drive…” 
W: “But I didn’t start it! You started the conversation this time! You started by asking me 
what we were going to do this afternoon – you started to chat!” 
M: “Yes, but you cannot do that; hey, you know you shouldn’t distract me.” 
W: “Ah, I shouldn’t respond then?” 
H: “Indeed.”
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1 Based on Hinnekens, C., & Verhofstadt, L. L. (2016). “I think you understand me.” Studying the 
associations between actual, assumed, and perceived understanding within couples. Manuscript 
submitted for publication. 
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The current study examined the associations between actual, assumed, and 
perceived understanding and partners’ levels of dyadic adjustment. One hundred fifty two 
couples provided questionnaire data (assumed and perceived understanding), participated 
in a video-taped conflict interaction, and in a video-review task to assess actual 
understanding (empathic accuracy). The data were analyzed by means of the Actor-Partner 
Interdependence Model (APIM). The results showed that perceivers’ assumed 
understanding and targets’ perceived understanding (both situation-specific measures) 
were not associated with perceivers’ actual understanding scores, suggesting that 
someone’s perception of understanding is not based on their own or their partner’s actual 
understanding performance during a preceding conflict interaction. Furthermore, our 
findings indicate that perceived understanding is uniquely associated with dyadic 
adjustment for both men and women. Additionally, a partner-effect was found for women 
indicating that it is important for women’s relationship well-being that their male partner 
feels understood. 
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Theory and research suggest that partners in an intimate relationship must be 
relatively accurate when inferring the specific content of each other’s thoughts and feelings 
if they want to effectively coordinate their individual and shared actions – a coordination 
that is needed to maintain a satisfying and stable relationship (Ickes & Hodges, 2013). 
Understanding the other partner refers to the ability to take the partner’s perspective, and 
to hold knowledge of the partner’s dispositions, thoughts, and feelings (Finkenauer & 
Righetti, 2009). Previous research supports the intuitive belief that mutual understanding 
plays a crucial role in intimate relationships, more specifically in relationship well-being 
(e.g., Neff & Karney, 2005; Pollmann & Finkenauer, 2009) and adjustment (e.g., 
Laurenceau, Barrett, & Pietromonaco, 1998; Lemay, Clark, & Feeney, 2007; Noller & 
Ruzzene, 1991; Swann, 1984). 
Not all studies support this conclusion, however. The results of some studies have 
revealed no significant association between understanding and relationship quality (e.g., 
Ickes & Simpson, 2001; Murray, Holmes, & Griffin, 1996; Pollmann & Finkenauer, 2009; 
Thomas & Fletcher, 2003). What accounts for these apparently contradictory results? First, 
as has been suggested by Pollmann and Finkenauer (2009), combining the results of these 
studies overlooks the important distinction between feeling understood and actually being 
understood by one’s partner. More specifically, some studies have measured mutual 
understanding within couples by documenting partners’ subjective self-reports whereas 
other researchers have relied on objective performance measures of actual understanding 
(e.g., empathic accuracy; Ickes, Stinson, Bissonette, & Garcia, 1990). Second, an additional 
but related issue concerns the fact that some studies analyzed understanding from the 
perceiver’s point of view, whereas others focused on the target’s point of view. Third, some 
studies focused on the global level of understanding within the relationship, whereas others 
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focused on situation-specific and interaction-based understanding based upon actual couple 
interactions.  
Taking this complexity into account, one can differentiate (see Figure 1) between 
(a) the perceiver’s actual understanding, referring to the perceiver’s accuracy in inferring 
the specific content of their partner’s (i.e., target’s) thoughts and feelings, (b) the 
perceiver’s assumed understanding, referring to the perceiver’s subjective report on how 
well they assume they have understood their partner (i.e., target), and (c) the target’s 
perceived understanding, referring to the target’s subjective rating of the degree to which 
they feel understood by their partner (i.e., perceiver).  
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The present study sought to extend existing research on understanding in couples 
by examining (a) the interrelations between these three distinct dimensions of 
understanding, and (b) their association with dyadic adjustment. In the sections that follow, 
we provide some background on the major features of the current study.  
 
Partner A  Partner B 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
Actual understanding: Did partner A as perceiver 
actually understand partner B as target? 
Assumed understanding: Does partner A as 
perceiver think (s)he understood partner B as 
target? 
Perceived understanding: Does partner A as 
target feel understood by partner B as perceiver? 
Actual understanding: Did partner B as perceiver 
actually understand partner A as target? 
Assumed understanding: Does partner B as 
perceiver think (s)he understood partner A as 
target? 
Perceived understanding: Does partner B as 
target feel understood by partner A as perceiver? 
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The concept of perceived understanding in the context of intimate relationships 
refers to one’s feeling of being understood by the partner and can be defined as the 
perception that one’s partner has an accurate understanding of one’s own subjective 
experience (i.e., thoughts and feelings). Perceived understanding has been documented in 
the literature as a form of cognition that lies at the heart of relationships (see Finkenauer & 
Righetti, 2009). For instance, according to Reis, Clark, and Holmes (2004) the feeling of 
being understood by one’s partner is one component of the partner’s perceived 
responsiveness. In their formulation, perceived responsiveness refers to the belief that one’s 
partner both understands and validates the thoughts, feelings, and perspectives of the other 
partner in a particular situation. Furthermore, perceived understanding has itself been 
identified as a key characteristic of perceived emotional support (Cramer, 1986; Rogers, 
1959), and perceived emotional support in turn has been found to be one of the strongest 
correlates of relationship satisfaction (Cramer 2003; Cramer, 2006; Cutrona 1996). 
Furthermore, a recent study by Gordon and Chen (2015) showed that conflict in couples is 
particularly harmful to the relationship when the members believe that their partners have 
failed to understand their thoughts, feelings, and perspectives. Feeling understood can 
operate as a buffer against these harmful effects because it supports the belief that a partner 
is devoted, and it is also positively associated with conflict resolution.  
Although these research results consistently demonstrate the importance of feeling 
understood by one’s intimate partner, there are very few studies examining the source of 
perceived understanding. Indirect evidence can be derived from studies on perceived 
support and perceived responsiveness, which demonstrate that partners’ perceptions are at 
least partially anchored in reality, i.e., these perceptions can be traced to behavioral 
exchanges and are not merely social constructions (e.g., Collins & Feeney, 2000; Cutrona, 
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Hessling, & Suhr, 1997; Reis et al., 2004). Applying this finding to perceived 
understanding leads us to assume that feeling understood, or one’s level of perceived 
understanding, should be fostered by the actual efforts made to understand and 
corresponding accurate insights of the other partner. 
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Over the last three decades, empirical research on actual understanding has been 
developing exponentially. More and more insight has been acquired into the complexity of 
the empathy process and empathic accuracy can be considered as the cognitive part of this 
process or, in other words, “the accuracy with which one can understand someone’s 
episodic thoughts and feelings as they spontaneously occur during the course of natural 
interactions” (Ickes, 1993, p.588). Ickes and colleagues (1990) introduced the dyadic 
empathic accuracy paradigm as an objective and reliable design to measure empathic 
accuracy in a controlled but naturalistic environment. The empathic accuracy percentage, 
the outcome of this paradigm, can be seen as a performance measure that reflects the 
objective level of understanding. Understanding (and thus also the empathic accuracy 
score) is affected by situational influences (e.g., perceived threat of the interaction; 
Simpson, Oriña, & Ickes, 2003) and additionally also by relationship (e.g., 
acquaintanceship effect; Ickes & Hodges, 2013) and target characteristics (e.g., readability 
of someone’s (non)verbal cues; Marangoni, Garcia, Ickes, & Teng, 1995).  
So, although the perceiver’s level of actual understanding should presumably be 
related to the target’s level of perceived understanding, research linking interaction-based 
“mind-reading” abilities to a perceiver’s interaction-based feelings of being understood is 
– to our knowledge – nonexistent.
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The Perceiver’s Level of Assumed Understanding 
But to what extent are partners aware of their own empathic performance? Previous 
studies have shown that people are not very proficient at estimating their own general 
capacity for perspective-taking, reflected in a lack of significant associations between 
perceivers’ levels of actual understanding (i.e., empathic accuracy) and questionnaires 
assessing the perception of their general empathy capacity (e.g., Interpersonal Reactivity 
Index; Davis, 1980; Laurent & Hodges, 2009). These findings raise the question of whether 
people are equally bad at estimating how well they understand the situational thoughts and 
feelings of people with whom they interact, including their partners. The latter should be 
distinguished from measures of general and dispositional perspective-taking capacities 
used in previous research, which are more broadly based. 
The question of whether assumed understanding between partners who are 
interacting with each other – as opposed to perspective-taking towards others in general – 
is related to their actual abilities to mind-read has remained largely unanswered to date, as 
few or no studies have assessed partners’ meta-knowledge about the outcomes of their own 
perspective-taking efforts during a preceding interaction. 
(Perceived) Understanding and Dyadic Adjustment 
 Previous research has shown that perceived understanding is related to beneficial 
relationship outcomes such as adjustment, intimacy, and trust (e.g., Pollmann & 
Finkenauer, 2009; Reid et al., 2004) and even is predictive of long-term relationship well-
being (Pollman & Finkenauer, 2009).  
Additionally, the level of actual understanding also seems important for various 
crucial relationship processes. Verhofstadt, Buysse, Ickes, Davis, and Devoldre (2008) 
found that an accurate understanding of one’s partner’s distress and needs, and an ability 
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to accurately judge which behaviors are helpful and appropriate given the situation leads to 
better instrumental support provision. Furthermore, the conflict literature suggests that an 
accurate interpretation of a partner’s thoughts and feelings during conflict leads to 
recognition that destructive reactions will evoke an escalating conflict (Bissonette, Rusbult, 
& Kilpatrick, 1997). Therefore, empathic accuracy is predictive of more accommodative 
behavior during conflicts as partners yield less hostile reactions and react more 
compassionately and responsively.  
Consequently, complaints about a lack of mutual understanding and misreading by 
the partner are frequently noted in research on empathy. It may also play an important role 
in a lot of failing dyadic processes (e.g., support provision, conflict resolution, relationship 
commitment, intimacy) in distressed couples, as a lack of understanding is often mentioned 
as a reason for pursuing consultation by couples seeking couple therapy (Doss, Simpson, 
& Christensen, 2004).  
Recently, the assumption that general perceived understanding is more important 
for relationship well-being than objective knowledge was tested in a study that measured 
understanding by using several questionnaires (Pollmann & Finkenauer, 2009). The results 
showed that feeling understood is indeed a feature present in well-functioning relationships; 
however, actual knowledge about each other in different domains was not. It is possible 
that an individual’s own perception or interpretation of a certain behavior or situation is 
more predictive for future behavior and outcomes than the actual behavior or situation. 
However, there is no corroborating research exploring this assumption that simultaneously 
examines the role of actual and perceived understanding in dyadic adjustment. The limited 
amount of studies that examined a similar association focused on the concept of social 
support and demonstrated that partners’ perceptions of received support are more predictive 
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of stress reduction than the actor’s actual support behavior (Abbey & Halman, 1995; 
Dunkel-Schetter & Bennett, 1990).  
The theoretical and empirical precedents described above suggest that both accurate 
understanding of one’s partner and perceived understanding are necessary for fundamental 
relationship processes such as support provision and conflict resolution; furthermore, 
perceived understanding predicts relationship well-being directly and indirectly by 
buffering the harmful effects of conflict. However, as no previous studies have 
simultaneously included all of these distinct aspects of interaction-based understanding 
within a single investigation, the relative importance of actual and perceived understanding 
during interactions for couples’ relationship well-being is unknown. 

In sum, the above-mentioned findings support the importance of (perceived) 
understanding in intimate relationships. However, no clear conclusions can be drawn due 
to a lack of conceptual and methodological differentiation between the different dimensions 
of understanding in existing research on this matter. This has resulted in a gap in our current 
knowledge about how a person’s actual understanding relates to their partner’s perceptions 
of being understood, and about how accurately people can estimate their degree of actual 
understanding. Further insight into these processes is needed in order to clarify whether 
people are aware of their own and their partner’s capacities for perspective-taking and to 
specify the relative importance of both forms of understanding for dyadic adjustment.
Therefore, the aim of the present study was to complement and extend previous 
studies on understanding in intimate relationships by (a) distinguishing between the target’s 
level of perceived understanding, the perceiver’s level of actual understanding, and the 
perceiver’s level of assumed understanding; (b) studying their interrelations, and (c) 
͟

ͥ͜

examining their associations with dyadic adjustment. We chose to test our hypotheses (see 
below) in the context of relationship conflict interactions because previous research 
suggests that both forms of understanding may have a greater impact in conflict situations, 
where the stakes (both individual and relational) are perceived to be higher than in routine, 
non-conflict situations (Gordon & Chen, 2015). In other words, we sought to test our 
hypotheses in a setting where the variables we are studying are likely to play a more 
significant role. 
We collected data from a large sample of couples that provided questionnaire data 
and participated in a videotaped conflict interaction and video review task. More 
specifically, we collected (1) a post-interaction self-report measure of perceived 
understanding (i.e., each participant’s subjective report on how well understood they felt 
by their partner during the conflict interaction), (2) an interaction-based measure of actual 
understanding (i.e., participants’ objective scores of how well they accurately inferred the 
content of each other’s thoughts and feelings during the conflict interaction), (3) a post-
interaction self-report measure of assumed understanding (i.e., participants’ subjective 
reports on how well they assumed they had understood their partner during the conflict 
interaction), and (4) a global self-report measure of dyadic adjustment (i.e., participants’ 
subjective reports on their general level of dyadic adjustment). Data were collected from 
both partners within the interaction in order to assess our variables of interest from both the 
perceiver and target’s perspectives within each dyad. The interdependence of their reports 
was taken into account statistically by using the Actor-partner Interdependence Model 
(APIM). 

 Ǥ First, we expected a mutual influence between the 
perceiver’s actual understanding and assumed understanding, such that the perceiver’s 
subjective score of assumed understanding would be positively associated with their own 
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objective score of actual understanding (i.e., empathic accuracy) (Hypothesis 1). Second, 
we also expected to find a significant association between the perceiver’s actual 
understanding and the target’s perceived understanding. As previous studies have found 
that the perception of partners’ responsiveness is based at least in part on the actual amount 
of responsiveness of their partner, the same tendency was expected for understanding as a 
part of the process of responsiveness, such that the perceiver’s objective actual 
understanding score would be positively associated with the target’s subjective perceived 
understanding score (Hypothesis 2). Third, we tested the hypothesis that both partners’ 
levels of actual understanding and the levels of perceived understanding would be related 
to relationship functioning and satisfaction, such that their objective actual understanding 
score and their subjective perceived understanding score would be positively associated 
with the general level of dyadic adjustment (Hypothesis 3). Finally, we wanted to explore 
potential gender differences in the predicted associations. When analyzing the previous 
literature, we found no evidence that allowed us to make specific predictions, but we 
nevertheless planned to examine the data for whether or not the processes under study are 
different for men and women (Research Question 1). 


The present data were collected within a broader observational study on conflict in 
couples; some results of this study – unrelated to the present research questions – already 
have been published (Hinnekens, Ickes, De Schryver, & Verhofstadt, 2016; Hinnekens, 
Vanhee, De Schryver, Ickes, & Verhofstadt, 2016). 
 
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The sample consisted of the 310 members of 155 cohabiting/married heterosexual 
couples. This sample was recruited in the context of a large observational study called the 
“UGent Family Lab Couple Study”. The recruitment strategy enlisted couples to volunteer 
for the study in two ways: (1) through posters and social media notices, and (2) by asking 
a group of 16 master’s-level clinical psychology students to recruit couples with whom they 
were acquainted. 
Couples who expressed interest in participating were contacted by the research 
assistants, informed in general terms about the project, and evaluated to determine whether 
they met the inclusion criteria, which required them to have been together in a heterosexual 
relationship for at least one year and to have been married/cohabiting for at least six months. 
Inadequate knowledge of the Dutch language was used as exclusion criterion. The data of 
three couples that were included in the original sample were later excluded from the 
analyses because for one couple a participant had left too many data fields blank on the 
self-report questionnaires and for the two other couples it was discovered upon analysis of 
the questionnaires that they had been together for less than a year.  
The first set of measures on the online questionnaire included demographic items. 
The responses to these items revealed that the average reported relationship length was 
12.06 years (SD = 1.16). The respondents’ average age was 36.20 years for the men (SD = 
14.06) and 34.26 years for the women (SD = 13.63) with a range of 19 to 76 years. By 
occupational category, the sample consisted of 37 laborers (11.9%), 138 office workers 
(44.5%), 17 executives (5.5%), 16 self-employed individuals (5.2%), 60 students (19.14%), 
3 stay-at-home moms or dads (1.0%), 10 individuals who were unemployed (3.2%), 16 
who were retired (5.2%), and 7 who were currently unable to work (2.3%).

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Couples who expressed an interest in participating were visited at home by one of 
the research assistants, informed in general terms about the project, and evaluated to 
determine whether they met the inclusion criteria. The partners in each couple received 
instructions to independently complete an online set of questionnaires that assessed both 
individual and relationship variables. The questionnaires used in this study are discussed in 
more detail below.  
After both partners had completed these questionnaires, they were contacted by 
telephone to schedule an appointment to either come to the laboratory or to have an 
observation session at home. The couples were asked to participate in a task in which they 
engaged in a video-recorded conflict interaction and a subsequent video-review task. Each 
couple received monetary compensation of €20 for completing the questionnaire session 
and an additional €20 for participating in the observational study. Participants could 
withdraw from the investigation at any time. The study was approved by the ethical 
committee of the Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences at the Ghent University. 

 Ǥ Relationship functioning and well-being were assessed with 
the Dutch version (Buysse & Heene, 1997) of the Dyadic Adjustment Scale (DAS; Spanier, 
1976). This questionnaire contains 32 items that are divided into four subscales. Dyadic 
consensus reflects the degree to which the partners perceive that they (dis)agree about 
important aspects of the relationship; this subscale consists of 13 items such as "To what 
extent do you and your partner agree or disagree on the handling of family finances?” (0 = 
always disagree to 5 = always agree). Dyadic satisfaction assesses the degree to which the 
partners are satisfied with their relationship; it consists of ten items such as "In general, 
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how much of the time do you think that things between you and your partner are going 
well?” (0 = never to 5 = all the time). Dyadic cohesion assesses the degree to which the 
partners report engaging in common activities and experiencing closeness; it consists of 
five items such as "How often do you and your partner have a stimulating exchange of 
ideas?” (0 = never to 5 = more often than once a day). Finally, affectional expression
assesses the extent to which the partners report that they express affection towards each 
other; it consists of four items such as “How often do you kiss your partner?" (0 = never to 
5 = every day).  
Total DAS scale scores were obtained by summing the scores of the 32 scaled items. 
Theoretically, these global dyadic adjustment scores can range from 0 to 151. In the present 
sample, men and women reported average marital satisfaction scores of 119.33 (SD = 
12.91) and 117.90 (SD = 13.47), respectively. DAS norms (Spanier, 1976) indicate an 
average satisfaction score of 114-115 for a typical sample of married couples, a normative 
benchmark that suggests that our sample is comparable to an average sample of North-
American married couples with respect to their typical levels of relationship satisfaction. 
The internal consistency of the DAS in our Dutch-speaking sample was high (Cronbach’s 
Į = .90 for both men and women). 
. In the observational part of the study, the couples 
were asked to participate in a conflict discussion task that was similar to those used in 
previous laboratory studies on marital conflict (e.g., Fletcher & Thomas, 2000; Simpson et 
al., 2003). Each couple was escorted into a laboratory that was furnished to look like a 
living room although it was equipped so that the couple’s interaction could be video-
recorded with their prior knowledge (n = 114). In those cases in which the interaction task 
was conducted at the couples’ home, the partners were seated in a quiet room where we 
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installed a small portable camera (n = 41). Both partners gave permission for this recording 
by means of a written consent form.  
Before commencing their conflict discussion, both partners were separately asked 
to identify a problem or issue (from a list of common conflict topics in intimate 
relationships), of which the source was either the partner or the relationship and which they 
recognized as causing them relationship distress or recurring disagreement. After this 
problem selection had occurred, the partners were assigned randomly to be either the 
initiator or not the initiator. Operationally, this variable meant that the conflict issue the 
designated initiator had selected would be the one that the partners would discuss during 
their subsequent video-recorded interaction. The initiator in each dyad was instructed to 
introduce the issue to the other partner so that they could discuss this problem together for 
a period of eleven minutes. Both partners were instructed to act, as far as possible, as they 
would do when discussing a similar problem with each other at home.  
Ǧ. Immediately after the conflict interaction had been 
recorded, both partners completed post-interaction questionnaires. 
 . A new post-interaction self-report measure 
was created to assess the dyad members’ perceptions of their own understanding during the 
preceding interaction. The five items on this measure were based on the literature about 
understanding and responsiveness (e.g., Maisel, Gable, & Strachman, 2008; Reis et al., 
2004), adapted to the purpose of this study. Participants were asked to respond on 7-point 
Likert scales (1 = not at all to 7 = completely) about how well they believed they managed 
to understand their partner’s thoughts and feelings (e.g., “To what extent do you think you 
accurately understood your partner’s thoughts and feelings during the interaction?”). The 
internal consistency of the self-reported understanding measure was moderate to high in 
this sample (Cronbach’s ĮMen = .85; ĮWomen = .75). 
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Ǥ Analogous to the previous questionnaire, five 
items were developed to measure the extent to which the respondents felt understood by 
their partner during the preceding interaction. These five items had parallel content to the 
post-interaction questionnaire about self-reported understanding except that they were 
formulated from the partner’s perspective (e.g., “To what extent do you think your partner 
understood the ways in which this interaction was distressing for you?”). The internal 
consistency of the perceived understanding measure was high in this sample (Cronbach’s 
ĮMen = .87; ĮWomen = .88). 
ǦǤ Immediately after the post-interaction task both partners 
individually completed a video review task similar to that used in previous studies of 
empathic accuracy (e.g., Ickes et al., 1990; Verhofstadt et al., 2016). The partners were 
separated and asked to re-experience and re-live their interaction while they viewed a video 
of the interaction they had just completed on a laptop. The video presentation was 
controlled by an interactive software package (Hinnekens & Kimpe, 2014) specifically 
developed to facilitate the data collection for the purpose of the current study. Every 90 
seconds, the video was paused and the same set of instructions appeared on the screen. 
First, each partner was asked to type the specific thoughts and feelings that he or she had 
at that point in the interaction into a blank box on an online questionnaire. Next, each 
member of the couple was asked to infer the specific content of each of their partner’s 
thoughts and feelings, and to type each inference into a blank box that appeared on the 
interactive online survey form.2 The instructions emphasized that the reported thoughts and 
feelings should be based on the 10-second segment of interaction that immediately 
preceded the pause in the video. To help ensure that both partners based their reports on 
 
2 The questionnaire of the video-review task included additional multiple choice items that are not 
relevant to, nor represented in, the current study. 
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the same 10-second segment of the interaction, our custom software program gave the 
participants the option to re-observe the 10-seconds of tape that occurred immediately 
before the pause before providing their requested answers. 
Ǥ Four independent judges rated the degree of similarity 
between the content of each actual thought or feeling that one partner recorded and the 
content of the corresponding inferred thought or feeling that the other partner recorded. 
Following the recommendations of Ickes and colleagues (1990), the degree of similarity 
was rated in each case using a 3-point scale on which 0 = different content from the actual 
thought or feeling, 1 = similar, but not the same content as the actual thought or feeling, 
and 2 = essentially the same content as the actual thought or feeling. Overall actual 
understanding (i.e., empathic accuracy) scores were then computed as a simple percentage 
measure of the number of “accuracy points” earned, divided by the total number of 
“accuracy points” available and multiplied by 100.3 The empathic accuracy coding was 
acceptably reliable for both men (ICC = .69) and women (ICC = .71) in the sample. 
Therefore the scores of the four raters were averaged. 
Ǥ
Ǥ The four independent judges also rated the degree of difficulty of 
inferring a target’s thoughts and feelings based on the information available in his or her 
words and actions (inferential difficulty measure; Marangoni et al, 1995). The raters 
watched each tape twice, once observing the male partner and once observing the female 
partner. They were instructed to make inferences about the target’s thoughts and feelings 
at each pause in the video review task. The raters were provided with copies of the target's 
reported thoughts and feelings, to which they could refer after making these inferences. 
 
3 The theoretical range of this percentage-correct accuracy measure was 0 (none of the possible 
accuracy points was earned) to 100 (all of the possible accuracy points were earned). 
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They could then compare their own inferences with the target’s actual reported thoughts or 
feelings and rate how transparent or readable they thought each of the target’s thoughts and 
feelings were at each tape stop. These readability ratings were made for each of the target’s 
individual thoughts and feelings separately on a 3-point scale ranging from 1 = very 
difficult to infer given the immediate context, 2 = somewhat difficult to infer given the 
immediate context, to 3 = easy to infer given the immediate context. The readability measure 
was acceptably reliable for both men (ICC = .64) and women (ICC = .65) in the sample. 
Therefore, the readability ratings were averaged across the four raters.  


The sample-based means, standard deviations, observed ranges, and paired sample 
t-tests for all study variables are presented in Table 1. According to the paired sample t-
tests, the men in the sample reported higher scores for assumed and perceived 
understanding. The analyses did not reveal gender differences in either actual 
understanding or in dyadic adjustment. The independent raters found it was slightly easier 
to infer thoughts/feelings from the (non)verbal cues of the female participants than it was 
for the men.  
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Descriptive Statistics for the Study Variables 
 Men  Women  
 
M 
(SD) 
Range  
M 
(SD) 
Range Diff 
Dyadic adjustment 
119.33 
(12.91) 
   86-149  
117.89 
(13.47) 
   69-148    1.43 
 Dyadic consensus 
51.74 
(6.40) 
   31-65  
50.93 
(7.46) 
   14-64    1.34 
 Dyadic satisfaction 
41.66 
(4.26) 
   28-49  
41.03 
(4.49) 
   24-49    1.94 
 Affective expression 
9.22 
(1.86) 
     2-12  
9.01 
(2.13) 
     1-12    1.19 
 Dyadic cohesion 
16.71 
(3.45) 
     7-23  
16.93 
(3.40) 
     8-24   -0.68 
Assumed understanding 
27.77 
(4.45) 
   10-35  
26.76 
(4.00) 
   10-35    2.72** 
Perceived understanding 
27.39 
(4.62) 
   14-35  
26.16 
(5.00) 
   10-35    3.00** 
Actual understanding 
18.02 
(8.95) 
0.00-39.29  
17.68 
(8.79) 
0.00-39.29    0.40 
Readability 
1.72 
(0.26) 
1.07-2.57  
1.78 
(0.29) 
1.19-2.67   -2.58* 
Note. * p  .05, ** p  .01; N = 152. 
 
In Table 2, the correlations between the predictor variables are presented, both for 
men and women. Overall, the positive correlations between the scales of dyadic adjustment 
are high for men (ranging from .34 to .89), and women (ranging from .31 to .85). 
Furthermore, the assumed and perceived understanding scores are positively correlated to 
the scales of dyadic adjustment, both for men (ranging from .20 to .54) and women (ranging 
from .17 to .43). Men’s actual understanding scores are not associated with any of the scales 
of dyadic adjustment, however, women’s actual understanding scores are positively 
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correlated with the scales of dyadic adjustment (ranging from .14 to .24), except for dyadic 
consensus. The readability score of the target is found to be positively correlated to the 
actual understanding (i.e., empathic accuracy) of the perceiver. When men are the target, 
then their readability score is correlated with a magnitude of .24 with their women’s actual 
understanding score, and vice versa, when women are the target, their readability score is 
correlated with a magnitude of .22 to their men’s actual understanding score. This finding 
indicates that the higher the target’s readability score (i.e., easier to infer), the higher the 
perceiver’s actual understanding score. Finally, we find significant positive correlations 
between the scores on all variables of men and women (ranging from .31 to .58).
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In the current study, the dyad members were partners within an intimate 
relationship. This means that the partners’ scores on a given variable are statistically 
interdependent, i.e., they should correlate to some degree. The APIM analyses estimated 
the degree to which dyad members’ responses were associated with factors attributable to 
the actor and to their partner. In other words, the APIM estimates both actor effects (the 
effect that partner A’s predictor score has on his or her own outcome score) and partner 
effects (the effect that partner A’s predictor score has on partner B’s outcome score and 
vice versa), while controlling for the statistical interdependence that exists between the 
partners. 
To test our first three hypotheses, we used the recently written interactive tool for 
Actor-Partner Interdependent Models using Multilevel Modeling (Kenny, 2015; available 
from https://davidakenny.shinyapps.io/APIM_MM/). In each of the three APIM analyses, 
the dyad members were treated as being distinguishable by gender, so the dummy-coded 
variables men and women were recoded to -1 and 1 for the current study. The predictor 
variables were grand-mean centered and the dependent variable was unstandardized. 
Because targets’ thoughts and feelings differed in how difficult they were to infer, the 
aggregated index of readability was entered as a covariate in each analysis.  

 ǯ 
ȋ͡Ȍǫ Our first analysis examined whether the perceiver’s 
post-interaction self-rating of having understood their partner during the interaction was 
positively related to their actual understanding performance, as measured by the perceiver’s 
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actual understanding score (an actor effect). The dependent variable in this analysis was 
each perceiver’s self-reported assumed understanding score. The predictor variable was the 
perceiver’s actual understanding score, and the covariate was the relevant target’s 
readability score.㻌 The correlation between the partners’ scores on the assumed 
understanding measure was .41. Readability was not a significant covariate in this model 
for either the men, ȕ = .05, p = .51, or the women, ȕ = .00, p = .98, and was therefore 
excluded from the final model. Surprisingly, the results of the final APIM showed that the 
perceiver’s actual understanding was not associated with his or her self-reported level of 
assumed understanding for either the men, ȕ = .07, p =.41, or the women, ȕ = .12 , p = .17. 
These findings suggest that perceivers’ perceptions of how well they understood their 
partner during a recent conflict interaction are not associated with the accuracy of the 
perceivers’ actual empathic inferences. 
ǯǯ
ȋ͢ Ȍǫ The second analysis was similar to the first, but instead 
of focusing on the perceiver’s level of assumed understanding, it examined whether the 
target’s perceived understanding was positively associated with the perceiver’s level of 
actual understanding (a partner effect). In this analysis, the dependent variable was each 
target’s perceived understanding score. The predictor variable was the perceiver’s actual 
understanding score and the covariate was each target’s readability score. The correlation 
between the partners’ scores on the perceived understanding measure was .45. Again, 
readability was not a significant covariate in this model for either the men, ȕ = .04, p = .57, 
or the women, ȕ = .00, p = .99, and was therefore excluded from the final model. The results 
of the final APIM showed that the perceiver’s actual understanding was not a significant 
predictor of the target’s level of perceived understanding for either the men, ȕ = .04, p = 
.68, or the women, ȕ = .07, p = .44. Contrary to our hypothesis, this finding indicates that 
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a perceiver’s level of actual understanding is not related to their target’s impression of being 
understood.  
ǯ
ȋͣȌǫ To address this question, 
an APIM analysis was conducted to test the hypothesis that both partners’ scores on the 
measures of perceived understanding and their level of actual understanding would be 
positively associated with (i.e., would “postdict”) their scores on the Dyadic Adjustment 
Scale that was administered prior to the observational part of this study (looking at both 
actor and partner effects). The partners’ scores on the DAS questionnaire served as the 
outcome variable. Both partners’ scores on perceived understanding and their levels of 
actual understanding were entered as predictors (testing both actor and partner effects). 
Besides these main effect terms, two two-way interactions (perceivers’ x targets’ perceived 
understanding, and perceivers’ x targets’ actual understanding) were defined and included 
in the model. Table 3 shows the separate effect estimates for men and women. 
͟
Actor and Partner Effects of Perceived Understanding and Actual Understanding Predicting 
Dyadic Adjustment 
Men  Women
Estimate 95% CI Estimate 95% CI 
Intercept 118.64**  [116.85-120.44]  118.04**  [116.07-120.01]
Perceived understanding 
Actor 1.36**  [0.94-1.79]   0.79**  [0.37-1.22] 
Partner 0.27  [-0.12-0.67]   0.61**  [0.21-1.01] 
Actual understanding 
Actor 5.69  [-14.89-26.27]       22.40+  [1.82-42.98] 
Partner -2.86  [-23.90-18.19]   2.65  [-18.40-23.70] 
Note.+ p  .10, * p  .05, ** p  .01 
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The correlation between the partners’ scores on the Dyadic Adjustment Scale was 
.56. None of the interaction terms were significant in this model, and they were therefore 
excluded from the final model. The final APIM explained 37.97% of the total non-
independence. The results showed a significant actor effect, indicating that a participant’s 
own level of perceived understanding was significantly associated with his or her own self-
reported dyadic adjustment for both the men, ȕ = .48, p < .01, and the women, ȕ = .29, p < 
.01. Furthermore, the partner effect was significant for the women, ȕ = .21, p = .01, 
indicating that for female participant’s, their partner’s perceived understanding is positively 
associated with their own dyadic adjustment, suggesting that it is important for women’s 
levels of relationship well-being that their male partner feels understood.  
These findings indicate that an individual’s level of perceived understanding is 
associated with their own self-reported dyadic adjustment. Additionally, male partners’ 
levels of perceived understanding are significantly associated with their female partners’ 
levels of self-reported dyadic adjustment. Neither men’s nor women’s actual understanding 
scores were associated with their own or their partners’ self-reported dyadic adjustment. 
However, the results did reveal a correlation that approached statistical significance 
between women’s levels of actual understanding and their own levels of dyadic adjustment. 
A visual representation including the standardized parameter estimates can be found in 
Figure 2. 
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	͞
A Visual Representation of the APIM including Perceived Understanding and Actual 
Understanding as Predictors for Dyadic Adjustment

Note.+ p  .10, * p  .05, ** p  .01 
 
The overall test of distinguishability of the dyad members in terms of gender was 
not statistically significant, Ȥ2(6) = 7.54, p = .27. Alternative models – including a similar 
model that treated the dyad members as indistinguishable and a model that treated dyads 
as indistinguishable but included gender as a predictor – were tested but did not change the 
findings as the first model showed the same associations and the second model was not 
significant, Ȥ2(5) = 7.20, p = .27. So, for the subsequent exploration of the associations 
between perceived understanding and dyadic adjustment, the decision was made to exclude 
gender as predictor. 
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	ȋȌ
ǫ To gain a more detailed understanding of the role of both partners’ perceived 
understanding in postdicting dyadic adjustment, the four subscales of the Dyadic 
Adjustment Scale were examined. Two Multivariate Generalized Linear Models (GLM) 
were tested with each partner’s score on the subscales of the DAS as the dependent 
variables. Each participant’s own and their partner’s levels of perceived understanding 
were entered as predictors. Besides these main effect terms, a two-way interaction between 
both partners’ perceived understanding was included in the model. Although gender was 
not significant in the previous model, the analyses were conducted for men and women 
separately considering the interdependence. 
Using Pillai’s trace, a significant association between the participant’s own 
perceived understanding, for the men: F(4, 146) = 10.59, p < .01, and the women: F(4, 146) 
= 4.92, p < .01, and their partner’s perceived understanding, for the men: F(4, 146) = 2.56, 
p < .05, and the women: F(4, 146) = 2.82, p < .05 with the subscales of the DAS emerged. 
However, because the two-way interaction between both partners’ perceived understanding 
was not significant, for the men: F(4, 145) = 1.78, p = .14, and the women: F(4, 145) = 
1.33, p = .26, this term was omitted from the final model. Table 4 reports the parameter 
estimates, standard errors, and the effect sizes for men and women. 
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͠
Univariate Parameter Estimates of the Multivariate GLM including Actors’ and Partners’ 
Perceived Understanding as Predictors for the Subscales of Dyadic Adjustment 
Note. * p  .05, ** p  .01 
The results show that each participant’s own perceived understanding score 
correlated with all the aspects of dyadic adjustment, both for men and women. These 
findings indicate that it might be important to feel understood by one’s partner in order to 
experience higher levels of relationship well-being (i.e., dyadic adjustment). Specifically, 
each participant’s level of perceived understanding was positively associated with (1) their 
own level of perceived consensus within the relationship, (2) their own perception of 
expressing affection towards each other, (3) their own feelings of connectedness, and (4) 
their own level of overall relationship satisfaction. Their partner’s perceived understanding 
was also positively associated with some of the subscales of the own dyadic adjustment. 
For men, their female partner’s perceived understanding was positively associated with 
their own level of dyadic consensus and thus their experience of a high level of consensus 
on daily topics. For women, we found the same result and additionally, their male partner’s 
Men Women 
Predictor Outcome variables ȕ SE(ȕ) Ș2 ȕ SE(ȕ) Ș2 
Actor
Dyadic consensus 0.41** 0.08 .15  0.20* 0.09 .04 
Dyadic satisfaction 0.47** 0.08 .19  0.35** 0.08 .11
Affective expression 0.37** 0.09 .11  0.22** 0.09 .04
Dyadic cohesion 0.30** 0.09 .07  0.21* 0.09 .04 
Partner
Dyadic consensus  0.17* 0.08 .03 0.23** 0.09 .05 
Dyadic satisfaction  0.12 0.08 .02  0.17* 0.08 .03 
Affective expression -0.05 0.09 .00   0.18* 0.09 .03
Dyadic cohesion -0.04 0.09 .00 -0.02 0.09 .00
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perceived understanding was also positively associated with their own level of overall 
relationship satisfaction, and their own perception of expressing affection towards each 
other. Although the above discussed findings are all significant, we observe rather small 
effect sizes. 


The present study sought to answer an empirically and clinically relevant question 
about how partners’ objective abilities to understand each other during a conflict and their 
subsequent feelings of assumed as well as perceived understanding are related, and whether 
their actual and/or perceived understanding are related to their levels of dyadic adjustment.  
ǡǡǤ Surprisingly, we did not 
find a significant association between perceivers’ actual understanding (i.e., objective 
empathic accuracy score) and their assumed understanding (i.e., self-reported level of 
understanding), which means that the perceivers’ perceptions of how well they understood 
their partner were not based on their actual empathic performances. Furthermore, and also 
contrary to our hypothesis, we found that the perceiver’s actual understanding was not 
associated with their partner’s level of perceived understanding. This finding indicates that 
a target’s perception of being understood is not based on the actual empathic performance 
of his or her partner. These findings applied equally to the men and the women who took 
part in this study.  
These findings are somewhat surprising, considering that the measures of assumed 
understanding and perceived understanding were filled out immediately after the 
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interaction task and concerned the dyad members’ perceptions of their own and their 
partner’s level of understanding as experienced in the preceding interaction. On the other 
hand, previous studies have reported evidence showing that people are not good at judging 
their own empathic abilities on self-report measures. Several studies have explored the 
association between participants’ actual understanding scores and their scores on the 
perspective-taking subscales of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1980), but 
these have failed to find any positive association (Ickes et al., 1990; Laurent & Hodges, 
2009; Stinson & Ickes, 1992). In addition, an unpublished master’s thesis study by 
Mortimer (1996) found evidence that most perceivers are also unable to track variation in 
their level of empathic accuracy across the set of inferences that they make. 
If an individual’s own score on the self-report measure of how well he or she feels 
understood by the partner is not based on the actual performance of that partner, then what 
does affect his or her perceived understanding score? One possibility is that partners base 
these post-interaction ratings on their general feeling of (dis)satisfaction with the level of 
mutual understanding within their relationship, irrespective of the actual level of 
understanding in the specific conflict discussion. This general feeling of being understood 
is probably based on many other previous conflict discussions on the same and other topics. 
This explanation is based on the concept of sentiment override during interactions, which 
refers to the observation that partners’ behavior during interactions is determined to a 
greater extent by a global sentiment about the relationship than by the valence of the 
immediately preceding stimulus, which in this case is the behavior displayed by a 
participant’s intimate partner (e.g., Fincham, Garnier, Gano-Phillips, & Osborne, 1995; 
Verhofstadt, Buysse, Ickes, De Clercq, & Peene, 2005; Weiss, 1980). One lab-based 
interaction might not affect a cognitive schema that has developed over time; indeed there 
is abundant empirical evidence confirming that these relational schemas are relatively 
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stable over time and situations (Fiske & Taylor, 2013). This evidence suggests that attention 
is generally drawn to schema-consistent information whereas schema-inconsistent 
information might receive less attention or might even be neglected. Regarding our results, 
the partners might have based their perceived understanding ratings on the schema-
confirming clues present in the observed interaction (verbal or nonverbal behavioral cues 
such as the partner’s verbal acknowledgments or nonverbal head nods), even though these 
clues were not necessarily indicative of the partner’s accurate understanding.  
Ǥ The results did not confirm 
the first part of our main hypothesis as no general association was found between actual 
understanding and relationship well-being as measured with the Dyadic Adjustment Scale. 
However, the results showed a positive trend between women’s actual understanding and 
their dyadic adjustment scores. This suggests that as women reach higher levels of actual 
understanding they tend to report higher levels of dyadic adjustment or, alternatively, if 
women are satisfied with their relationship they report higher levels of dyadic adjustment 
and also reach higher levels of actual understanding. Caution is necessary when interpreting 
the current findings as there is no clear evidence for causation as this is a correlation study.  
It is possible that we overlooked an association between actual understanding and 
relationship satisfaction as there was no distinction made between inferred thoughts and 
feelings that had little or no potential to threaten the partners’ relationship and thoughts and 
feelings that did have this potential. A study by Cohen, Schulz, Weiss, & Waldinger (2012) 
did take this distinction into account – distinguishing between empathic accuracy for 
positive emotions, which have no potential to threaten the perceiver, and empathic accuracy 
for negative emotions, which may be relationship threatening, in line with the Ickes and 
Simpson’s model (1997) – but they also found that empathic accuracy was not a very strong 
predictor of relationship satisfaction. Perceived empathic effort by the partner was found 
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to be a much stronger predictor of relationship satisfaction, however, especially for women. 
This indicates that women may place greater value on their partners’ willingness and 
investment of energy to understand them, reflected in their empathic effort. 
. The second part of the 
main analysis revealed that an actor’s perceived understanding is associated with his or her 
relationship well-being as measured with the Dyadic Adjustment Scale, and that this is true 
for both men and women. The partner effect was also significant for women: When men 
reported higher levels of perceived understanding, women reported higher levels of dyadic 
adjustment. The additional explanatory analysis revealed that each participant’s own level 
of perceived understanding is associated with all aspects of their own dyadic adjustment: 
dyadic consensus, dyadic satisfaction, affectional expression, and dyadic cohesion. 
Furthermore, male partner’s perceived understanding was also associated with one aspect 
of their own dyadic adjustment: dyadic consensus, and female partner’s perceived 
understanding was associated with three aspects of their own dyadic adjustment: dyadic 
consensus, satisfaction, and affectional expression.  
These findings are in line with previous work by Pollmann and Finkenauer (2009) 
who found that partners’ general feelings of understanding each other are predictive of 
several indicators of relationship well-being (dyadic adjustment, intimacy, and trust) but 
that accurate knowledge about a partner was not. 
This finding may also confirm the clinical experience of many couple therapists – 
that perceived understanding plays a major role in relationship well-being and satisfaction. 
A common complaint of partners seeking marital help is a lack of (mutual) understanding 
in their relationship (Laing, Phillipson, & Lee, 1966). The results of both the current and 
previous studies suggest that a combination of strengthening empathic efforts and 
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encouraging responsive behavior might help to enhance the feeling of perceived 
understanding. 

The use of an observational design allowed us to collect an overall measure of 
empathic accuracy (one that was aggregated across all of the perceiver’s inferences) along 
with post-interaction measures of assumed and perceived understanding. This enabled us 
to compare an objective measure of understanding (i.e., empathic accuracy) with the 
perception of each participant’s own and their partners’ understanding, a comparison that 
had not been conducted in research so far. In addition, a dyadic approach was used that 
included data from both the actor and partner in the process of understanding in couples; 
this enabled us to assess the influence of both actor and partner effects on relationship 
outcomes. Finally, given the time-consuming and labor-intensive realities of observational 
research, the large sample size is definitely an advantage of this study. 
With regard to the study’s limitations, the generalizability of the results may be 
limited because the sample consisted of white, middle-class couples that were generally 
satisfied with their relationships. It would be useful to examine a sample that is more 
heterogeneous and consists of at least a subsample of couples who are currently 
experiencing high levels of relationship distress. Furthermore, the self-reports of dyadic 
adjustment levels were measured before the interaction task and thus reflected a general 
perception of the relationship whereas actual understanding and perceived understanding 
were measured during and after a conflict and thus reflected situation-specific 
understanding, which can be considered as a weakness in our operationalization. Future 
research should include a post-interaction measure of relationship well-being and 
satisfaction and should also consider the role of empathy communication as possible 
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moderator between actual understanding and relationship outcomes. Finally, the usual 
recommended caution should be exercised in inferring causality from our results, as the 
cross-sectional design means that the hypothesized temporal ordering of the variables could 
not be established conclusively.  
ǡǡ


͝͝͡

 	 

Abbey, A., & Halman, L. J. (1995). The role of perceived control, attributions, and meaning 
in members of infertile couples' well-being. Journal of Social and Clinical 
Psychology, 14, 271-296. doi: 10.1521/jscp.1995.14.3.271 
Bissonnette, V. L., Rusbult, C. E., & Kilpatrick, S. D. (1997). Empathic accuracy and 
marital conflict resolution. In W. Ickes (Ed.), Empathic accuracy (pp. 251-281). New 
York, NY, US: Guilford Press. 
Buysse, A., & Heene, E. (1997). Dutch version of the Dyadic Adjustment Scale (DAS, 
Spanier, 1976). [Unpublished Manuscript]. Gent, Belgium: University of Ghent, 
Faculty of Psychology. 
Cohen, S., Schulz, M. S., Weiss, E., & Waldinger, R. J. (2012). Eye of the beholder: The 
individual and dyadic contributions of empathic accuracy and perceived empathic 
effort to relationship satisfaction. Journal of Family Psychology, 26, 236-245. doi: 
10.1037/a0027488 
Collins, N. L., & Feeney, B. C. (2000). A safe haven: An attachment theory perspective on 
support seeking and caregiving in intimate relationships. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 78, 1053-1079. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.78.6.1053 
Cramer, D. (1986). An item factor analysis of the revised Barrett-Lennard Relationship 
Inventory. British Journal of Guidance and Counselling, 14, 314–325. doi: 
10.1080/03069888608253521 
Cramer, D. (2003). Facilitativeness, conflict, demand for approval, self-esteem, and 
satisfaction with romantic relationships. The Journal of Psychology, 137, 85-98. doi: 
10.1080/00223980309600601 
͟

͢͝͝

Cramer, D. (2006). How a supportive partner may increase relationship satisfaction. British 
Journal of Guidance and Counselling, 34, 117–131. doi: 
10.1080/03069880500483141 
Cutrona, C. E. (1996). Social support as a determinant of marital quality: The interplay of 
negative and supportive behaviors. In G. R. Pierce, B. R. Sarason, & I. G. Sarason 
(Eds.), Handbook of social support and the family (pp. 173–194). New York, NY: 
Plenum Press.  
Cutrona, C. E., Hessling, R. M., & Suhr, J. A. (1997). The influence of husband and wife 
personality on marital social support interactions. Personal Relationships, 4, 379-
393. doi: 10.1111/j.1475-6811.1997.tb00152.x
Davis, M. H. (1980). A multidimensional approach to individual differences in empathy. 
Catalog of Selected Documents in Psychology, 10(85), 85-104.   
Doss, B. D., Simpson, L. E., & Christensen, A. (2004). Why do couples seek marital 
therapy? Professional Psychology: Research and Practice, 35, 608-614. doi: 
10.1037/0735-7028.35.6.608 
Dunkel-Schetter, C., & Bennett, T. L. (1990). Differentiating the cognitive and behavioral 
aspects of social support. In B. R. Sarason, I. G. Sarason, G. R. Pierce (Eds.), Social 
support: An interactional view. Wiley series on personality processes (pp. 267-296). 
Oxford, UK: John Wiley & Sons. 
Fincham, F. D., Garnier, P. C., Gano-Phillips, S., & Osborne, L. N. (1995). Pre-interaction 
expectations, marital satisfaction, and accessibility: A new look at sentiment 
override. Journal of Family Psychology, 9, 3-14. doi: 10.1037/0893-3200.9.1.3 
Finkenauer, C., & Righetti, F. (2009). Understanding. In H. T. Reis & S. Sprecher (Eds.), 
Encyclopedia of human relationships (pp. 1658-1662). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
ǡǡ


ͣ͝͝

Fiske, S. T., & Taylor, S. E. (2013). Social cognition: From brains to culture (2nd ed.). 
London, UK: Sage. 
Fletcher, G. J., & Thomas, G. (2000). Behavior and onǦline cognition in marital 
interaction. Personal Relationships, 7, 111-130. doi: 10.1111/j.1475-
6811.2000.tb00007.x 
Gordon, A. M., & Chen, S. (2015). Do you get where I’m coming from? Perceived 
understanding buffers against the negative impact of conflict on relationship 
satisfaction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 110, 239-260. doi: 
10.1037/pspi0000039  
Hinnekens, C., Ickes, W., De Schryver, M., & Verhofstadt, L. L. (2016). Demand behavior 
and empathic accuracy in observed conflict interactions in couples. The Journal of 
Social Psychology, 156, 437-443. doi: 10.1080/00224545.2015.1115386 
Hinnekens, C., & Kimpe, N. (2014). UFLCS Review Program [Unpublished Software 
Program]. Ghent, Belgium: Ghent University. 
Hinnekens, C., Vanhee, G., De Schryver, M., Ickes, W., & Verhofstadt, L. L. (2016). 
Empathic accuracy and observed demand behavior in couples. Frontiers in 
Psychology, 7. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01370 
Ickes, W. (1993). Empathic accuracy. Journal of Personality, 61, 587-610. doi: 
10.1111/j.1467-6494.1993.tb00783.x 
Ickes, W., & Hodges, S. D. (2013). Empathic accuracy in close relationships. In J. A. 
Simpson & L. Campbell (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of close relationships (pp. 348-
373). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
Ickes, W., & Simpson, J. A. (1997). Managing empathic accuracy in close relationships. In 
W. Ickes (Ed.), Empathic accuracy (pp. 218–250). New York, NY: Guilford Press. 
͟

ͤ͝͝

Ickes, W., & Simpson, J. A. (2001). Motivational aspects of empathic accuracy. In G.J.O. 
Fletcher & M.S. Clark (Eds.), Interpersonal processes: Blackwell handbook in social 
psychology (pp. 229-249). Oxford, UK: Blackwell. 
Ickes, W., Stinson, L., Bissonnette, V., & Garcia, S. (1990). Naturalistic social cognition: 
Empathic accuracy in mixed-sex dyads. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 59, 730-742. DOI: 10.1037/0022-3514.59.4.730 
Kenny, D. A. (2015). An interactive tool for the estimation and testing the Actor-Partner 
Interdependence Model using multilevel modeling. [Computer software]. Available 
from https://davidakenny.shinyapps.io/APIM_MM/. 
Laing, R. D., Phillipson, H., & Lee, A. R. (1966). Interpersonal perception: A theory and 
a method of research. Oxford, England: Springer. 
Laurenceau, J. P., Barrett, L. F., & Pietromonaco, P. R. (1998). Intimacy as an interpersonal 
process: The importance of self-disclosure, partner disclosure, and perceived partner 
responsiveness in interpersonal exchanges. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 74, 1238-1251. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.74.5.1238 
Laurent, S. M., & Hodges, S. D. (2009). Gender roles and empathic accuracy: The role of 
communion in reading minds. Sex Roles, 60, 387-398. doi: 10.1007/s11199-008-
9544-x 
Lemay Jr, E. P., Clark, M. S., & Feeney, B. C. (2007). Projection of responsiveness to 
needs and the construction of satisfying communal relationships. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 92, 834-853. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.92.5.834 
Maisel, N. C., Gable, S. L., & Strachman, A. M. Y. (2008). Responsive behaviors in good 
times and in bad. Personal Relationships, 15, 317-338. doi: 10.1111/j.1475-
6811.2008.00201.x 
ǡǡ


ͥ͝͝

Marangoni, C., Garcia, S., Ickes, W., & Teng, G. (1995). Empathic accuracy in a clinically 
relevant setting. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 68, 854-869. doi: 
10.1037/0022-3514.68.5.854 
Mortimer, D.C. (1996). ‘Reading ourselves ‘reading’ others: Actual versus self-estimated 
empathic accuracy. [Unpublished master’s thesis], Arlington, TX: University of 
Texas. 
Murray, S. L., Holmes, J. G., & Griffin, D. W. (1996). The self-fulfilling nature of positive 
illusions in romantic relationships: Love is not blind, but prescient. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 71, 1155-1180. doi: 10.1037/0022-
3514.71.6.1155 
Neff, L. A., & Karney, B. R. (2005). To know you is to love you: The implications of global 
adoration and specific accuracy for marital relationships. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 88, 480-497. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.88.3.480 
Noller, P., & Ruzzene, M. (1991). Communication in marriage: The influence of affect and 
cognition. In G. J. O. Fletcher & F. D. Fincham (Eds.), Cognition in close 
relationships (pp. 203-233). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Pollmann, M. M., & Finkenauer, C. (2009). Investigating the role of two types of 
understanding in relationship well-being: Understanding is more important than 
knowledge. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 35, 1512–1527. 
doi: 10.1177/0146167209342754 
Reis, H. T., Clark, M. S., & Holmes, J. G. (2004). Perceived partner responsiveness as an 
organizing construct in the study of intimacy and closeness. In D. J. Mashek & A. 
Aron (Eds.), Handbook of closeness and intimacy (pp. 201-225). Mahwah, NJ: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers. 
͟

͜͝͞

Rogers, C. R. (1959). A theory of therapy, personality, and interpersonal relationships: As 
developed in the client-centered framework. In S. Koch (Ed.), Psychology: A study 
of a Science: Formulations of the Person and the Social Context (pp 184-256). 
Columbus, OH: McGraw-Hill. 
Simpson, J. A., Oriña, M. M., & Ickes, W. (2003). When accuracy hurts, and when it helps: 
A test of the empathic accuracy model in marital interactions. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 85, 881-893. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.85.5.881 
Spanier, G. B. (1976). Measuring dyadic adjustment: New scales for assessing the quality 
of marriage and similar dyads. Journal of Marriage and the Family, 38, 15-28. doi: 
10.2307/350547 
Stinson, L., & Ickes, W. (1992). Empathic accuracy in the interactions of male friends 
versus male strangers. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 62, 787-797. 
doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.62.5.787  
Swann, W. B. (1984). Quest for accuracy in person perception: A matter of 
pragmatics. Psychological Review, 91, 457-477. doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.91.4.457 
Thomas, G., & Fletcher, G. J. (2003). Mind-reading accuracy in intimate relationships: 
Assessing the roles of the relationship, the target, and the judge. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 85, 1079-1094. doi: 10.1037/0022-
3514.85.6.1079 
Verhofstadt, L. L., Buysse, A., Ickes, W., De Clercq, A., & Peene, O. J. (2005). Conflict 
and support interactions in marriage: An analysis of couples’ interactive behavior 
and onǦline cognition. Personal Relationships, 12, 23-42. doi: 10.1111/j.1350-
4126.2005.00100.x.  
ǡǡ


͝͞͝

Verhofstadt, L. L., Buysse, A., Ickes, W., Davis, M., & Devoldre, I. (2008). Support 
provision in marriage: The role of emotional similarity and empathic 
accuracy. Emotion, 8, 792-802. doi: 10.1037/a0013976 
Verhofstadt, L., Devoldre, I., Buysse, A., Stevens, M., Hinnekens, C., Ickes, W., & Davis, 
M. (2016). The role of cognitive and affective empathy in spouses' support 
interactions: An observational study. PloS one, 11. doi: 10.1371/ 
journal.pone.0149944 
Weiss, R. L. (1980). Strategic behavior marital therapy: Towards a model for assessment 
and intervention. In J. P. Vincent (Ed.), Advances in family intervention, assessment 
and theory (Vol. 1) (pp. 229–271). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.

͟͝͞












  





	ǣ
Ǧ	
ϭ









1 Based on Hinnekens, C., Sillars, A., Verhofstadt, L. L., & Ickes, W. (2016). Empathic accuracy 
and cognitions during conflict: An in-depth analysis of understanding scores. Manuscript submitted 
for publication.
͠

͝͞͠



Empathic accuracy research indicates that partners achieve only poor to moderate 
success at reading each other’s thoughts during couple communication. The current study 
identifies specific patterns of online thought that potentially contribute to empathic 
inaccuracy during conflict interactions. Married/cohabiting partners completed a conflict 
interaction and, afterwards, reported their own thoughts during video-assisted recall of the 
interaction, while also inferring the thoughts of the other partner. Reported and inferred 
thoughts were analyzed for thematic content (i.e., focus on content issues, interaction 
process, or personal characteristics) and affective tone (positive, negative, or neutral 
thoughts). Men had more positive than negative thoughts; however, women showed a 
tendency to overlook these thoughts and overestimate negative thinking by their male 
partners. Specific misunderstandings linked to both the thematic content and affective tone 
of online thought predicted lower empathic accuracy scores.   
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She thought… 
 
He thinks she thought… 
…I don’t understand his point of view. 
 
 
… he ignores everything I say by talking 
about something else. 
 
 
…my partner is exaggerating again. 
 
…about how she still feels not understood. 
 
 
…Why should I keep talking if he isn’t 
listening anyway? 
 
 
…we are not talking about the heart of the 
matter. 
 
These quotes of partners’ spontaneous thoughts reflect a crucial aspect of 
relationships, namely the aspect of understanding. But how well are partners able to 
understand each other? Previous research has tried to answer this question through the 
investigation of understanding as a function of specific relationship characteristics (e.g., 
duration, satisfaction; Thomas, Fletcher, & Lange, 1997) and in several relational contexts 
(e.g., support interactions; Verhofstadt et al., 2016). These studies indicate that partners 
achieve only poor to moderate success at inferring each other’s thoughts and feelings. 
According to Ickes (2011), empathic accuracy generally averages no higher than 30-35% 
for married partners. Other research finds even lower empathic accuracy among partners, 
averaging around 20% (Hinnekens, Vanhee, De Schryver, Ickes, Verhofstadt, 2016; 
Verhofstadt, Buysse, Ickes, Davis, & Devoldre, 2008). Logically, this means that partners 
are 65-80% incorrect when inferring each other’s thoughts and feelings. Therefore, some 
evident next questions are: How do these misunderstandings occur? Why are partners 
“misreading” each other this much? These questions remain largely unanswered to date.  
The current article explores these questions through an in-depth analysis of 
partners’ online cognitions (i.e., spontaneous thoughts during a discussion). Specifically, 
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this research examines participants’ own thoughts (i.e., direct perspectives) and their 
inferences about their partner’s thoughts (i.e., meta-perspectives), as reported during a post-
conflict interaction recall task. We compare direct and meta-perspectives in terms of their 
thematic content and affective tone, and we aim to identify specific forms of incongruence 
and misunderstanding. Further, we consider how these types of specific misunderstandings 
relate to overall empathic accuracy. We test to see whether certain types of 
misunderstandings occur more frequently than others, and whether these 
misunderstandings can explain the rather low scores previously observed in studies of 
couples’ empathic accuracy.    

Disagreements and conflicts inevitably occur in intimate relationships, and although 
conflict can be threatening, it might also be perceived as an opportunity to reconcile 
partners’ different goals, opinions, or concerns (Hinnekens et al., 2016). To effectively 
discuss and potentially reconcile such differences, we assume that partners must, first, 
adopt a shared focus and congruent definition of the issues contributing to conflict, and 
second, be able to take the other’s perspective in order to understand his or her reasoning 
about these issues.  
Because these processes unfold “in the moment” during couple communication, a 
method that can capture the in vivo stream (i.e., online stream) of the partners’ thought is 
essential to research on understanding during relationship conflict. One method involves 
the use of a video review task in which participants complete an interaction and afterwards 
report their thoughts and feelings during the interaction while observing a video of the 
discussion (Halford & Sanders, 1988; Ickes, Stinson, Bissonnette, & Garcia, 1990). The 
empathic accuracy paradigm, developed by Ickes and colleagues (1990), also requires 
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participants to infer their partner’s thoughts and feelings, thereby simulating perspective-
taking during communication. Video-assisted recall helps participants to retrieve their 
memory of the events that occurred during the interaction, and re-experience thoughts and 
feelings as they occurred spontaneously (Waldron & Cegala, 1992). Some evidence 
suggests that people experience the same physiological reactions during video review as 
they do during the actual interaction (Gottman & Levenson, 1988).  
Studies by Sillars and colleagues extend research on online cognition and empathic 
accuracy by analyzing the content of thoughts and feelings during family conflict (Sillars, 
Roberts, Leonard, & Dun, 2000; Sillars, Smith, & Koerner, 2010). The Interaction 
Cognition Coding System (ICCS) developed from this research translates the complexity 
of online thoughts into meaningful hierarchical content categories. Previous research with 
the ICCS has identified important characteristics inherent in online thoughts during conflict 
interactions and has revealed gender differences that are described below (Sillars et al., 
2000). 
Our comments thus far highlight two goals for further research on online cognition 
during couple conflict. First, research should identify the congruence (shared focus) and 
incongruence (non-shared focus) of partners’ direct perspectives, reflecting the issues they 
each think about and how they evaluate these issues. Second, partners’ meta-perspectives 
should be explored to determine if partners are able to infer each other’s thoughts 
accurately, irrespective of their own direct perspectives, and to reveal specific 
misunderstandings that underlie empathic inaccuracy. We now turn to each of these 
research goals. 
 
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Of the two processes noted above (shared focus and perspective-taking), adopting 
a shared focus on conflict issues would seem to be a less demanding cognitive task. 
Nonetheless, research suggests that this process can prove challenging during couple 
conflict. Thomas et al. (1997) found that married partners maintained a shared focus in their 
online thoughts just over half the time during conflict interactions. Sillars et al. (2000) 
observed that couples were often, even routinely, thinking about different things during 
conflict (e.g., past events versus the immediate conversation) and/or thinking about these 
things in qualitatively different ways (e.g., what was said versus how it was said). In other 
words, partners can experience the same interaction quite differently, allocating their 
selective attention to different issues, background events, and aspects of ongoing 
communication (Sillars, 2009). We discuss these differences in perspective in terms of 
differences in the thematic content and affective tone of online thought.  
. Because a primary goal during couple conflict is to reconcile 
the partners’ perspectives, the most obvious thoughts to examine are about the topic of 
disagreement itself. These thoughts address issues such as: “What is the conflict about? 
What is my opinion about it? What are my arguments pro and con?” However, as noted by 
Hocker and Wilmot (1991), the ostensible topic is often a cover for an underlying implicit 
relationship issue. A basic axiom of communication is that all communication has both 
content meaning and relationship meaning (Watzlawick, Beavin-Bavelas, & Jackson, 1967), 
with the former referring to declarative content and the latter to relational states (e.g., 
respect, distance, antagonism) implied by that act of communication. This basic axiom 
suggests that partners will not only think about the explicit topic of disagreement (e.g., 
cleaning, work commitments, sex), or what Watzlawick and colleagues called the content 
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level of communication, they will also think about the process of interaction and what it 
implies about the relationship. 
A common difference in partners’ perspectives during couple conflict, referred to 
as content-process confusion (Sillars et al., 2000), occurs when one partner interprets the 
interaction in terms of the ostensible content or topic while the other partner thinks about 
the process of interaction and associated relational meanings. Sillars and colleagues (2000) 
found that content-process confusion was tied to gender, with men focusing more on 
content issues in the discussion and women more on the communication process and other, 
more relational cognitions. A possible explanation for this pattern is suggested by the 
concept of relationship awareness (Acitelli, 1992). She found that women engaged in more 
relationship-level thinking, and that this focus was tied to their satisfaction to a greater 
extent than it is for men. It is important to note, however, that Vangelisti, Middleton, and 
Ebersole (2013) found few gender differences in online thought, despite using the same 
coding methods as Sillars et al. (2000).  
In addition to content or relationship aspects of communication, partners’ online 
thoughts could engage more abstract attributions that describe partner traits, evaluate the 
relationship, or identify causes of behavior (Vangelisti, Corbin, Lucchetti, & Sprague, 
1999; Vangelisti, et al., 2013). The study of these processes suggests that much online 
thinking during conflict involves observing, interpreting, and evaluating intentions and 
behaviors, while also searching for causes of conflict. As noted in the next section, 
relationship satisfaction is one of the greatest influences on attributions, such that 
dissatisfied individuals tend to make distress-maintaining attributions about the partner’s 
negative behavior, whereas satisfied individuals make relationship-enhancing attributions 
(Fincham & Bradbury, 1989; Fletcher & Fincham, 1991; Grigg, Fletcher, & Fitness, 1989; 
Vangelisti et al., 1999).  
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Ǥ As mentioned earlier, conflict can be perceived as threatening or 
distressing but also as an opportunity to find a new balance. These perceptions reflect the 
overall affective tone of online thought. Sentiment override theory suggests that the general 
feeling of relationship (dis)satisfaction has a significant impact on situational perceptions 
and emotions (e.g., Fincham, Garnier, Gano-Phillips, & Osborne, 1995; Verhofstadt, 
Buysse, Ickes, De Clercq, & Peene, 2005; Weiss, 1980). More specifically, a general 
perception of the relationship develops over time and establishes a cognitive relationship 
schema, which in turn influences thoughts and feelings during interaction in a self-
confirming fashion (e.g., Fincham, 2001; Holtzwordth-Munroe & Jacobson, 1985).  
Supporting the assumption of sentiment override, studies of online cognition have 
found that relationship dissatisfaction is associated with angry, frustrated, and blaming 
thoughts, and also with pessimistic thoughts about the course and resolution of conflict 
(e.g., Sillars et al., 2000; Vangelisti et al., 2013). Conflict severity is associated with similar 
negative thoughts. In contrast, satisfaction is more likely to be associated with “issue-
oriented” thoughts concerning the topic of disagreement, suggesting that satisfied partners 
maintain a more neutral and objective tone during conflict (Sillars et al., 2000; Vangelisti 
et al., 2013). Further, satisfied partners also report more thoughts expressing positive 
expectations to resolve the disagreement (e.g., belief that the partner is understanding, 
suggestions about solutions; Fletcher & Thomas, 2000; Sillars et al., 2000; Verhofstadt, 
Buysse, Rosseel, & Peene, 2006).  
Sillars and colleagues (2000) observed parallels between the affective tone of online 
thought and the familiar actor-observer bias in attributions. That is, individuals reported 
more positive thoughts about their own communication (i.e., seeing it as constructive 
engagement), but more often attributed avoidant and confrontational acts to their partner. 
These results suggest that self-serving cognitive tendencies can influence how ambiguous 
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cues or behaviors are interpreted as positive or negative communication (Sillars et al., 
2000).  

Empathic accuracy in couples can be defined as “…the extent to which [partners] 
understand each other’s unspoken thoughts or feelings as they spontaneously occur during 
the course of their everyday interactions” (Ickes, 1993, p. 588). Studies reveal low-to-
moderate overall accuracy in couple interactions (e.g., Ickes et al., 1990; Simpson et al., 
2011; Verhofstadt, et al., 2008) and scores can drop even further during threatening 
interactions, such as disagreements (Simpson, Oriña, & Ickes, 2003). To reach a certain 
level of accuracy, interaction partners need to adopt comparable interpretive frames (Ickes, 
2003). However, frame incompatibilities are a common feature of conflict (e.g., Putnam & 
Holmer, 1992; Sillars, 2009; Sillars, et al., 2010). Anticipating and adjusting for such 
incompatibilities can require significant cognitive effort. Yet, research on online cognition 
during couple conflict finds that people do not often make a conscious effort to understand 
the partner’s perspective without being prompted to do so by the researcher (Sillars et al., 
2000).  
Sillars and colleagues (2000) suggested that basic features of communication during 
conflict inhibit conscious perspective-taking and contribute to differences in interpretive 
frames. Specifically, they proposed that: (1) selective attention is an inherent feature of 
communication and is necessary to conserve cognitive resources within a complex and 
ambiguous stimulus field; (2) participation in interaction requires continuous interpretation 
of intentions that give meaning to communication; (3) such inferences are made routinely 
and automatically to keep up with the pace of interaction and thus, are mostly snap 
judgments that go unquestioned; (4) selective attention and inference is further encouraged 
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by the disorderly nature of communication during serious relationship conflict (e.g., the 
presence of multiple issues, and the tendency to lose focus and engage past disagreements); 
and (5) emotions related to conflict and the general affective atmosphere influence the 
availability of executive functions and bias online cognitions.  
Given the low-to-moderate scores for empathic accuracy observed in past studies 
and the complex factors influencing these scores, there is a need for further research on 
factors affecting empathic inaccuracy during couple conflict.  

The first goal of the current study is to examine descriptive characteristics of online 
thoughts and replicate associations with gender, relationship satisfaction, and conflict 
intensity that have been found in previous research. The second goal is to identify specific 
misunderstandings, reflected in discrepancies between direct and meta-perspectives, that 
relate to empathic accuracy. 
  ǯ   ȋ ȌǤ First, we offer 
predictions about the occurrence of certain types of online thoughts. In research by Sillars 
et al. (2000) and Vangelisti et al. (2013), partners showed considerable mindfulness about 
the process of interaction, reflected in their thinking about the immediate interaction, 
including inferences about communicative acts or intentions and evaluations of 
communication. These process thoughts constituted the most frequently-used coding 
category in previous studies. Thus, our first hypothesis predicts that both partners will 
report more process thoughts relative to thoughts pertaining to other categories (H1). 
Further, the research of Sillars and colleagues (2000) found a tendency in online thought to 
attribute positive conflict acts to the self and negative conflict acts/intentions to the partner. 
Thus, our second hypothesis predicts that individuals will report more thoughts attributing 
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constructive communication to self than to their partner (H2a), and more thoughts about 
confrontation and avoidance to the partner versus self (H2b). Regarding potential gender 
differences, we expect that men will report more thoughts concerning content issues in 
conflict than women (H3a), whereas women will report more thoughts about the 
communication process and other relational states (i.e., person and process appraisal) than 
men (H3b).  
Following past studies (Sillars et al., 2000; Vangelisti et al., 2013), we expect the 
affective tone of online thoughts to be associated with conflict severity (as reflected in 
ratings of relationship threat) and relationship satisfaction. Thus, we predict that partners 
who report more positive thoughts will perceive the interaction as less threatening and that 
partners who report more negative thoughts will perceive the interaction as more 
threatening (H4a). Further, from attribution research and the construct of sentiment 
override, we assume that the affective tone of thoughts reflects relationship satisfaction, 
such that partners who score higher on relationship satisfaction will report more positive 
thoughts, whereas partners who score lower will report more negative thoughts (H4b). 
     Ǥ In line with predictions 
concerning direct perspectives, the fifth hypothesis predicts that men will overestimate the 
incidence of content-focused thoughts (called issue appraisal; H5a) and underestimate the 
incidence of relationship-focused thoughts (called person appraisal and process appraisal; 
H5b) by women. Conversely, we expect women to underestimate the incidence of content-
focused thoughts (H5c) and overestimate the incidence of relationship-focused thoughts by 
men (H5d).  
Ǧ    Ǥ Last, we offer predictions 
about the discrepancy between the participants’ actual thoughts and the thoughts that are 
inferred by their partner. Generally, we expect specific mind-reading errors by the perceiver 
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to be reflected in their overall understanding, such that the larger the discrepancy between 
the target’s direct thoughts (with respect to thematic content and affective tone) and the 
perceiver’s inferred thoughts, the lower the perceiver’s empathic accuracy (H6).  

The present data were collected within a broader observational study on conflict in 
couples; some results of this study – unrelated to the present research questions – already 
have been published (Hinnekens, Ickes, De Schryver, & Verhofstadt, 2016; Hinnekens et 
al., 2016). 

A sample of 158 cohabiting/married heterosexual couples (316 individuals) was 
recruited as part of an observational study called the “UGent Family Lab Couple Study”. 
Couples were recruited for the study through posters and social media notices, and through 
the acquaintance networks of master’s level clinical psychology students. Participation was 
limited to Dutch-speaking couples who had been together in a heterosexual relationship for 
at least one year and married or cohabiting for at least six months. Three couples in the 
original sample were later excluded due to missing questionnaire responses or 
questionnaire responses that revealed failure to meet the inclusion criteria.  
The couples had been together at the time of the study for an average of 12.15 years 
(SD = 11.76). The men averaged 36.29 years of age (SD = 14.05) and the women averaged 
34.21 years (SD = 13.60) (age range = 19 to 76 years). The sample included 37 laborers 
(11.9%), 140 office workers (45.5%), 17 executives (5.7%), 16 self-employed individuals 
(5.2%), 61 students (19.7%), 3 stay-at-home mothers or fathers (1.0%), 11 individuals who 
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were unemployed (3.5%), 16 who were retired (5.2%), 7 who were currently unable to 
work (2.3%), and 2 individualswhose profession is unknown. 

Couples who expressed an interest in participating were visited at home, where they 
were provided an orientation and evaluated to determine if they met inclusion criteria. The 
partners received instructions to independently complete online questionnaires that 
measured relationship satisfaction and other variables not relevant to the current report.  
After both partners completed the questionnaires, they were contacted by telephone 
to schedule an appointment to either come to a research laboratory or have an observation 
session at home. The couples were asked to participate in a task in which they engaged in 
a video-recorded discussion and subsequent video-review task. Each couple received 
monetary compensation of €20 for completing the questionnaire and an additional €20 for 
completing the observational session. Participants were informed they could withdraw 
from the investigation at any time; however, all couples completed both phases of the 
research. The study was approved by the ethical committee of the Faculty of Psychology 
and Educational Sciences at the Ghent University. 
 . Relationship satisfaction was assessed with the 
Dyadic Adjustment Scale (DAS, Spanier, 1976; Dutch version by Buysse & Heene, 1997). 
The questionnaire consists of 32 items over 4 subscales (dyadic consensus, dyadic 
satisfaction, dyadic cohesion, and affective expression). The total scale scores, summed 
across subscales, averaged 119.31 (SD = 12.87) for men and 117.91 (SD = 13.34) for 
women. DAS norms (Spanier, 1976) indicate an average satisfaction score of 114/115 for 
a married sample, suggesting that our sample was comparable to an average group of 
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married couples. The DAS demonstrated strong internal consistency in this sample 
(Cronbach’s ĮMen = .91; ĮWomen = .90). 
Ǥ In the observation session, the couples completed a discussion 
task similar to those used in previous studies of marital conflict (e.g., Fletcher & Thomas, 
2000; Simpson et al., 2003). Couples who chose to come to the university were escorted to 
a laboratory that was furnished to resemble a living room but equipped to allow video-
recording of the conflict discussion (n = 114). In those cases in which the interaction task 
was conducted at the couples’ home, the partners were seated in a quiet room where we 
installed a small portable camera (n = 41). In both settings, the recording took place with 
the couple’s knowledge and written consent.   
Prior to the discussion, the partners were separately asked to identify, from a list of 
common conflict topics, an issue they recognized as a source of recurring disagreement in 
their relationship. The conflict issue selected by one partner was then randomly chosen as 
the topic for subsequent discussion. The partner who selected the issue introduced it to the 
other partner and the couple discussed it together for eleven minutes. The partners were 
encouraged to act as they would do when discussing similar problems without a camera 
present.  
 Ǧ Ǥ Immediately after the interaction task, the partners 
individually completed a video-review task similar to that used in other studies (e.g., Ickes 
et al., 1990; Verhofstadt et al., 2016). The partners were separated and asked to re-
experience their interaction while they viewed the recorded discussion on a laptop. The 
video presentation was controlled by interactive software developed for the research 
(Hinnekens & Kimpe, 2014). Every 90 seconds, the video paused and instructions appeared 
on the screen. Each partner was asked to type the specific thought and feeling that he or she 
had at that point in the interaction, and also rate how threatening the thought and feeling 
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was to themselves, their partner, and the relationship. The ratings of threat potential were 
recorded on Likert-type scales that ranged from 0 = not threatening to 7 = very threatening. 
The instructions emphasized that the reported thoughts and feelings should be based on the 
10-second segment of interaction that immediately preceded the pause in the video. The 
software gave participants the option to re-observe the ten seconds of interaction that 
occurred before each pause. 

 Ǥ Four independent judges rated the degree of similarity 
between the actual thoughts that one partner recorded (their direct perspective) and the 
corresponding inferred thoughts that the other partner recorded (the partner’s meta-
perspective). Following Ickes and colleagues (1990), similarity was rated using a 3-point 
scale on which 0 = different content from the actual thought or feeling, 1 = similar but not 
the same content as the actual thought or feeling, and 2 = essentially the same content as 
the actual thought or feeling. Overall empathic accuracy scores were then computed as a 
percentage score that was computed as the number of “accuracy points” earned, divided by 
the total “accuracy points” available and multiplied by 100.2 The empathic accuracy coding 
had acceptable reliability for both the men (ICC = .69) and the women (ICC = .71) in the 
sample. Therefore, the scores of the four raters were averaged. 
Ǥ Thoughts reported during the video review session were coded 
using the ICCS, a system that was inductively derived from recall sessions with married 
partners watching their own conflict interactions (Sillars et al., 2000). We used a revised 
version of the coding system developed for research on parent-adolescent interaction 
 
ϮThe theoretical range of this percentage-correct accuracy measure was 0 (none of the possible 
accuracy points was earned) to 100 (all of the possible accuracy points were earned).
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(Sillars & Smith, 2014). This version of the ICCS was simplified and adapted to enable the 
comparison of direct (own thoughts) and meta-perspectives (inferred partner thoughts), 
making it ideally suited to gain further insight into the process of empathic accuracy.  
The ICCS coding system classifies thoughts into 26 specific categories nested 
within five main categories (see Appendix A for examples). The main categories are as 
follows: (1) Emotion includes thoughts that contain a direct reference to an emotional state; 
(2) Issue appraisal includes thoughts referring to the literal topic of discussion, that is,
facts, ideas, or opinions concerning the ostensible issue being discussed and therefore 
reflects the “content” level of interaction; (3) Process appraisal includes thoughts about 
communicative acts or intentions within the immediate interaction, along with evaluations 
of the communication process; (4) Person appraisal includes thoughts conveying abstract 
evaluations about the self or the partner, often through trait attributions and attribution of 
responsibility for the conflict; (5) Uncodable/off topic thoughts include thoughts that are 
unintelligible, not relevant to the conflict, or do not fit within other categories. In addition, 
some specific codes are followed by an actor code: (a) self, (b) partner, or (c) dyad, 
indicating the object of the thought (e.g., “I understand” is coded as self; “She is getting 
frustrated” is coded as partner; “We are a strong couple” is coded as dyad). For purposes 
unrelated to the current report, the partners were prompted to report thoughts and feelings 
separately during the video review. Because of the current study’s focus on thoughts, the 
emotion codes are excluded from analyses to which they are not relevant.  
The coding procedure followed three steps. First, each thought entry was divided 
into thought units, referring to a segment expressing a single thought that is understandable 
independent of adjoining comments (e.g., “I understand why he wants to talk about 
this,/however, I don’t want to talk about it again,” would be two thought units). Second, 
each thought unit was assigned to one of the five main categories according to the thematic 



ͥ͟͝

content of that unit. Third, a specific code with an additional actor code (if called for by the 
coding scheme) was assigned. All data were coded by a team of three coders. Two coders 
each coded half of the data. The third coder, designated as the “expert coder,” coded all of 
the data independently as a reliability check. Afterwards, the independent coders’ 
judgments were compared and any disagreements were resolved through discussion.  
RESULTS 

Ǥ The first aim of the study was to explore the characteristics 
of online thoughts during a conflict interaction within a Dutch-speaking sample. The 
percentages of specific codes and main categories are reported for men and women in Table 
1. Although the data were coded according to five main categories, the category of emotions 
is excluded from Table 1. As noted above, our procedure required the participants to report 
emotions separately from their thoughts; therefore, only a minimal percentage of 
spontaneously reported thoughts referenced emotions (1.5%). 
The results show that the category of process appraisal, reflecting mindfulness about 
the communication process, represented almost half of the online thoughts. By comparison 
about one-third of thoughts were coded as issue appraisal, representing thoughts about 
content issues in the discussion, and 13-14% were person appraisals, representing personal 
evaluations and attributions. These results confirm the first hypothesis (H1), as process 
thoughts indeed represented the largest percentage of thoughts reported relative to those in 
other content categories.  
Second, we expected individuals to attribute more favorable conflict strategies to 
the self and more negative conflict strategies to the partner (H2). Because there were more 
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self-directed thoughts than partner-directed thoughts overall, we calculated percentages for 
each strategy code separately for self-directed versus partner-directed thoughts. The results 
supported H2: When individuals thought about their own communication, they were more 
likely to see the interaction as constructive engagement than when thinking about the 
partner’s communication (men: 62.62% vs. 12.75%; women: 44.93% vs. 23.49%; H2a). 
Logically, as the percentages sum to 100%, when individuals thought about their partner’s 
communication, they were more likely to see the interaction as confrontation or 
avoidance/detachment than when thinking about their own communication (men: 87.25% 
vs. 37.38%; women: 76.51% vs. 55.08%; H2b). 

Ǥ Our second hypothesis predicted that men would have a 
greater content-focus and women a greater relationship-focus. The paired t-tests reported 
in Table 1 could not confirm this hypothesis, as there was no overall gender difference in 
the percentage of issue appraisal thoughts (H3a), or in person and process appraisal 
thoughts (H3b). The overall similarity of men and women was notable, and only a few 
statistical significant (p  .05) gender differences emerged from the paired t-tests.  
͝
Descriptive Statistics for Direct Perspectives 
MMen (SD)  MWomen (SD) t(154) 
Person Appraisal  12.95 (17.44) 14.28 (16.63) 0.74 
 Positive Appraisal 
Self 0.68 (3.27) 0.27 (1.70)  1.38 
Partner 0.83 (3.78) 1.01 (3.50) -0.44
Dyad 0.77 (3.44) 0.93 (3.41) -0.44
Benign Attribution 0.73 (4.25) 0.91 (3.60) -0.40
Admission   4.64 (10.56) 2.36 (5.54) 2.61**
Denial & Justification 1.82 (5.34) 2.67 (7.36) -1.17
Complaint 2.13 (7.09) 3.78 (9.70) -1.80+
Imperative 1.35 (4.58) 2.37 (6.00) -1.75+
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Issue Appraisal  31.73 (22.64)  32.29 (21.81)   0.24 
 Elaboration  12.85 (15.26)  10.98 (13.30)  1.15 
 Likes  0.47 (2.38)  0.50 (2.53)  -0.14 
 Dislikes  1.23 (4.56)  2.71 (7.08)      -2.60** 
 Agreement    7.07 (11.37)  6.58 (9.38)   0.41 
 Disagreement  4.17 (8.30)  5.08 (9.28)  -0.96 
 Solution  5.78 (9.46)    6.34 (11.26)  -0.55 
        
Process Appraisal   49.10 (26.18)  47.24 (24.46)   0.65 
 Constructive Engagement       
  Self   10.92 (15.40)    6.06 (10.92)      3.30** 
  Partner  0.45 (2.47)  1.11 (4.26)   -1.64+ 
  Dyad  2.13 (6.25)  1.62 (6.31)  0.70 
 Avoidance & Detachment       
  Self  2.14 (5.96)  3.04 (7.00)  -1.27 
  Partner  0.73 (3.17)  1.80 (5.89)   -1.93+ 
  Dyad  0.28 (1.97)  0.18 (1.62)   0.45 
 Confrontation       
  Self  3.52 (8.57)  3.65 (7.79)  -0.13 
  Partner  3.10 (8.53)  2.33 (6.72)   0.91 
  Dyad  0.96 (5.06)  0.79 (3.19)   0.44 
 Understanding       
  Self  2.29 (7.72)  1.74 (4.46)   0.76 
  Partner  1.63 (5.38)  2.21 (6.03)  -0.91 
  Dyad  0.95 (4.18)  0.70 (3.43)   0.60 
 Misunderstanding & 
Confusion 
 
     
  Self  2.69 (6.37)    4.40 (10.40)   -1.77+ 
  Partner  1.33 (4.43)  2.75 (7.79)   -2.04* 
  Dyad  0.00 (0.00)  0.00 (0.00)   
 Foreboding & Impasse  2.72 (6.48)  3.35 (7.64)  -0.79 
 Resolution    5.60 (11.04)  4.31 (9.33)   1.22 
 General Process    7.82 (13.62)    7.31 (14.31)   0.36 
        
Other/Uncodable    4.65 (13.52)    4.70 (15.62)  -0.03 
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 Don’t Know 0.08 (1.00) 0.09 (1.15) -0.09
Thinking Same as What was 
Said 
0.09 (1.15) 0.17 (1.52) -0.53
Uncodable   4.48 (13.49)   4.43 (15.45) 0.03

Note. + p  .10, * p  .05, ** p  .01; direct perspectives = ‘I thought…’. Percentages do not sum to 100% 
because the category “emotions” and the corresponding specific codes are excluded. 
However, the men seemed to think more about their own responsibility in the 
conflict, as they had more thoughts within the admission category than women. Men also 
seemed more constructively engaged (or at least had the intention) than the women did. 
Yet, women still felt more misunderstood than men, as they reported more thoughts 
concerning misunderstanding and confusion by their male partner. There was also a trend 
approaching significance (p < .10) for women to report more thoughts about their own 
misunderstanding and confusion. With regard to the topic-related thoughts, the results 
show only a gender difference of women reporting more thoughts of dislike than men. 
The affective tone represented in the definitions of specific codes allows collapsing 
codes into affective categories instead of categories based on the thematic-content (see 
Appendix A). An unexpected gender difference emerged regarding affective tone. Men 
reported far more positive thoughts (44.93%, SD = 25.71) than negative ones (28.18%, SD 
= 25.09). For women, the difference in positive (38.89%, SD = 28.52) versus negative 
thoughts (36.64%, SD = 24.27) was less pronounced. The number of thoughts without a 
clear positive or negative tone (i.e., neutral category) was similar for men (20.68%, SD = 
18.49) and women (18.29%, SD = 19.12).  
Table 2 reports results concerning the fourth hypothesis. The first part of the 
hypothesis (H4a) was confirmed, as perceived threat was negatively correlated with 
positive thoughts and positively correlated with negative thoughts for both men and 
women. Additionally, the number of neutral thoughts negatively correlated with perceived 
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threat for women. The second part of the fourth hypothesis (H4b) was also confirmed, as 
the affective tone of the thoughts of both partners correlated with general relationship 
satisfaction. Table 2 shows an obvious pattern, in that positive thoughts correlated 
positively with relationship satisfaction, and negative thoughts correlated negatively with 
satisfaction.  
͞
Pearson Correlations between Affective Tone, Relationship Satisfaction, and Perceived Threat 
  Perceived threat  Relationship satisfaction 
  Men  Women  Men  Women 
Positive affect  -.28**  -.37**   .35**   .24** 
Neutral affect  -.05  -.22**   .03   .12 
Negative affect   .32**   .55**  -.35**  -.29** 
Note. + p  .10, * p  .05, ** p  .01 
Ǧ
The second aim of the current study was to uncover specific types of 
misunderstanding reflected in perceivers’ under- or overestimation of the target’s actual 
thoughts. The fifth hypothesis predicted gender-based discrepancies between the thematic 
content of meta-perspectives versus direct perspectives. The results did not confirm these 
predictions. Men did not overestimate issue appraisal thoughts by women, t(154) = .03, ns, 
as anticipated (H5a), nor did men underestimate their female partners’ person appraisal, 
t(154) = .09, ns, or process appraisal, t(154) = -1.05, ns (H5b). Further, women did not 
underestimate issue appraisal by men as anticipated, t(154) = .79, ns, (H5c). One gender 
difference did approach significance in the hypothesized direction (H5d), with women 
overestimating the incidence of men’s person appraisal thoughts, t(154) = 1.69, p < .10. 
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However, H5d also predicted that women would overestimate men’s process appraisal 
thoughts. Instead, women underestimated process appraisal by men, t(154) = -2.17, p < .05. 
Although we did not offer predictions, we also examined differences in the affective 
tone of direct and meta-perspectives. The results showed a pattern of errors by women 
when they inferred the direct perspectives of their male partners. Specifically, the women 
underestimated their partner’s positive thoughts, t(154) = -4.12, p < .01, and overestimated 
the men’s negative thoughts, t(154) = 3.66, p < .01. The incidence of neutral thoughts 
inferred by women did not differ from their male partner’s actual neutral thoughts, t(154) 
= .09, ns. In terms of specific codes, women seemed to anticipate men denying 
responsibility more than male direct perspectives suggested. That is, the women 
overestimated the men’s denial and justification thoughts, t(154) = 3.45, p < .01, and 
underestimated men’s admission thoughts, t(154) = -2.35, p < .05. The women also 
perceived the men to be thinking about the interaction in a more negative way than was 
actually reflected in the men’s direct perspectives. The women overestimated the men’s 
thoughts about their own withdrawal (i.e., avoidance and detachment), t(154) = 2.20, p < 
.05, and underestimated male thoughts about their own cooperative intentions in the 
interaction (i.e., constructive engagement), t(154) = -3.62, p < .01. In addition, the women 
underestimated how much the men saw the interaction as moving toward resolution, t(154) 
= -3.44, p < .01. Curiously though, the women also underestimated the men’s thoughts of 
foreboding and impasse within the discussion, t(154) = -2.24, p < .05. Finally, the women 
perceived the men as feeling misunderstood more than the men’s direct perspectives 
suggested. Finally, the women underestimated how much the men thought that the two, as 
a dyad, were achieving understanding, t(154) = -2.56, p < .01, and they over-perceived the 
men as having thoughts about feeling misunderstood (i.e., the men’s thoughts about the 
partner’s misunderstanding and confusion). 
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Of note, men did not make comparable errors when inferring the thoughts of 
women. There were no significant differences between male meta-perspectives and female 
direct perspectives when comparing positive thoughts, t(154) = -1.54, ns, negative 
thoughts, t(154) = -1.27, ns, or neutral thoughts, t(154) = 1.76, p < .10. There were 
differences at the level of specific codes; however, these effects did not trend in a consistent 
direction. Men seemed to misread their female partner’s positive thoughts about them, since 
the men underestimated positive appraisal of the partner by the women, t(154) = -2.05, p 
< .05, along with benign attribution by the women, t(154) = -1.99, p < .05. Men also 
overestimated female thoughts about their own competitive intentions in the interaction 
(i.e., confrontation), t(154) = 2.07, p < .05. On the other hand, men underestimated 
women’s thoughts about mutual confrontation (i.e., confrontation by the dyad), t(154) = -
2.14, p < .05. Men also underestimated how much women thought about dislikes, t(154) = 
-2.01, p < .05, and about foreboding and impasse in the interaction t(154) = -2.18, p < .05.  
Overall, these results suggest that men had an accurate perception of the overall 
affective tone of women’s thoughts during a conflict discussion; whereas women imputed 
a more negative and defensive outlook to their male partners than was suggested by the 
men’s actual thoughts.  
Mind-reading Errors and Empathic Accuracy 
H6 predicted an inverse association between specific mind-reading errors and 
empathic accuracy. To test H6, we computed scores based on the absolute difference 
between the meta-perspectives within a given category by one person versus the direct 
perspectives within the same category by the partner. Difference scores were calculated 
using summary codes for affective tone (percentage of positive, neutral, and negative 
thoughts) and thematic content (percentage of issue, person, and process appraisal 
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thoughts). For example, a female partner’s error in reading her male partner’s positivity 
was calculated as the difference between positive thoughts she assigned to him versus 
positive thoughts he reported for himself.   
Multi-level modeling, performed with mixed-model ANOVA, was used to test 
associations between mind reading errors by the perceiver and the perceiver’s empathic 
accuracy. The analysis treated male and female scores as separate observations but screened 
for gender differences and controlled for interdependence within dyads by treating the dyad 
as a random effect (Kenny, Kashy, & Cook, 2006). Initially, we screened for gender 
differences by conducting separate MLM analyses for difference scores on each summary 
code, with gender and the interaction of gender with mind-reading errors included in these 
analyses. These models revealed significant main effects for all mind-reading errors, with 
the exception of difference scores for issue appraisal. Gender accounted for no significant 
main effects or interactions (all effects p > .10) and was therefore dropped from subsequent 
analyses. 
Two models assessed the combined effects of mind reading errors in affective tone 
and thematic content, respectively, on empathic accuracy (see Tables 3, 4). An initial check 
for multicollinearity showed only small-to-moderate correlations (.30 or below) among the 
three difference scores in each model. Both models supported H6. The first model revealed 
significant effects for mind reading errors in positivity and neutrality on empathic accuracy 
(p < .05) and a nonsignificant trend for negativity error (p < .10). The three mind reading 
errors for affective tone had a moderate combined relationship to empathic accuracy (quasi 
R2 = .05; see Kenny et al., 2006). The second model revealed a significant effect for mind 
reading errors in process appraisal (p < .01), a borderline effect for person appraisal error 
(p =.05), and a nonsignificant trend for issue appraisal error (p < .10). The three mind 
reading errors for thought content had a small-to-moderate combined relationship to 
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empathic accuracy (quasi R2 = .04). Collectively, these results indicate that empathic 
accuracy suffers either when individuals misread the partner’s affective tone or the content 
focus of the partner’s thoughts.  
͟
Fixed Effects of Multi-level Model Predicting Empathic Accuracy from Absolute Value 
Discrepancies in Affective Tone  
Fixed Effects B SE df t p
 
Intercept 19.80 .74 152.70 26.6   .00 
Positive affect discrepancy -.06 .03 293.25  -1.83 .03 
Neutral affect discrepancy -.11 .04 303.88  -2.98 .00 
Negative affect discrepancy -.05 .03 300.52  -1.39 .08 
Note. One-tailed p-values are reported to reflect the directional hypothesis (H6) 
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Fixed Effects of Multi-level Model Predicting Empathic Accuracy from Absolute Value 
Discrepancies in Thought Content  
Fixed Effects B SE df t p 
Intercept      20.26 .77 164.53 26.23 .00 
Issue appraisal discrepancy -.05 .04 300.83 -1.39 .08 
Person appraisal discrepancy -.07 .04 303.45 -1.63 .05 
Process appraisal discrepancy -.07 .03 301.55 -2.42 .00 
Note. One-tailed p-values are reported to reflect the directional hypothesis (H6) 

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Empathic accuracy is both a key process during couple conflict and an especially 
challenging one. To effectively discuss relationship conflicts and thereby reconcile or better 
manage differences, partners presumably must focus on common issues, understand how 
the other person reasons about these issues, and do so on a moment-to-moment basis as the 
interaction unfolds. Yet, empathic accuracy research shows that partners are often unable 
to decipher what the other is thinking during couple communication. The present study 
probes the sources of empathic inaccuracy by examining the thematic content and affective 
tone of partners’ spontaneous online thoughts and how these characteristics are related to 
their success at mind-reading. The results describe basic features of online thought during 
couple conflict and identify certain types of misunderstandings that are related to overall 
empathic inaccuracy.  
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The thematic focus of online thought reflects selective attention to different issues, 
background knowledge, and aspects of ongoing communication. Our initial hypothesis 
suggested that partners show a high degree of mindfulness about the process of 
communication during conflict interactions. The results confirmed this hypothesis, as 
partners indeed reported more thoughts about the process of communication versus other 
categories. This finding supports the claim that natural speech is multilayered in nature and 
communicates both content and relationship meaning (e.g., Watzlawick et al., 1967; Sillars 
et al., 2000). Although conflict is often triggered by a partner’s opinion or behavioral act, 
disagreements over the ostensible topic of conflict can be a cover for underlying implicit 
relationship issues that are evoked by the process of communication. Combined, process 
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and person appraisal were nearly double in frequency compared to issue appraisal thoughts; 
this finding is consistent with the observation that relational, identity, and process issues in 
interpersonal conflicts often supersede content issues in importance (Hocker & Wilmot, 
1991). However, the methodology used could have played a role in the results. Specifically, 
the video-review task asked participants to observe their own and partner’s (non-)verbal 
behavior in order to report about and infer unspoken thoughts and feelings. Thus, we cannot 
discount the possibility that the methods contributed to mindfulness toward communication 
and relationship issues generally. 
The findings also confirmed the second hypothesis, indicating a self-serving bias in 
the way partners think about their own communication versus their partner’s 
communication during couple conflict. Both men and women attributed constructive 
engagement more often to self than to their partner and attributed negative conflict 
strategies more often to their partner than to self. These findings align with previous 
research findings which suggest that partners’ perceptions of conflict are consistent with a 
positive self-schema, maintained through positively evaluating the self and degrading or 
accusing the partner (Fletcher & Fincham, 1991). However, the present findings also 
suggest that self-serving bias extends beyond the realm of attributions in the conventional 
sense (i.e., explanations for behavior) and, in fact, color how particular speech events are 
read as acts of collaboration, confrontation, or avoidance.  
We further assumed that the thoughts of men would be directed more toward issue 
appraisal, whereas women would think more about the conflict process and personal 
evaluations and attributions. However, these previously observed gender patterns were not 
confirmed in the current study, nor were they replicated by Vangelisti et al. (2013). 
Differences between the samples provide one potential explanation, since the Dutch-
speaking couples in the current study are from a different culture and represent a more 
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recent cohort than the one studied in the earlier research (Sillars et al., 2000). In addition, 
some couples were recruited for the current study through the networks of university 
graduate students, a recruitment method that could have yielded a less “traditional” sex-
typed sample than the couples in Sillars et al. (2000). Finally, some details of the video-
review task varied between the studies. Unlike the earlier study, the present study assessed 
empathic accuracy (vs. spontaneous thoughts only) and showed a video image in which 
both partners appeared (as opposed to a video that showed only the partner paired with the 
audio of both partners talking). These study features might have reduced gender differences 
by directing greater attention to the other partner’s experience.  
As expected, partners who were more satisfied and felt less threatened by the 
interaction reported more positive thoughts and fewer negative ones. These findings 
support the premise of sentiment override theory that general perceptions of the relationship 
affect and guide situational information processing in a schema-consistent manner. 
Translated to the current study, this means that satisfied partners tend to think about positive 
aspects of the conflict, partner, and interaction, whereas dissatisfied partners and those who 
feel threatened by conflict, report negative thoughts that can reinforce dissatisfaction.  
Mind-reading Errors Related to Empathic Inaccuracy 
In line with hypothesized gender differences in content-focused versus relationship-
focused thoughts, we expected that the men would overestimate issue appraisal and 
underestimate process and person appraisal by the women, whereas the women would do 
the opposite when inferring the thoughts of the men. The results did not confirm these 
expected gender differences; however, they did reveal mind-reading errors that were made 
by women when they inferred the affective tone of their male partners’ thoughts. The 
women in this study underestimated positive thinking and overestimated negativity by men, 
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both overall and in several specific areas. The women perceived the men as denying 
responsibility for the conflict, feeling misunderstood, and wanting to withdraw versus 
engage during the discussion, with these inferred thoughts exceeding the actual thoughts of 
denial, misunderstanding, and withdrawal by men.  
To summarize, the women saw the men as adopting a rather defensive outlook 
toward the discussion, whereas the actual thoughts of the men were distinctly more positive 
than negative. This finding is broadly consistent with the results of previous studies that 
point to a similar gender difference in partners’ demand-withdraw behavior during conflict, 
such that women tend to be demanding and men tend to withdraw (Eldridge & Christensen, 
2002). Some of the observational ratings collected in the current sample but not used in the 
present study, indeed confirm the suggested gender difference in demand-withdraw 
behavior (Vanhee, Lemmens, & Verhofstadt, 2016). This finding acknowledges the fact 
that women’s reasoning about their male partner being less engaged in the conflict 
interaction and more avoidant or defensive is (partially) anchored in reality because men 
actually showed more withdrawal behavior. On the other hand, women might increase 
demand behavior and reinforce withdrawal by men if they overestimate men’s negative and 
defensive thinking and overlook their cooperative and positive thoughts. 
Generally, we expected specific mind-reading errors by the perceivers to be 
reflected in their overall empathic accuracy. The results mostly supported this core premise 
of the research. Misreading of positivity and neutrality were associated with lower empathic 
accuracy, and negativity error showed a parallel, nonsignificant trend. With respect to 
thematic content, misreading of process appraisal was also associated with lower empathic 
accuracy, person appraisal error had a borderline association, and issue appraisal error 
showed a parallel, nonsignificant trend. These results suggest that empathic accuracy is 
impaired either when individuals misread the partner’s affective tone or the content focus 
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of the partner’s thoughts. Because spontaneous feedback about the accuracy of a partner’s 
inferred thoughts or feelings is rarely given during daily interactions, it seems likely that 
partners’ thematic and affective misunderstandings will seldom be unmasked or corrected. 
Nonetheless, previous research has demonstrated that accuracy increases when the 
perceiver does receive immediate, veridical feedback. A finding that has opened up a 
promising direction for future research and clinical practice (Marangoni, Garcia, Ickes, & 
Teng, 1995; Barone, et al., 2005). 
Study Limitations 
A few limitations of the study should be acknowledged. First, the sample included 
mainly middle-class, heterosexual, non-clinical, and satisfied couples; therefore, no 
conclusions can be drawn about significantly dissatisfied or distressed couples. Future 
research should attempt to replicate these findings with more heterogeneous samples. 
Second, because the design was cross-sectional, the usual caution should be exercised about 
attempting to draw any causal inferences from the results. The temporal order of the 
processes under investigation could not be tested with the present data. In order to resolve 
the issue of causal ordering, future research should therefore use longitudinal or 
experimental designs. Third, the protocol used for reporting and inferring thoughts required 
a certain reflective and verbal ability of the participants, given that they had to report their 
own thoughts, infer the partners’ thoughts, and translate these reflections into written verbal 
reports. Fourth, the categorical coding systems we used required subjective judgments to 
be made by the raters. Although rater differences were all resolved through discussion, 
there were occasional forced assignments of thought units to only one appropriate category 
in spite of ambiguity or possible double meaning.   
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Conclusion 
The results point to factors underlying empathic inaccuracy during couple conflict. 
First, partners can misread the other partner’s thoughts because they focus on qualitatively 
different aspects of interactions. In particular, empathic accuracy suffers when one partner 
(male or female) thinks about content issues in the discussion (i.e., where to go on holiday, 
getting chores done) while the partner analyzes the discussion (e.g., “s/he doesn’t listen”) 
or makes personal evaluations and attributions (“s/he has to do everything alone”) and they 
fail to anticipate or correct for this difference. Second, partners can misread the affective 
tone of the other partner’s thoughts, as seen in the tendency of women to read a more 
negative, defensive, and avoidant outlook in men than shown in men’s thoughts. In part, 
this could reflect the fact that partners do not experience their interactions in quite the same 
way – both partners typically view their own communication as more constructive and less 
avoidant or confrontational than they see the partner’s communication. Thus, men might 
act avoidant while thinking of themselves as doing something else. Finally, sentiment 
override could play a role, in that partners who are dissatisfied or feel threatened tend to 
think about their interactions in a self-confirming, negative way. Potentially, this could lead 
some to read the partner in a more negative way than warranted and overlook when the 
partner is accepting responsibility or thinking about the interaction constructively. These 
trends in online thought suggest important complexities of couple communication; 
however, further research is needed to show the precise impact on couples’ ability to 
discuss and resolve conflicts.  
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Examples [English translation of Dutch input] 
Affect Direct 
“I thought…” 
Meta 
“My partner thought…” 
Person Appraisal 
Positive 
Appraisal 
Self + …I’ve changed a lot too.
…about how she addresses 
the situation a lot better. 
Partner +
…the bad habits of my
girlfriend have been
decreased
…that I was working hard 
to make things better 
Dyad +
…We can do this. We
have already been through
a lot more than this
…we are so close, we can’t 
live without each other 
Benign 
Attribution 
+
…It will be hard for her to
change, but I can live with
it.
…that he knows we have 
his best interests at heart. 
Admission +
…Indeed, sometimes I
react too harsh.
…I have to solve the 
problem at the source. 
Denial & 
Justification 
-
…I work more hours than
my boyfriend, so I have
the right to do less
household chores.
…You see, she is seeking 
excuses again. 
Complaint -  
…She says she does the
dishes, but I don’t agree.
She only rinses the plates.
…he has to do everything 
alone 
Imperative -
…Do the effort to show
me you can!
 …Stop nagging! 
Issue Appraisal 
Elaboration 0
…to spend our holidays 
useful, on several areas. 
… of the difficulties that 
await him 
Likes +
…I like to spend time 
with you. 
…I’m satisfied with the 
positive changes. 



͢͝͝

 Dislikes -  
…the moment is not right 
for it 
 
…this problem really 
bothers her 
 Agreement +  …my partner is right.  …She agrees. 
 Disagreement -  
…I disagree with his 
thoughts on this. 
 
…about the differences in 
our perspectives at this 
point. 
 Solution +  
…about other alternative 
possibilities. 
 
…perhaps we can work on 
this too? 
       
Process Appraisal      
 
Constructive 
Engagement 
     
  Self +  
…that I expressed myself 
well. 
 
…How can I introduce this 
problem properly? 
  Partner +  …he tries to comfort me  
…that it was good I 
expressed my thoughts and 
feelings clearly. 
  Dyad +  
…that it is a good thing 
that we can discuss this 
topic here. 
 
…that we can solve the 
problem together, they are 
negotiable. 
 
Avoidance & 
Detachment 
     
  Self -  
…Why should we discuss 
this problem? We already 
talked about this. 
 
…that the topic is not 
important at all 
  Partner -  
…that he ignores 
everything I say by 
talking about something 
else. 
 …he isn’t listening. 
  Dyad -  
…What should we say 
more? 
 
…Why should I keep 
talking if he isn’t listening 
anyway. 
 Confrontation      
  Self -  
…I will confront him with 
the topic again! 
 
…I’ll show him the facts 
again [Dutch expression: 
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met de neus op de feiten 
drukken] 
Partner -
…that my partner is 
exaggerating again. 
…that I attacked her to 
protect myself. 
Dyad - …here we go again. …same old story. 
Understanding 
Self +
Okay, I understand what 
he wants to bring about. 
…I understand what is 
bothering you. 
Partner +  
…that my partner 
understands what I’m 
talking about. 
…that I understood her 
position 
Dyad +
…We’re on the same 
wavelength 
…that she was feeling that 
we’re understanding. 
Misunderstanding 
& Confusion 
 Self -
…about why my partner 
is reacting like this. 
…I don’t understand what 
he wants to say. 
 Partner -
…that she misunderstands 
me. 
…about how e still feels not 
understood by me. 
 Dyad -
…that we both have to be 
more understanding. 
…we never understand one 
another. 
Foreboding & 
Impasse 
-
…we are not talking about 
the heart of the matter. 
…he is not discussing the 
matter by saying it is my 
topic, but that doesn’t mean 
he should make no effort. 
Resolution +
…that we reached a good 
solution. 
…we are progressing. 
General Process 0 …to recap briefly 
…how will we fill the 
remaining minutes with 
talking about the subject? 
      
Other/Uncodable 
Don’t Know 0 …nothing, I guess. …not much, I think. 
Thinking Same as 
What was Said 
0
…about the things that I 
said. 
…the same as she said. 
Uncodable 0  …good.  …negatively. 
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1  Based on Hinnekens, C., Loeys, T., De Schryver, M., & Verhofstadt, L. L. (2016). The 
manageability of empathic (in)accuracy during couples’ conflict: Relationship-protection or self-
protection? Manuscript submitted for publication.
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 The current study sought to expand upon research on motivated empathic 
(in)accuracy by testing three assumptions that underlie the motivated empathic accuracy 
model, namely if a perceiver’s level of empathic accuracy is manageable, if perceived threat 
can trigger a shift in a perceiver’s accuracy motive to an inaccuracy motive, and finally if 
empathic accuracy can both improve and harm a perceiver’s situational well-being 
depending on his or her level of perceived threat. These assumptions were tested in a 
laboratory-based study in which partners completed a conflict interaction and, afterwards, 
reported on their thought processes during a video-assisted recall task, while also inferring 
the thoughts of the other partner. All participants also completed a similar standard stimulus 
interaction task. The results showed mixed evidence for the three assumptions. A shift in 
the perceiver from motivation to be accurate to motivation to be inaccurate in response to 
perceived threat could not be detected, but some evidence for an acquaintance-effect was 
found (i.e., the effect of familiarity with the target). The results also indicated that higher 
levels of empathic accuracy for non-threatening feelings are predictive of a pre-to-post-test 
increase in perceived closeness for men and improvement in mood for women. However, 
a harmful effect of empathic accuracy for threatening thoughts/feelings on situational well-
being was not found. 
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A dominant prescriptive narrative concerning communication strategies in intimate 
relationships emerged in the early 1980s, emphasizing the importance of self-disclosure to 
reduce the number of misconceptions and thus, to facilitate mutual understanding between 
partners (Birchler, 1979). To date, the assumption that understanding is crucial in intimate 
relationships has largely been empirically supported and interventions fostering mutual 
understanding between partners are frequently used within couple therapy. However, not 
all researchers and practitioners agree on this assumption as studies have also found 
associations between understanding and raised levels of conflict (Sillars, 1985) on the one 
hand, and lower levels of autonomy, privacy (Gilbert, 1976; Olson, Sprenkle, & Russell, 
1979), and relationship satisfaction (Sillars, Pike, Jones & Redmond, 1983; Sillars & Scott, 
1983; Simpson, Ickes, & Blackstone, 1995) on the other. In summary, systematic research 
integrating these contrasting findings on multiple aspects of understanding is not available, 
which impedes us from taking a clear position in this debate.  
The aim of the present study was therefore to clarify the conflicting assumptions 
concerning understanding by investigating empathic accuracy (i.e., an objective measure 
of understanding) during conflict interactions in the context of intimate relationships. 
Empathic accuracy is defined as “the extent to which individuals can accurately infer 
another person's unspoken thoughts and feelings as they spontaneously occur during the 
course of natural interactions” (Ickes, 1993, p. 588). Stemming from the contradicting 
assumptions concerning understanding introduced above, Ickes and Simpson (1997) 
designed a theoretical framework regarding empathic accuracy with the central aim of 
answering three principal questions: (1) Is the level of empathic accuracy manageable (e.g., 
dialing it up or down)?; (2) If so, which factors will influence an individual’s level of 
empathic accuracy?; and (3) What is the effect of an individual’s level of empathic accuracy 
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on his/her situational well-being? Although these questions are intuitively interesting, very 
little systematic research has been conducted, and certainly not within the context of 
intimate relationships. In the paragraphs that follow, we will attempt to answer these 
principal questions based on the limited research that has been conducted to date. 
Afterwards, the research questions of the current study will be introduced. 

Whether or not an individual’s level of empathic accuracy is manageable seems to 
have been probed by research aimed at identifying characteristics of “good” versus “bad” 
perceivers (where the perceiver is a person who infers a target’s thoughts/feelings). The 
latter appeared to be extremely difficult as no personality or other stable individual 
variables have been discovered that were able to predict which perceivers would achieve 
high versus low levels of empathic accuracy (Ickes et al, 2000). Yet, some relationship and 
target variables have been found to be more promising in indicating when perceivers were 
motivated to be empathically (in)accurate and this has been found to be positively 
associated with their accuracy level (see Hodges, Lewis, & Ickes, 2015 for an overview). 
These findings have led to the model’s first general assumption that empathic accuracy is 
manageable (and thus not a fixed ability) depending on proximal and distal factors.  
Indeed, several studies have actually provided evidence for some of these factors 
operating as “motives” that foster an enhancement of perceivers’ levels of empathic 
accuracy. For instance, monetary incentives have been found to be situational motives for 
empathic accuracy for verbal cues (Klein & Hodges, 2001). Also, when both men and 
women were encouraged to be accurate – because they believe this is an aspect of a socially 
desirable gender role – their empathic accuracy has been found to increase (Thomas & 
Maio, 2008). Likewise, characteristics inherent to the perceiver that are triggered during 
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interactions with others have been found to stimulate empathic accuracy, for example a 
perceiver’s need to belong (Pickett, Gardner, & Knowles, 2004) or their tendency to be 
securely attached to others in contrast to an avoidant attachment tendency (Simpson et al., 
2011).  
These findings have led to the conclusion that empathic accuracy can be defined as 
a situation-dependent phenomenon2 rather than a fixed ability. However, this does not 
imply that motivated perceivers will show perfect empathic accuracy because each 
individual differs in their ability to perceive and to interpret (non) verbal signals conveyed 
by a target. Furthermore, each target also differs in how clearly (s)he emits these signals, 
or in other words, how expressive (s)he is. These restrictions are what Ickes has defined as 
“individual-level distal factors […]that set the range – the upper and the lower boundaries 
– of empathic accuracy in a given interaction” (Ickes & Simpson, 1997, p. 235). These 
individual factors determine the levels between which empathic accuracy can vary, and 
thus, when situational factors will play a more prominent role in stimulating or 
downgrading empathic accuracy.  
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2 This term has been used instead of motivation-based empathic accuracy as some caution is 
recommended when using the term motivation. Although, the factors described in the model that 
affect the level of accuracy are defined as ‘motives’ (Ickes, 2011), the assumptions stemming from 
the model are predominantly intuitive (because to date there has been little empirical verification 
of the full model) and the designated underlying motives only allow for implicit measurement. 
Furthermore, motivation is not merely a quantitative construct as some authors have stated that the 
quality or type of motivation is also important when drawing conclusions about the influence of 
motivation (Ryan & Deci, 2000; Vansteenkiste, Ryan, & Deci, 2006), but these aspects of 
motivation are not included in the present study. 
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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In addition to the assumption that empathic accuracy is manageable, the model of 
empathic accuracy focuses on the question of which factors stimulate a perceiver’s level of 
empathic accuracy (i.e., dial it up) and which factors downgrade the level of empathic 
accuracy (i.e., dial it down). Some factors have already been described in answering the 
previous question, but we will now focus on the model’s specific predictions about intimate 
partners’ levels of empathic accuracy.  
  Ǥ In line with the accepted belief that higher 
levels of empathic accuracy are beneficial for intimate relationships, the general 
assumption of the empathic accuracy model states that intimate partners should be guided 
by an accuracy motive (i.e., a motive to reach accurate inferences; Kunda, 1990) in 
everyday, routine interactions as this generally results in enhanced relationship stability 
and closeness. More specifically, the model predicts that in so-called “non-threatening” 
situations, a moderate to high level of empathic accuracy will lead to relationship stability 
and even to relationship growth, where “non-threatening” versus “threatening” situations 
are defined by “the degree to which the perceiver feels [not threatened versus] highly 
threatened by the consequences that would likely result from accurately inferring the 
partner’s thoughts/feelings” (Ickes & Simpson, 1997, p. 235).  
Indirect evidence for this assumption can be derived from research documenting 
that partners who are dating or partners in new relationships show increased levels of 
empathic accuracy (Thomas & Fletcher, 2003; Thomas, Fletcher, & Lange, 1997), thereby 
suggesting that partners within these kind of relationships are motivated by getting to know 
each other, and the process of estimation of the target partner’s commitment to the 
relationship and beliefs about the future of the relationship. It should be noted, however, 
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that besides the studies cited above, no other research directly testing this assumption has 
been conducted. 
   Ǥ Other studies have revealed that certain 
factors operate as motives for partners to downgrade the level of empathic accuracy (i.e., 
move towards empathic inaccuracy). More specifically, there are situations in which an 
esteem-regulatory motive (i.e., a motive to make desirable/esteem-enhancing inferences) 
can occur instead of an accuracy motive, and consequently, someone can shift from one 
motivational mindset to another, according to their needs and concerns given the current 
situation. This model specifies particular situations in which such an esteem-regulatory 
motive may be triggered. More specifically, every couple has certain areas or topics of 
conflict (i.e., “danger zones”) that should not be approached or discussed for the sake of 
the relationship. Nevertheless, a partner may introduce such a topic, and initiate a 
potentially threatening interaction. In such a situation, Ickes and Simpson (1997) assume 
that the non-initiator has two options, either the topic may be rejected and the non-initiator 
may try to escape from the situation, or, when escaping is impossible or inappropriate, this 
partner may try to minimize potential harm by avoiding or ignoring the threatening 
discussion. The empathic (in)accuracy model proposes that someone may engage in 
cognitive avoidance or empathic inaccuracy, when their partner’s or their own 
thoughts/feelings are perceived as likely to cause distress. Hence, cognitive avoidance can 
be considered to involve shifting away from an accuracy motive to a motive to inaccurately 
interpret thoughts/feelings that are considered as threatening (esteem-regulatory motive) 
because this defense strategy may be efficient in preserving a low level of personal and 
relational distress in the short-term (Ickes & Simpson, 1997). 
Evidence for this assumption comes from a study by Simpson and colleagues (1995) 
that showed an association between high levels of perceived threat and lower levels of 
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empathic accuracy. More specifically, partners who were dating who were confronted with 
attractive opposite-sex alternatives perceived these as threats to their relatively new 
relationships and consequently showed lower levels of empathic accuracy. This finding 
suggests that the participants felt the need to protect their relationship from accurate 
inference of their partner’s thoughts about the attractive alternatives. Again, however, it 
should be noted that research directly targeting this assumption is scarce. 
ǯǦ
The main key in unraveling the discussion about whether empathic accuracy has a 
positive or negative role to play in intimate relationships can be found in the final 
assumption of the EA-model. Both empirical and clinical observations indicate that 
empathic accuracy has the potential to either harmonize or harm intimate relationships. 
However, combining the results of these observations overlooks the important distinction 
between the effect of empathic accuracy on long-term outcomes versus short-term 
outcomes, whilst also denying the existence of benevolent misunderstandings. 
Ǧ  ǦǤ Previous work on social support 
(Verhofstadt, Buysse, Ickes, Davis, & Devoldre, 2008; Verhofstadt et al., 2016) has found 
that empathic accuracy is predictive of better support provision as individuals who are more 
able to recognize their partner’s needs can provide more welcome support to their partner 
in distress. Empathic accuracy can also prevent interactions from escalating into 
threatening conflicts by stimulating accommodative behavior (Kilpatrick, Bissonnette, & 
Rusbult, 2002) or by reminding someone that their partner is devoted (Gordon & Chen, 
2015) – as reflected by an accurate understanding of the target’s feelings and perspectives 
– during disagreements. Taken together, empathic accuracy can be considered to be
beneficial to relationships.  
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However, some nuance is necessary, as an important study (Simpson, Oriña, & 
Ickes, 2003) based on the assumptions underlying the empathic accuracy model has 
convincingly demonstrated that the effect of empathic accuracy on short-term outcomes 
can differ depending on the situation. The findings indicated that when the perceiving 
partner reached higher levels of empathic accuracy with regard to the target partner’s 
thoughts/feelings and these were rated as relationship-threatening, then his or her post-
interaction feelings of closeness diminished in comparison to perceivers who dialed down 
their accuracy, therefore not experiencing such a decrease. These findings demonstrate that 
the short-term consequences of empathic accuracy depend on a perceiver’s subjective 
experiences of threat (i.e., perceived threat) given the situation. When taking a closer look 
at the association between perceived threat and the consequences of partners’ levels of 
empathic accuracy, it is noticeable that these consequences are already inherent to the 
definition of perceived threat. More specifically, a situation can only be perceived as 
threatening when the consequences resulting from accurately inferring the partner’s 
thoughts/feelings are assessed as negative. The former suggests that a context cannot be 
characterized as threatening as such, but depends on the perceptions and assessment of the 
perceiving partner. 
Ǥ A study by Sillars (1985) suggested three 
cases in which the consequences of empathic accuracy might be assessed as negative, 
namely by revealing (1) irreconcilable differences (differences or disagreements that 
cannot be resolved), (2) benevolent misconceptions (assumptions about the partner or 
relationship that are not based on reality but have the intention of improving or maintaining 
relationship satisfaction and stability), and (3) unpleasant truths (distressing interpretations 
or assumptions held or formed by the target about the perceiving partner’s behavior or 
character). Disclosing this kind of information might have an impact on either the 
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 
ͣ͝͞

relationship, by increasing conflict or relationship insecurity, on the perceiver’s self, by 
undermining a consistent self-view or belief, or on both. How partners cope with these 
disclosures will differ from individual to individual, and therefore they will not always have 
a negative impact on the perceiver’s relationship or self-esteem in the long-term. However, 
these disclosures generally have a short-term destabilizing effect, reflected in a post-
interaction drop in relationship well-being or/and personal well-being. So, in addition to 
the statement that empathic accuracy can be beneficial to relationships, it should be noted 
that greater understanding can also increase distress and frustration within the relationship. 
ǦǤ These findings lead us to the hypothesis 
that it might not just be relationship-protection, as specified by the model, that can be a 
motive to be empathically inaccurate during potentially threatening situations, but that there 
is also a role for self-protection serving as a similar motive. Implicit evidence for self-threat 
as an underlying motive for empathic inaccuracy has been found in research investigating 
the content of partners’ thoughts (Hinnekens, Sillars, Verhofstadt, & Ickes, submitted; 
Sillars, Roberts, Leonard, & Dun, 2000). These studies suggest that an individual’s 
thoughts during conflict often concern their partner’s behavior or personality, and can be 
labeled as personal appraisals (i.e., thoughts including “personal evaluations and perceived 
characteristics of the partner, or the self”; Sillars et al., 2000, p. 487). This implies that 
although a thought can be perceived as possessing no potential threat to a relationship, the 
same thought can be perceived as very threatening to the perceiver’s self-esteem or self-
image. The latter may trigger inaccuracy as a way of preserving an individual’s dignity and 
pride, regardless of how they are perceived by their partner (i.e., self-verification theory; 
Swann, 1983; the relationship dissolution model; Fine & Harvey, 2013). 
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The main focus of this study was to examine the assumptions held by the empathic 
accuracy model. Taken together, if these assumptions are correct, then (a) a partner’s level 
of empathic accuracy is manageable within the boundaries of his or her ability, (b) a 
partner’s level of empathic accuracy should be negatively associated with perceived 
relationship-threat, and (c) the association between empathic accuracy and short-term 
(relationship/personal) well-being should be moderated by perceived (relationship/self) 
threat.  
Ǥ To test the first assumption, partners’ baseline levels of empathic 
accuracy will be determined as this sets the lower boundary of their empathic accuracy 
ability. Therefore, the level of empathic accuracy when confronted with an unknown target 
was measured in addition to the participant’s level of empathic accuracy for the own 
partner. This baseline accuracy was measured by means of the standard stimulus paradigm 
in which each partner observes an interacting stimulus couple (SS-paradigm; Kagan, 1977). 
A feature of the SS-paradigm necessary to determine a reliable baseline score is that every 
individual infers the same target “stranger” which (1) ensures that there is no shared history 
or relationship between the target and the perceiver, and (2) allows us to compare the 
accuracy scores of the different perceivers. The absence of a shared history between the 
perceiver and target is necessary to make sure that each perceiver’s inferences are entirely 
based on his or her ability to detect and interpret their target’s situational cues (whilst the 
obviousness of the target’s cues, i.e., readability, is controlled and invariable; Marangoni, 
Garcia, Ickes, & Teng, 1995). Furthermore this interaction should be perceived as non-
threatening because the perceiver is not personally involved in the interaction.  
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͡
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Taken together, the first part of our assumption predicted that empathic accuracy is 
manageable and thus partners’ accuracy scores should fluctuate across the seven points of 
measurement during the interaction (H1). Furthermore, following the reasoning of the 
empathic accuracy model, our second hypothesis predicted that a perceiving partner’s level 
of empathic accuracy for their own target partner’s non-threatening thoughts/feelings 
should be higher than the perceiver’s level of empathic accuracy for the unknown target’s 
thoughts/feelings (H2a), due to an underlying accuracy motive which will be present when 
inferring detail from one’s own partner but not when inferring from an unknown partner 
(in addition to the shared knowledge on which partners can rely when making inferences). 
Ǥ In contrast to this accuracy motive for predicting moderate to 
high levels of empathic accuracy for non-threatening thoughts/feelings, is the assumption 
of an esteem-regulatory motive to predict low levels of empathic accuracy (i.e., inaccuracy) 
for threatening thoughts/feelings. This esteem-regulatory motive is considered as a 
defensive mechanism that protects short-term well-being. Thus, the second part of the first 
hypothesis predicted that the perceiving partner’s level of empathic accuracy for the target 
partner’s threatening thoughts/feelings would be lower than the perceiving partner’s level 
of empathic accuracy for the target partner’s non-threatening thoughts/feelings, and may 
even drop below their baseline level of empathic accuracy (i.e., the lower boundary of 
empathic ability measured in the SS-paradigm; H2b).  
Additionally, previous research has found indications that accuracy for 
thoughts/feelings can be distinguished at an empirical and conceptual level (e.g., Barone et 
al., 2005; Ickes & Cheng, 2011), therefore, empathic accuracy was split into empathic 
accuracy for thoughts and empathic accuracy for feelings. However, no specific predictions 
on the differential impact of perceived threat on accuracy for thoughts versus feelings can 
be derived from the existing empathic accuracy literature. 
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 ǦǤ Finally, we offer predictions about the association 
between empathic accuracy for thoughts/feelings and short-term well-being as moderated 
by perceived threat. As our previous hypothesis predicted a drop in empathic accuracy 
when threat is perceived, the subsequent hypothesis tested whether the assumption of an 
underlying protection mechanism is a valid one by taking the consequences of empathic 
(in)accuracy into account. Therefore, we compared the association between a perceiving 
partner’s level of empathic accuracy for the target partner’s non-threatening 
thoughts/feelings and short-term well-being (i.e., post-interaction measures of well-being) 
with the association between a perceiving partner’s level of empathic accuracy for the target 
partner’s threatening thoughts/feelings and short-term well-being. As already introduced 
above, the empathic accuracy model assumes that an underlying protection mechanism is 
activated to protect relationship well-being in the short term, however, the current study 
assumed that this mechanism is also activated to protect the perceiver’s personal well-
being. More specifically, the second hypothesis predicted a positive association between 
empathic accuracy for thoughts/feelings rated as not threatening to the relationship and the 
perceiving partner’s level of relationship closeness (i.e., a situational measure of 
relationship well-being; H3a) and a positive association between empathic accuracy for 
thoughts/feelings rated as not threatening to the perceiving partner’s self and his/her mood 
(i.e., a situational measure of personal well-being; H3b). Furthermore, our third hypothesis 
predicted a negative association between empathic accuracy for thoughts/feelings rated as 
threatening to the relationship and the perceiving partner’s reported level of relationship 
closeness (H4a) and a negative association between empathic accuracy for 
thoughts/feelings rated as threatening to the perceiving partner’s self and his/her mood 
(H4b). 
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Ǥ Although Ickes and Simpson (1997) remarked 
that the relationship-protection motive might only be clearly evident for perceivers who are 
highly committed to their relationship, this moderating variable was not included in the 
final model. However, we assumed that the predicted negative association between 
empathic accuracy for relationship-threatening thoughts/feelings on relationship closeness 
would be moderated by a perceiver’s level of commitment (H5a). Similarly, as the current 
study also focused on perceived self-threat, we assume that the value that each partner 
reported placing on the goal of holding a consistent view of them self (i.e., their strength of 
self) would moderate the predicted negative association between empathic accuracy for 
thoughts/feelings rated as threatening to the perceiver’s self and the perceiver’s mood 
(H5b). Finally, we took into account that women might respond more to perceived threat 
to their relationship as reflected in their empathic accuracy levels and reported well-being 
because women are described to be more relationship-oriented in their thinking about 
relationships and in their self-presentations than men (e.g., Cross & Madson, 1997), 
whereas men might react more to perceived threat to themselves (e.g., Vanhee, Lemmens, 
Stas, Loeys, & Verhofstadt, 2016). Therefore, potential gender differences were explored.  

The present data were collected within a broader observational study on conflict in 
couples; some results of this study – unrelated to the present research questions – already 
have been published (Hinnekens, Ickes, De Schryver, & Verhofstadt, 2016; Hinnekens, 
Vanhee, De Schryver, Ickes, & Verhofstadt, 2016). 
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The sample consisted of the 310 members of 155 cohabiting/married heterosexual 
couples recruited in the context of a large observational study called the “UGent Family 
Lab Couple Study”. The recruitment strategy enlisted couples to volunteer for the study 
through a general call (via posters and social media), and through the contacts of a group 
of 16 Master’s level clinical psychology students who recruited couples in their networks 
including family, friends, and neighbors. Participation was limited to Dutch-speaking 
couples who had been together in a heterosexual relationship for at least one year and 
married or cohabiting for at least six months. The data of three couples that were included 
in the original sample were later excluded from the analyses due to missing questionnaire 
responses or questionnaire responses that revealed failure to meet the inclusion criteria. 
The couples had been together at the time of the study for an average of 12.15 years 
(SD = 11.76; range = 1 to 47 years). The men averaged 36.29 years of age (SD = 14.05) 
and the women averaged 34.21 years (SD = 13.60) (age range = 19 to 76 years). The sample 
represented several levels of education: the highest level of education was primary 
education for 6 individuals (1.9%), lower secondary school for 29 individuals (9.4%), 
higher secondary school for 101 individuals (32.6%), short courses of higher education for 
96 people (31.0%), and long courses of higher education for 75 individuals (24.2%), while 
1 individual had completed a PhD program (0.3%), and 2 individuals had anunknown level 
of education due to missing data. 

Couples who expressed interest in taking part were visited at home, where they were 
provided with information about the study and evaluated to determine if they met the 
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inclusion criteria. The partners received instructions to independently complete online 
questionnaires that measured relationship satisfaction and other variables not relevant to 
the current report. After both partners had completed the questionnaires, they were 
contacted by telephone to schedule an appointment for the observational part of the study, 
which could take place either at the university or at the couple’s home. The observational 
part of the study consisted of a conflict interaction and a post-interaction video-review task. 
Each couple received monetary compensation of €20 for completing the questionnaire 
session and an additional €20 for completing the observational session. Participants were 
informed that they could withdraw from the investigation at any time; however, all couples 
completed both phases of the research. The study was approved by the ethical committee 
of the Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences at the Ghent University. 
ǤPartners’ level of commitment to the relationship was assessed 
with a subscale of the Investment Model Scale (IMS; Rusbult, Martz, & Agnew, 1998; Dutch 
translation of Van Lange et al., 1997). The questionnaire consists of four subscales 
(satisfaction, alternatives, commitment, and investment), but for the purpose of the current 
study, we only used the commitment scale to gauge how engaged a partner was in the 
relationship and how dependent they were willing to be. The items were scored on a 9 point-
Likert scale ranging from 1 = totally disagree to 9 = totally agree, and were summed to 
make a total score. This scale has been found to be the strongest predictor of longevity in a 
relationship beyond the other subscales (e.g., Drigotas & Rusbult, 1992; Rusbult, Johnson, 
& Morrow, 1986). The internal consistency of the scale was acceptable (Cronbach’s Įmen 
=.75, and Įwomen = .68).
Ǥ The Sense of Self Scale (SOS; Flury & Ickes, 2007) was 
developed to measure the strength of an individual’s identity. The questionnaire consists of 
twelve items that measure four aspects of identity: (1) difficulty in keeping one’s own 
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identity separate from that of others, (2) a lack of knowledge about one’s own interests, 
opinions, and personality, (3) sudden shifts in feelings, values, and preferences, and (4) the 
feeling of a tenuous existence. The items are scored on a 4 point-Likert scale (ranging from 
1 = not at all typical for me to 4 = very typical for me). Individuals who have a weak sense 
of self will have a high total score indicating that they feel unsure about who they are, what 
they think or what their own opinions are. Individuals who have a strong sense of self can 
be described as being certain about who they are, having firm personal preferences, and 
having a clearly defined personality. The internal consistency of the scale was good 
(Cronbach’s Įmen =.83, and Įwomen = .83). 
 Ǥ In the observational part of the study, the couples 
were asked to participate in a conflict discussion task that was similar to those used in 
previous studies on marital conflict (e.g., Fletcher & Thomas, 2000; Simpson et al., 2003). 
Couples who chose to come to the university were escorted to a laboratory that was 
furnished to resemble a living room but equipped to allow video-recording of the conflict 
discussion (n = 114). In cases in which the interaction task was conducted at the couples’ 
home, the partners were seated in a quiet room where we installed a small portable camera 
(n = 41). In both settings, the recording took place with the couple’s knowledge and written 
consent.   
Prior to the conflict discussion, the partners were separately asked to select a 
problem or issue from a list of common topics of conflict in intimate relationships of which 
the source was either their partner or the relationship and which caused relationship distress 
or recurring disagreement. The issues (e.g., trust, intimacy, finances) were derived from 
previous work on sources of conflict within intimate relationships (Kurdek, 1994). One of 
the conflict issues selected by the partners was then randomly chosen as the topic for the 
subsequent discussion. The partner who selected the issue introduced it to the other partner 
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and the couple was asked to discuss it together for eleven minutes. Both partners were 
instructed to try to act as they would do when discussing a similar problem with each other 
at home.  
 Ǥ During the course of the observational session, 
partners’ self-reported level of relationship closeness was assessed twice (once before and 
once after the conflict interaction task) using the Inclusion of the Other in the Self Scale 
(IOS; Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992). This scale consists of a single pictorial item in the 
form of Venn diagrams of which partners have to select the diagram that accurately 
represents their impression of relationship closeness at that moment in time.  
Ǥ Similar to the IOS, partners’ levels of personal well-being were also rated 
twice using the Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM; Bradley & Lang, 1994). This pictorial 
three-item questionnaire measures three different components of a person’s affective or 
emotional reaction (pleasure or mood, arousal, and dominance), yet, for the purpose of the 
current study, only the first item was used. Participants rated their mood on a 9-point Likert 
scale ranging from an unhappy, sad figure to a happy, smiling figure. 
ǦǤ
  Ǥ Immediately after the post-interaction task both 
partners individually completed a video-review task similar to that used in other studies 
(e.g., Ickes, Stinson, Bissonnette, & Garcia, 1990; Verhofstadt et al., 2016). The partners 
were separated and asked to re-experience and re-live their interaction while they viewed a 
video of it on a laptop. The video presentation was controlled by an interactive software 
package (Hinnekens & Kimpe, 2014) developed to facilitate the video-review task. Every 
90 seconds, the video paused and the same set of instructions appeared on the screen. First, 
each partner was asked to (a) type the specific thoughts/feelings that he or she had at that 
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point in the interaction into a blank box in an online questionnaire, (b) rate how obviously 
(i.e., how transparently) they believed their expression of these thoughts/feelings was in 
their behavior at the time, and (3) rate how threatening they perceived the content of their 
thoughts/feelings to be to themselves, their partner, and their relationship. Next, each 
member of the couple was asked to (a) infer the specific content of each of their partner’s 
thoughts/feelings, and to type each inference into a blank box, (b) rate how obviously they 
believed their partner expressed each thought or feeling in his or her behavior at the time, 
and (3) rate how threatening each of their partner’s inferred thoughts/feelings were to 
themselves, their partner, and their relationship. The ratings of transparency were recorded 
on a Likert scale that ranged from 0 = not at all obvious to 4 = totally obvious, and the 
ratings of perceived threat were recorded on a Likert scale that ranged from 0 = not 
threatening to 7 = very threatening. The instructions emphasized that the reported 
thoughts/feelings should be based on the 10-second segment of interaction that 
immediately preceded the pause in the video. The software gave participants the option to 
re-observe the 10-seconds of interaction that occurred before each pause. 
. Similar to the dyadic interaction paradigm, participants 
were asked to observe a video of an unknown couple engaging in a conflict-interaction (in 
which the stimulus couple had agreed to display their videotaped conflict interaction). After 
confirming that they did not know or recognize the stimulus couple, each participant was 
asked to imagine experiencing the couple’s interaction themselves, and to observe the 
partner of the opposite gender. Similar to the review task of the dyadic interaction 
paradigm, the video was paused at regular intervals and analogously, the participants were 
asked (a) to make inferences about the thoughts/feelings of the partner of the opposite 
gender, and (b) to score how obviously this partner had expressed these thoughts/feelings 
during the interaction on a 5-point Likert scale.  
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 Ǥ Four independent judges rated the degree of similarity 
between the actual thought or feeling that each (stimulus/own) partner recorded and the 
content of the corresponding inferred thoughts or feelings that the other (stimulus/own) 
partner recorded. Following the recommendations of Ickes and colleagues (1990), the 
degree of similarity was rated in each case using a 3-point scale on which 0 = different 
content from the actual thought or feeling; 1 = similar, but not the same content as the 
actual thought or feeling, and 2 = essentially the same content as the actual thought or 
feeling. Overall empathic accuracy scores were then computed as a simple percentage 
measure of the number of “accuracy points” earned, divided by the total number of 
“accuracy points” available and multiplied by one hundred. 3  Generally, the empathic 
accuracy coding had acceptable reliability. For the dyadic interaction paradigm, ICC scores 
of EAfeelings were .70 and .74, and EAthoughts were .67 and .67, both for men and women, 
respectively. In the standard stimulus task, ICC scores of EAfeelings were .83 and .75, and 
EAthoughts were .67 and women .67, both for men and women, respectively. 

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The sample-based means, standard deviations, ranges, and paired sample t-tests for 
all study variables are presented in Table 1. According to the paired sample t-tests, men 
and women generally scored very similarly on the study variables. A few significant gender 
differences emerged. Partners seemed to differ in their empathic accuracy score for the 
 
3 The theoretical range of this percentage-correct accuracy measure was 0 (none of the possible 
accuracy points was earned) to 100 (all of the possible accuracy points were earned). 
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standard stimulus task, as men seemed to reach higher levels of empathic accuracy both for 
thoughts/feelings. Furthermore, partners differed on the measures of perceived threat for 
the relationship, both in response to the partner’s thoughts/feelings, with men seeming to 
experience more potential threat from the thoughts/feelings of his female partner, reflected 
in higher mean scores. Additionally, men and women also seemed to differ in their scores 
on the sense of self scale as women scored slightly higher, indicating a weaker sense of 
self.
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ǤWe analyzed the data using a Multilevel model for dyadic data 
with repeated measures (i.e., data collected at seven time points during video-review) that 
treats the three levels of distinguishable dyadic data (time points nested within persons 
nested within couples) as two levels of random variation. The lower level represents 
variability due to within-person repeated measures for male and female partners separately, 
and the upper level represents between-person variability across male and female partners.
͞
Results of the Multilevel Model Analyzing Variability on the Within-Person and Between-Person 
Level 
 Empathic accuracy  Threat 
   Relationship  Self 
 Feelings  Thoughts  Feelings  Thoughts  Feelings  Thoughts 
ı2M 0.32  0.2  0.91  0.95  1.32  1.23 
ı2V 0.32  0.27  0.87  0.96  1.25  1.13 
ȡıMıV .07  0.08  -.31  -.33  -.30  -.31 
ĲM 0.01  0.02  0.79  0.82  0.74  0.76 
ĲV 0.01  0.02  0.79  0.70  0.80  0.74 
ȡĲMĲV .90  .74  .96  .97  .97  .95 
Note. ı denotes variability due to within-person repeated measures; Ĳ denotes variability due to between-
person variability. 
 
Table 2 shows that there is hardly any between-person variability in empathic 
accuracy for thoughts and feelings. But, there is a high degree of within-person variability 
for empathic accuracy suggesting that partners’ level of empathic accuracy is not fixed, but 
indeed manageable (H1). However, these variability scores do not inform us about what 
accounts for this variability in partners’ empathic accuracy scores. Furthermore, it is 
͡
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noticeable that partners seem to have very similar overall levels of empathic accuracy, but 
their within-moment correlation is rather small. 
Ǥ When taking a closer look to the variability of the hypothesized 
predictor of perceived threat, Table 2 shows that the between-person variability is a bit 
smaller than the within-person variability for threat. Remarkable is that partners’ within-
moment correlation is negative for threat. Regarding our second hypothesis, our model did 
not find a significant association between empathic accuracy and threat (p > .05). This null-
finding suggests that the variability in a partner’s empathic accuracy score for 
thoughts/feelings is not due to any form of perceived threat. 
The same conclusion could be drawn from the analyses regarding the comparison 
between empathic accuracy during the DI-paradigm (for the participant’s own partner) and 
the SS-paradigm (for the unknown target). Our hypotheses were tested by the means of 
one-sample t-tests that allowed us to control for the readability of the targets. For each 
individual, four scores of empathic accuracy were taken into account. The empathic 
accuracy score(s) for thoughts/feelings on the time point(s) rated by the target as least 
threatening during the interaction (i.e., those that involved empathic accuracy for not-
threatening thoughts/feelings) and the empathic accuracy score(s) on the most threatening 
time point(s) during the interaction (i.e., those that involved empathic accuracy for 
threatening thoughts/feelings) were selected for the analyses. Prior to each t-test, a simple 
linear regression was fit to the data with each participant’s level of empathic accuracy at 
the least/most threatening time point as the dependent variable and their partner’s 
readability as the independent variable. Next, the estimated regression coefficients (b0 and 
b1) were used to predict the estimated mean (Mpred) and compute a value of the independent 
variable when their partner’s readability score would be equal to that of the stimulus 
partner, that is, Mpred = b0 + b1[readability target SS]. We then compared, using a one-
 
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sample t-test, whether the sample mean of partners’ levels of empathic accuracy during the 
SS-paradigm significantly differed from the estimated mean (Mpred). Table 2 shows the 
results of the t-tests comparing each perceiver’s expected mean level of empathic accuracy 
in the DI-paradigm when the readability of their own partner was equal to the readability 
of the stimulus partner and the same perceiver’s level of empathic accuracy in the SS-
paradigm. These comparisons were conducted twice, once for each perceiver’s level of 
empathic accuracy for their own/the unknown partner’s non-threatening thoughts/feelings 
and once for the perceiver’s level of empathic accuracy for their own/the unknown partner’s 
most threatening thoughts/feelings. 
As predicted, perceivers’ expected mean levels of empathic accuracy for their own 
partner’s non-threatening thoughts/feelings was higher than those for the unknown 
partner’s non-threatening thoughts/feelings (H2a; see Table 3). The second part of the 
hypothesis predicted that perceivers’ levels of empathic accuracy for the partner’s 
threatening thoughts/feelings would be lower than the perceivers’ levels of empathic 
accuracy for the partner’s non-threatening thoughts/feelings. Although Table 3 shows a 
tendency in the predicted direction for women, an inverse trend was observed for men in 
that men’s empathic accuracy scores were higher when female partners had threatening 
thoughts/feelings. Additional paired t-tests indeed found our hypothesis to be disconfirmed 
(H3b) as no significant differences were found either between women’s empathic accuracy 
for their male partner’s non-threatening thoughts versus threatening thoughts, t(154) = .88, 
ns, or for empathic accuracy for their male partner’s non-threatening feelings versus 
threatening feelings, t(154) = 1.15, ns, were found. Similarly, no significant differences 
were found between men’s empathic accuracy for their female partner’s non-threatening 
thoughts versus threatening thoughts, t(154) = -1.16, ns, or for empathic accuracy for their 
female partner’s non-threatening feelings versus threatening feelings, t(153) = .72, ns. 
͡
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Perceivers’ levels of empathic accuracy for their own partner always remained higher than 
their baseline level of empathic accuracy (i.e., empathic accuracy for the unknown target), 
both for non-threatening and threatening thoughts/feelings.   
͟
Results of the Comparison between the Expected Levels of Empathic Accuracy during the Dyadic 
Interaction Paradigm and the Observed Levels of Empathic Accuracy during the Standard Stimulus 
Paradigm
Men Women
MDP 
MSS 
[95% CI] 
t  MDP 
MSS 
[95% CI] 
t 
EA for feelings 
 Min. threat 22.67 19.19 
[17.35-21.03] 
-3.74**  32.25 15.70 
[14.06-17.34] 
-19.96**
 Max. threat 24.58 -5.79**  25.20 -11.82**
EA for thoughts 
 Min. threat 25.18 17.11 
[15.44-18.79] 
-9.54**  23.05 14.94 
[13.68-16.19] 
-12.81**
 Max. threat 28.92 -13.96** 22.58 -12.06**
Note. ** p < .01; Min. threat = thoughts/feelings rated as least threatening on both scales; Max. threat = 
thoughts/feelings rated as most threatening on both scales. 
ǦǤ Despite the non-significant 
association between empathic accuracy and perceived threat, the latter could still moderate 
the association between accuracy and situational well-being. However, multi-level 
modeling could not be used to test these hypotheses as we only measured pre- to post-
interaction differences of situational well-being instead of repeated measurements at each 
time point during the interaction. Therefore, the effects of empathic accuracy on the 
outcome variables were tested for the least threatening thoughts/feelings and for the most 
threatening thoughts/feelings. This strategy enabled us to test our hypotheses twice, once 
in the complete sample of the current data-set and once in a subsample. The latter made it 
possible to test the robustness of our findings as the subsample excluded couples where the 
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partners reported no variation in their perceived threat ratings. The rationale for the latter 
subset analysis is the maximization of the use of the variance of the perceived threat ratings, 
which is important given that this variation was often limited. To assess the effect of 
empathic accuracy on short-term well-being, path analysis models in the Structural 
Equation Modeling (SEM) framework were fitted for men and women simultaneously, 
thereby allowing for correlations in the outcomes between partners to be detected. This 
allowed us to explore whether empathic accuracy at low or high levels of threat, calculated 
as explained above, was associated with well-being in men and women. 
Table 4 reports results concerning the third and fourth hypothesis. The first part of 
the third hypothesis (H3a) was partially confirmed for men, as a positive effect on their 
level of relationship closeness was found for empathic accuracy for the feelings they 
detected in their female partners rated as not threatening to their relationship. This effect 
was also significant for the subsample of participants selected from our dataset, 
demonstrating the robustness of this effect, ȕ = 0.55 , p < .05, n = 77. However, this was not 
found for empathic accuracy for non-threatening thoughts. The second part of the 
hypothesis (H3b) was partially confirmed for women, as a positive effect on their self-
reported mood was found for empathic accuracy for feelings that they had detected in their 
male partners and rated as not threatening. The robustness of this effect was demonstrated, 
as this association was also significant in the sample subset, ȕ = .96, p < .01, n = 98. As 
with the men, this effect was not found for empathic accuracy for non-threatening thoughts. 
Although not predicted, two other interesting findings emerged, as for women the results 
indicated a positive effect of empathic accuracy for feelings detected in their male partners 
and rated as not threatening to their relationships on their self-reported mood, and for men 
the results suggested a positive trend between empathic accuracy for their female partners’ 
feelings rated as non-threatening to themselves and their levels of relationship closeness. 
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͡
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Results of the Structural Equations Predicting Changes in Perceived Closeness and Changes in 
Mood from Empathic Accuracy for Feelings and Thoughts at Different Levels of Perceived 
Relationship- or Personal Threat 
¨Closeness ¨Mood 
Men  Women Men Women 
ȕ SE ȕ SE ȕ SE ȕ SE 
EA for feelings… 
Min. relationship-threat  .35* .17  .20 .25 -.13 .33 .79* .34 
Max. relationship-threat .01 .15  .24 .23 -.27 .27  -.05 .32 
Min. self-threat  .28+ .17 -.03 .23 -.10 .32 1.00** .32 
Max. self-threat  -.40** .14 -.08 .19 -.23 .26  -.10 .27 
EA for thoughts… 
Min. relationship-threat .00 .16 -.13 .28 -.32 .31  -.16 .40 
Max. relationship-threat -.23+ .13  .08 .23 -.15 .25  -.08 .33 
Min. self-threat .04 .19 -.32 .23 -.03 .37  -.19 .33 
Max. self-threat   -.19 .12  .06 .20 -.27 .24   .02 .29 
Note. + p < .10, * p < .05,  ** p < .01; N = 155; Min. relationship-threat = thoughts/feelings rated as least 
threatening for the relationship; Max. relationship-threat = thoughts/feelings rated as most threatening for the 
relationship; Min. self-threat = thoughts/feelings rated as least threatening for the perceiver’s self; Max. self-
threat = thoughts/feelings rated as least threatening for the perceiver’s self. 
Regarding the fourth hypothesis, the results suggest a negative trend between men’s 
empathic accuracy for thoughts that they detected in their female partners and rated as 
threatening to the relationship and their self-reported levels of relationship closeness (H4a). 
However, no other significant findings confirming our hypotheses were found, i.e., there 
was no further detectable negative impact of empathic accuracy for thoughts/feelings rated 
as relationship- or self-threatening on closeness or mood (H4a&b). Again, an effect that 
was not predicted was found for men, in that men’s empathic accuracy for feelings that 
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they detected in their female partners and rated as being threatening to themselves was 
negatively associated with their self-reported levels of relationship closeness.   
 Ǥ To test our final hypothesis, the analyses concerning 
hypotheses 3 and 4 were conducted again, but now either including the perceiver’s level of 
commitment or the perceiver’s sense of self as moderator.  
Ǥ The first set of analyses included the perceiver’s level of empathic 
accuracy for the least threatening thoughts/feelings and for the most threatening 
thoughts/feelings, the perceiver’s level of commitment, and their interaction term as the 
independent variables, and their relationship closeness or mood as the dependent variable. 
No significant results emerged from this set of analyses, suggesting that the level of 
commitment is not a moderator of the association between empathic accuracy and 
perceived threat on changes in relationship closeness or mood (H5a). 
  Ǥ The second set of analyses was similar, but now included the 
perceiver’s self-reported sense of self score. Two models that were previously not 
significant, now reached significance due to the significant two-way interactions once sense 
of self was included as a moderator (H5b). A first significant finding indicated a positive 
effect of men’s empathic accuracy for feelings detected in their female partners rated as not 
threating to themselves on relationship closeness that is moderated by men’s self-reported 
sense of self score, with the positive effect being smaller for men with a weaker sense of 
self, ȕ = -.06, p < .05. A second significant finding indicated a negative effect of men’s 
empathic accuracy for feelings detected in their female partners and rated as threatening to 
themselves on the perceiver’s self-reported mood, which was moderated by men’s self-
reported sense of self score, in that this negative effect is, surprisingly, smaller for men 
with a weaker sense of self, ȕ = 0.12, p < .01. A similar moderating trend was found in 
͡
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women; however, it was not found to be statistically significant at the Į <.05 level, ȕ = .08, 
p = .08.  

The general aim of the current study was to examine the three principal questions 
concerning empathic accuracy in intimate relationships that form the basis for the core 
assumptions of the empathic accuracy model developed by Ickes and Simpson (1997). 
Although previous empathic accuracy research has offered some indications directly or 
indirectly supporting these assumptions, no published research has explicitly tested them. 
Because the model provides an important theoretical framework to gain further insight into 
the complex field of actual understanding, empirical research is essential to verify the 
model and to deduce valuable advice for clinical practice. The current study investigated 
each assumption separately, first of all by comparing perceivers’ levels of empathic 
accuracy for their own partners and an unknown partner for different levels of threat, and 
testing the manageability of accuracy based on the assumption of underlying accuracy 
versus esteem-regulatory motives. Secondly, the impact of both relationship-threat and 
self-threat on the associations between empathic accuracy and short-term relationship and 
personal well-being were tested by means of an advanced statistical analysis strategy and 
finally, the potential moderation effects of commitment and sense of self were investigated. 
In the sections that follow, the results and their implications for the empathic 
accuracy model are discussed, and some future directions are suggested, taking into account 
the limitations of the current study. 
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As a first step, the assumption concerning the manageability of empathic accuracy 
was examined. We reasoned that if this assumption is a valid one, then a partner’s level of 
empathic accuracy would vary within the boundaries of his or her ability. The second step 
investigated the assumption that a shift from an accuracy motive to an esteem-regulatory 
motive might be triggered by perceived threat and that this shift accounts for the variation 
in each individual’s accuracy level. Here, we reasoned that if this assumption is valid, then 
partner’s level of empathic accuracy should be negatively associated with their self-
reported levels of perceived threat to both their relationship and themselves. The first 
hypothesis was confirmed as the variability scores indeed suggested that a partner’s 
empathic accuracy scores fluctuated during the interaction.  
The first part of the second hypothesis derived from these assumptions was 
confirmed, as perceivers showed higher levels of empathic accuracy for their partner’s non-
threatening thoughts/feelings in comparison to their empathic accuracy for the 
thoughts/feelings of an unknown target. This could be due to the effect of the accuracy-
motive, which stimulates empathic accuracy as a means of reaching accurate inferences of 
the partner’s thoughts/feelings. However, the assumption that underlying motives, more 
specifically perceived threat, is able to stimulate (dial up) or downgrade (dial down) the 
level of empathic accuracy was not confirmed as there was no significant association 
between both variables. Additionally, each perceiver’s level of empathic accuracy for non-
threatening thoughts/feelings was compared with their level of accuracy for threatening 
thoughts/feelings. And as expected, the prediction that the latter should be lower than the 
former, was not confirmed. Women’s levels of empathic accuracy showed a tendency in 
the predicted direction, but surprisingly, men’s levels of accuracy indicated a tendency in 
the opposite direction, as their empathic accuracy levels for their female partner’s 
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threatening thoughts/feelings were higher than for not threatening thoughts/feelings. It 
should be noted, however, that none of the observed increases or decreases in the empathic 
accuracy level reached statistical significance. 
Furthermore, the results showed that the perceiver’s level of empathic accuracy for 
their own partner was higher than their level of empathic accuracy for the unknown target 
regardless of the level of threat. These results suggest that familiarity with the partner is a 
stronger predictor of accuracy than the potential impact of threat. Nonetheless, an important 
consideration regarding these findings is that the level of threat remained rather low in the 
interactions involved in this study; consequently, the underlying esteem-regulatory motive 
might not have been fully triggered. 
Ǧ
In the third step, we investigated the role of perceived threat as a moderator of the 
association between empathic accuracy and partners’ situational well-being. Here, we 
reasoned that the presence or absence of higher levels of perceived threat in a participant’s 
partner’s thoughts/feelings would determine whether empathic accuracy is desirable or 
beneficial for short-term relationship well-being (e.g., the relationship is perceived as 
stable, closeness increases) or if empathic accuracy might be harmful for short-term 
relationship well-being (e.g., as relationship distress and instability increases, closeness 
decreases). The second hypothesis tested the assumption that empathic accuracy for 
thoughts/feeling rated as not threatening to the relationship on the one hand, or not 
threatening to the perceiver’s self on the other, would lead to an increase in relationship 
closeness or improved mood, respectively. Partial evidence was found for this hypothesis 
as higher levels of men’s empathic accuracy for their female partner’s feelings rated as not 
threatening to the relationship were associated with an increase in the men’s perceived 
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relationship closeness. In the same vein, higher levels of women’s empathic accuracy for 
their male partner’s feelings rated as not threatening to themselves were associated with an 
improvement in their self-reported mood. Some findings that we had not predicted also 
confirmed the same logic, in that higher levels of women’s empathic accuracy for feelings 
detected in their male partners that were not relationship-threatening were associated with 
an improvement in the women’s self-reported mood, and for men the results suggested a 
positive trend between empathic accuracy for feelings detected in their female partners that 
were rated as not threatening to themselves and an increase in the men’s perceived 
relationship closeness. 
In conclusion, the results seem to indicate that, in the context of conflict 
interactions, higher levels of empathic accuracy for non-threatening feelings – either for 
the relationship or the self – are associated with a higher level of perceived closeness for 
men and an improvement in women’s mood.  
In contrast with the results concerning the association between empathic accuracy 
in non-threatening situations and short-term well-being, the results did not totally confirm 
our hypothesis predicting a harmful effect of empathic accuracy for threatening 
thoughts/feelings on relationship well-being. A tendency in the predicted direction 
emerged, in that men who showed higher levels of empathic accuracy for women’s 
thoughts rated as being threatening for their relationship experienced a decrease in 
relationship closeness. Furthermore, in a result that we had not predicted, men who were 
more empathically accurate for feelings of their female partners that threatened themselves 
reported a decline in their perceived relationship closeness. These findings are only 
partially consistent with the results from a previous study (Simpson et al., 2003) that 
indicated that higher levels empathic accuracy for relationship-threatening 
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thoughts/feelings rated by both partners and trained observers were associated with a 
decline in perceivers’ feelings of relationship closeness.  
The consideration mentioned above also applies to the current results, as the level 
of self-reported threat remained rather low in the conflict interactions observed in this 
study. The absolute level of threat might have been rather moderate, and even though the 
thoughts/feelings were labeled as the ‘most’ threatening ones compared to the other 
thoughts/feelings during that interaction, empathic accuracy might not have been perceived 
as being harmful for the situational well-being of the interacting partners who participated.  
The differentiation between empathic accuracy for thoughts/feelings may provide 
another explanation for our results, as previous research has not included this division. 
Although the empathic accuracy scores for thoughts/feelings are quite similar, there 
appeared to be a slight difference in the accuracy scores in favor of feelings. The varying 
difficulty between inferring thoughts versus feelings could explain why we found an 
association between perceived threat and empathic accuracy for feelings but not for 
thoughts. Several reasons supporting this explanation can be noted, namely (1) the number 
of thoughts is endless whereas the number of feelings is limited, (2) the flow of thoughts is 
also continuously changing, whereas feelings might reflect a more generalized emotional 
state and might even represent a general feeling of relationship (dis)satisfaction (i.e., 
sentiment override theory; Verhofstadt, Buysse, Ickes, De Clercq, & Peene, 2005; Weiss, 
1980), (3) thoughts can only be inferred from verbal cues – which might be totally unrelated 
to the target’s thoughts – whereas feelings can be inferred from a lot of non-verbal cues 
(e.g., facial expression, intonation, body language), (4) thoughts are characterized by a 
greater linguistic complexity (e.g., a broader range of words, more functional words and 
verbs, more discrepancy, and tentative words; Ickes & Cheng, 2011) than feelings, (5) 
inferring the valence of thoughts is ambiguous and sometimes artificial, as thoughts are 
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frequently rated as neutral, whereas inferring the valence of feelings is more straight-
forward, and (6) empathic accuracy for feelings benefits from training in contrast to 
empathic accuracy for thoughts (Barone et al., 2005).  
In summary, the impact of accurately inferring a partner’s feelings might be more 
obvious as feelings are limited, less complex, and more straight-forward in their threat-
potential, whereas the impact of accurately inferring thoughts – which are more complex, 
ambiguous, and often neutral – might be harder to detect on a short-term basis. Hence, a 
different underlying association between perceived threat and empathic accuracy for 
feelings on the one hand, and empathic accuracy for thoughts on the other might have been 
disclosed. 

Another possibility for why we did not find an association between empathic 
accuracy for thoughts and perceived threat could be found in the fact that perceivers’ levels 
of commitment and strength of self were not included in the analyses. The negative 
association between empathic accuracy for relationship-threatening thoughts and 
relationship closeness for perceivers highly committed to their relationship might be 
masked by data from perceivers who did not experience a decline in relationship closeness 
because they are less committed to their relationship. These less committed perceivers 
might not experience such a decline as their initial level of closeness might have been lower 
compared to the initial level of closeness rated by highly committed perceivers – additional 
analyses did confirm this explanation as lower commitment was indeed associated with 
lower initial ratings of closeness – and therefore the post-interaction closeness ratings of 
low commitment perceivers could not drop any further (i.e., there was a floor effect). 
Alternatively, as these perceivers seem to not be so committed, relationship-threat might 
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not significantly impact upon their relationship closeness, as they simply care less about 
their relationship. However, these possible explanations seem unlikely, as no significant 
results were found and our hypotheses including commitment as a potential moderator 
could not be confirmed.  
The same line of reasoning also applies for a perceiver’s sense of self as this may 
moderate the association between empathic accuracy for self-threatening thoughts and 
personal well-being. Again, the negative association between empathic accuracy for self-
threatening thoughts on the mood of perceivers with a weak sense of self might be hidden 
by data from perceivers with a strong sense of self who did not experience a drop in their 
mood. Perceivers with a strong sense of identity might not experience accurately inferring 
self-threatening thoughts as destabilizing to their personal well-being. Conversely, 
perceivers with a weaker sense of self might experience feelings of insecurity after 
accurately inferring self-threatening content from their partner’s thoughts. Although we did 
not offer predictions on the direction of the moderations, the results were surprising with 
regard to male perceiver’s strength of identity on well-being, as they showed an opposite 
pattern than that has been previously reasoned. The first significant model indicated that 
the increase of relationship closeness for male perceivers who had accurately inferred their 
female partner’s non-self-threatening feelings was attenuated for perceivers with a weaker 
sense of self; the second significant model indicated that the worsening of a male 
perceiver’s mood after accurately inferring their female partner’s self-threatening feelings 
was also attenuated for perceivers with a weaker sense of self. These results suggest that 
our earlier reasoning should be inverted, so that accurately inferring thoughts/feelings that 
threaten the well-defined view of a perceiver with a strong sense of self might actually be 
very confusing and consequently destabilize the perceiver’s short-term well-being. A 
perceiver might interpret this as indicating that their partner is disapproving or even 
 
	

ͥͥ͝

rejecting their identity. This destabilizing effect might not occur for perceivers with a 
weaker sense of self as they already perceive their identity as inconsistent or uncertain.  
However, as these explanations are all very speculative, future research 
investigating these ambiguous findings should be conducted. This leads us to some final 
limitations and directions for future research. 
	
Despite the strengths of our multi-method design and statistical approach some 
limitations and suggestions for improvement should be noted. First of all, the low scores 
on the measures of perceived threat showed limited levels of variance that possibly reduced 
the power to detect predicted effects. The same limitation applies for our measure of 
commitment. Secondly, our sample consisted of white, middle-class, and non-clinical 
couples who were generally satisfied with their relationships, as is reflected in their 
moderate to high levels of commitment. Future research would benefit from using a more 
heterogeneous sample including couples ranging from distressed to very satisfied about 
their current relationship. Finally, the assumptions concerning the manageability of 
empathic accuracy due to underlying motives might create the impression that perceivers 
consciously monitor and regulate their levels of accuracy. However, it is rather unlikely 
that perceivers are consciously managing this process while considering the potential 
impact of potential threat. Future research should address this issue by using an 
experimental design that effectively manipulates the perceiver’s accuracy motive versus 
their esteem-regulatory motive in order to unravel the influence of underlying motivational 
mechanisms on the empathic accuracy process and situational outcomes.  
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The current findings provide some suggestions to answer the three principal 
questions of this study. These questions were deduced from the basis for the empathic 
accuracy model developed by Ickes and Simpsons, and in turn, this model was used as the 
basis for our hypotheses. First of all, evidence for the manageability of empathic accuracy 
had been found in previous research, demonstrating some motivational factors underlying 
empathic accuracy. Partners’ levels of perceived threat during interactions could be 
considered as the factor that determines the activation of an accuracy-motive (fostering 
higher levels of empathic accuracy) or an esteem-regulatory motive (discouraging empathic 
accuracy). In the current study, some evidence was found for the accuracy-motive, as 
partners showed higher levels of accuracy for their own partner than for an unknown 
interaction partner. However, no evidence was found for the esteem-regulatory motive as 
the results did not show a drop in partners’ accuracy levels for threatening 
thoughts/feelings. As no hard evidence was found for an influencing effect of perceived 
threat on the level of empathic accuracy, our second question remains unanswered at this 
stage. Thirdly, we did find some evidence for a role of perceived threat as a moderator 
between empathic accuracy and situational well-being, as higher levels of empathic 
accuracy for non-threatening feelings were predictive of a pre-to-post-test increase in 
perceived closeness for men and improved mood in women. However, no evidence for a 
harmful effect of empathic accuracy for threatening thoughts/feelings on situational well-
being was found. These findings suggest that the role of empathic accuracy is complex 
during couples’ conflict, and point to the important role of perceived threat, however, future 
research is needed to further elucidate the precise interplay of this and other possible 
moderators on the association between understanding and (post-interaction) well-being.
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The central aim of this doctoral dissertation was to investigate empathic accuracy 
within intimate relationships within the scope of four main objectives. In this final chapter, 
we briefly recapitulate these objectives and present an integrated overview of the most 
important findings together with some theoretical reflections. We then elaborate on 
potential clinical implications. Finally, some general and methodological limitations of the 
current dissertation are considered, leading to some suggestions for future research. 
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The current dissertation aimed at refining and extending the existing research on the 
role of empathic accuracy in intimate relationships. With their introduction of the 
unstructured dyadic interaction paradigm in the 1990s, Ickes and colleagues (Ickes, 
Stinson, Bissonette, & Garcia, 1990) started a period where the research on empathic 
accuracy increased exponentially. Researchers have examined how accurate we are when 
trying to understand other people by investigating different kinds of relationships (e.g., with 
unknown interaction partners, friends, dating partners; Kilpatrick, Bissonnette, & Rusbult, 
2002; Simpson, Ickes, & Blackstone, 1995; Stinson & Ickes, 1992), as a function of specific 
relationship characteristics (e.g., relationship length, satisfaction; Thomas, Fletcher, & 
Lange, 1997) and in various relational contexts (e.g., support interactions; Verhofstadt, 
Buysse, Ickes, Davis, & Devoldre, 2008; Verhofstadt et al., 2016). Research on empathic 
accuracy in intimate relationships has mainly focused on the two most important domains 
of marital interaction, namely couples’ support interactions and couples’ conflict 
interactions. The work of Verhofstadt and colleagues (Verhofstadt et al., 2008; 2016) has 
led to an interesting and consistent pattern of findings on the association between partners’ 
empathic accuracy and their support provision (i.e., couples’ support interactions); the 
beneficial role of empathic accuracy in helping individuals to provide welcome and 
effective support to their partner in distress is now well-documented. However, less is 
known about the association between partners’ empathic accuracy and how they deal with 
relationship conflict (i.e., conflict interactions).  
Although some researchers have completed initial investigations into the role of 
empathic accuracy during couples’ relationship conflict, these studies have not yet provided 
us with a clear picture of the specific ways in which partners’ empathic accuracy comes 
into play or affects outcomes when dealing with relationship conflict. Consequently, as 
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outlined in the general introduction (Chapter 1), we chose to study empathic accuracy in 
the context of relationship conflict for four main reasons, namely (1) disagreements and 
conflict are inevitable in intimate relationships, and therefore occur on a common basis, (2) 
understanding each other is crucial if partners are to effectively discuss and resolve conflict, 
(3) although mutual understanding when dealing with conflict is crucial, conflicts are by 
far the most significant domain of interaction in which misunderstanding and perceptual 
biases arise, and (4) conflict may also trigger high levels of perceived relationship- or self-
threat – as one is confronted with opposing goals between oneself and the partner – which 
might hinder the processes by which people step back and take perspective. 
Our first research question focused on the association between empathic accuracy 
and conflict behavior. Previous research had already indicated that partners’ levels of 
empathic accuracy play an important role in successful couple-focused problem-solving 
(i.e., accommodative behavior; Kilpatrick et al., 2002). However, we reasoned that 
empathic accuracy might also be helpful in more individual-focused problem-solving (i.e., 
demand behavior; Chapter 2). Furthermore, when reviewing the existing literature on 
empathic accuracy, we noticed that there has been no research exploring the association 
between actual and perceived understanding during relationship conflict. In the context of 
conflict, in which an individual may feel not understood at all, it is especially important to 
examine whether this feeling is associated with their partner’s lack of actual understanding, 
and whether this lack of actual and perceived understanding is associated with the couple’s 
general level of adjustment (Chapter 3). Following the observation of potential 
misunderstanding in conflict interactions, the next chapter sought to identify specific 
patterns of partners’ thoughts that potentially contribute to misunderstanding (i.e., empathic 
inaccuracy) during conflict interactions (Chapter 4). In the last chapter, we investigated 
some theoretical assumptions (i.e., the model devised by Ickes & Simpson) about the 
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manageability of partners’ level of empathic accuracy during conflict interactions and the 
effect of empathic accuracy on partners’ interaction-based situational well-being (Chapter 
5). 
These research goals were examined by the means of a large-scale observational 
study called the “UGent Family Lab Couple Study”. This study combined a questionnaire 
session and an observational session consisting of an observed interaction task and a video-
review task based on the dyadic interaction paradigm.  
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In the second chapter, two empirical studies were described that addressed the lack 
of research on empathic accuracy and conflict behavior. Although previous research has 
examined the link between empathic accuracy and pro-relationship behavior, such as 
partners’ support behavior or partners’ accommodating behavior, no research has been 
conducted on the association between empathic accuracy and more self-serving conflict 
behavior, more specifically, demand behavior. 
Even in satisfying intimate relationships, partners who are more motivated to 
resolve a conflict by effecting desired changes seem to rely more on demand behavior 
(Christensen & Heavey, 1990; Eldridge, Sevier, Jones, Atkins, & Christensen, 2007; 
Heavey, Layne, & Christensen, 1993). Furthermore, research has demonstrated that greater 
motivation to be empathically accurate typically leads to higher levels of empathic accuracy 
(Ickes, 2011). Combining these two observations, we expected that individuals who used 
more demand behavior would also be more likely to “read” their partner’s minds in ways 
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that enable them to exert more influence on their partner and thereby achieve a better 
outcome. Consistent with this reasoning, we predicted that partners’ levels of demanding 
communication during a conflict discussion, i.e., their use of “blame” and “pressure for 
change”, would be positively associated with their levels of empathic accuracy. We also 
explored whether this association was moderated by whether or not the perceiver was the 
person who initiated the conflict. 
The sample of Study 1 consisted of 26 cohabitating/married heterosexual couples 
that completed first a relationship satisfaction self-report questionnaire and then a video-
taped conflict interaction with a subsequent video-review task. After controlling for a 
significant association with levels of relationship satisfaction, the results revealed a 
significant and positive association between the perceiver’s blame behavior and his/her 
level of empathic accuracy, as well as a significant two-way interaction between the 
perceiver being the conflict initiator and them applying pressure for change. The first 
association suggested that partners who displayed more blame behavior during the 
videotaped conflict interaction showed more empathic accuracy, independent of whether 
they had initiated the conflict or not. The interaction suggested that when the perceiver was 
in the conflict-initiating role, his or her levels of pressure for change were associated with 
lower levels of empathic accuracy. However, this observed negative relation between 
perceivers’ pressure for change and empathic accuracy was reversed when the perceiver 
was not the conflict initiator. 
In Study 2, the same predictions were tested in a sample of 155 cohabiting/married 
heterosexual couples that again completed a relationship satisfaction self-report and a 
video-taped conflict interaction with subsequent video-review task. In comparison to Study 
1, the data in this study allowed us to differentiate between empathic accuracy for thoughts 
versus that for feelings, and to include gender as predictor in the model. After controlling 
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for relationship satisfaction, the analyses revealed no significant effects. A marginal two-
way interaction was found in the model predicting empathic accuracy for thoughts, in that 
the more blame behavior that was employed by the partner that was not in the role of the 
agent of change, the more empathically accurate he/she was. The observed positive 
relationship between blame and accuracy seems to be reversed when the person was the 
agent of change. 
Taken together, we found some indications that when a perceiver initiated a conflict 
interaction and used more demanding behavior, this accusing and confrontational perceiver 
appeared to be less accurate in “reading” their partner’s thoughts. However, when the 
perceiver was the person who did not initiate the conflict discussion, he or she was found 
to make more accurate inferences about the initiator’s thoughts.  
In other words, conflict initiators who try to impose their will on others tend to be 
less sensitive to their interaction partner’s thoughts and feelings, whereas partners who 
accurately infer the initiator’s actual thoughts and feelings seem to be more likely to be 
able to resist the initiator’s influence and apply a strong counter-influence rather than 
succumbing to the initiator’s pressure. However, since the two studies could not fully 
replicate each other’s results, further (experimental) research is required before firm 
conclusions can be drawn. 
͟Ǧ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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In the third chapter, a study that addressed the lack of research on understanding 
measured from different perspectives (i.e., target versus perceiver’s perspective), and 
applying different measures (i.e., empathic accuracy paradigm versus self-reports) is 
described. The main focus of this empirical study was to investigate the association 
between actual understanding (an objective measure) and the perception of understanding 
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(a subjective measure). Actual understanding was operationalized through the empathic 
accuracy paradigm (which tests the perceiver’s accuracy in inferring the specific content of 
their partner’s thoughts and feelings), and the perception of understanding was split up into 
understanding from the perspective of the perceiver, which we called assumed 
understanding (i.e., the perceiver’s subjective reports on how well they assumed to have 
understood their partner) and understanding from the perspective of the target, which we 
called perceived understanding (i.e., the target’s subjective rating of the degree to which 
they feel understood by their partner). Additionally, the unique contribution of both actual 
and perceived understanding to dyadic adjustment was investigated. 
Previous studies have found that the perception of partners’ responsiveness is based 
at least in part on the actual amount of responsiveness of an individual’s partner (Murray, 
Holmes, & Griffin, 2000; Reis, Clark, & Holmes, 2004), therefore, the same tendency was 
expected for understanding. More specifically, we expected a positive association between 
the perceiver’s actual understanding and his/her assumed understanding, and a positive 
association between the perceiver’s actual understanding and the target’s perceived 
understanding. Finally, we tested the hypothesis that both partners’ levels of actual 
understanding and perceived understanding would be positively related to relationship 
functioning and satisfaction.  
These predictions were tested in a sample of 155 cohabiting/married heterosexual 
couples that provided questionnaire data and participated in a videotaped conflict 
interaction and video-review task. More specifically, we collected (1) an interaction-based 
measure of actual understanding (i.e., participants’ objective scores of how well they 
accurately inferred the content of each other’s thoughts and feelings during the conflict 
interaction), (2) a post-interaction self-report measure of assumed understanding (i.e., 
participants’ subjective reports on how well they assumed they had understood their partner 
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during the conflict interaction), (3) a post-interaction self-report measure of perceived 
understanding (i.e., each participant’s subjective report on how well understood they felt 
by their partner during the conflict interaction), and (4) a global self-report measure of 
dyadic adjustment (i.e., participants’ subjective reports on their general level of dyadic 
adjustment).  
First, there was no significant association between perceivers’ actual understanding 
and their assumed understanding scores. Second, the perceiver’s actual understanding was 
not associated with their partner’s level of perceived understanding. Third, the APIM 
analyses found no general association between actual understanding and dyadic 
adjustment. However, the results did show a positive trend between women’s actual 
understanding and their dyadic adjustment scores. The second part of the APIM revealed 
that an actor’s perceived understanding is associated with his or her dyadic adjustment 
score, and that this is true for both men and women. The partner effect was also significant 
for women: When men reported higher levels of perceived understanding, women reported 
higher levels of dyadic adjustment. 
In summary, this study suggested the following answers to the questions raised in 
our general introduction (Chapter 1): Is an individual’s perception of being understood by 
their partner based on the partner’s level of actual understanding? Surprisingly, our results 
suggested that this is not the case. Both the perceiver’s perception of their own actual ability 
to accurately understand their partner as the target’s perception of the perceiver’s 
understanding performance was not associated with the perceiver’s actual understanding 
score. Second, what is the unique contribution of both actual and perceived understanding 
in relationship functioning and satisfaction? Our results suggested that perceived 
understanding is an important predictor of men’s and women’s adjustment scores, however, 
actual understanding also tended to be important for women’s adjustment scores.  
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The study described in chapter four investigated the sources of empathic inaccuracy 
during couples’ conflict interactions. Based on the fact that accuracy scores are only poor-
to-moderate, we suggested that misunderstandings could be identified at two levels: The 
thematic level (i.e., content of partners’ perspectives, e.g., topic issues, the interaction 
process, personal characteristics) and the affective level (i.e., affective tone of partners’ 
perspectives: Positive, negative, or neutral). First, we offered predictions about the 
occurrence of certain types of thoughts during the interaction (i.e., direct perspectives). 
Second, we made predictions about the comparison between the inferred online thoughts 
(i.e., meta-perspectives) and the partner’s actual online thoughts to discover potential 
misunderstandings. Finally, we examined the association between these misunderstandings 
and empathic inaccuracy. Our predictions were mainly based on the earlier work of Sillars 
and colleagues (Sillars, Roberts, Leonard, & Dun, 2000) who have developed a coding 
system to investigate the content of partners’ online cognitions.  
 Regarding the examination of partners’ direct perspectives, we predicted that both 
partners would report more positive process thoughts, i.e., more thoughts attributing 
constructive communication to themselves than to their partner, and that men would report 
more thoughts concerning content issues in conflict than women, whereas women would 
report more thoughts about the communication process and other relational issues than 
men. Furthermore, we predicted that partners who reported more positive thoughts would 
perceive the interaction as less threatening, and the inverse for negative thoughts. We also 
hypothesized that partners who scored higher in terms of relationship satisfaction would 
report more positive thoughts, whereas partners who scored lower would report more 
negative thoughts. Regarding the examination of direct versus meta-perspectives, we 
predicted that men would overestimate the incidence of content-focused thoughts and 
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underestimate the incidence of relationship-focused thoughts by women. We expected the 
inverse for women’s meta-perspectives. Finally, we expected specific mind-reading errors 
by the perceiver to be reflected in their overall understanding, such that the larger the 
discrepancy between the target’s direct thoughts (with respect to thematic content and 
affective tone) and the perceiver’s inferred thoughts, the lower the perceiver’s empathic 
accuracy would be.  
These predictions were tested in the sample of the “UGent Family Lab Couple 
Study”. Partners’ own and inferred thought-entries were categorized using the Interaction 
Cognition Coding System (Sillars et al., 2000). At the thematic level, partners considerably 
thought about the interaction process and person evaluations, a finding that was true for 
both men and women, thereby disconfirming the assumed gender difference. Furthermore, 
partners demonstrated a self-serving bias as they attributed constructive engagement more 
often to themselves than to their partner, and vice versa. However, an unexpected gender 
difference was found, as women showed a tendency to think about their partners as 
defensively or displaying avoidance, but this was not the case for men. Our main finding 
suggested that the misreading of process thoughts was significantly associated with 
empathic inaccuracy, and a similar trend was found for the misreading of person appraisal 
thoughts. At the affective level, the results revealed significant mind-reading errors by 
women as they under-estimated positivity and over-estimated negativity by men. With 
regard to our main research question, misreading of positivity and neutrality was positively 
associated with empathic inaccuracy.  
In summary, these findings indicated that partners’ low-to-moderate empathic 
accuracy scores are not only the result of moment-to-moment inaccurate inferences but 
were also associated with a general tendency of partners to misread each other’s thoughts 
at both the content and affective level. 
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The aim of the final chapter was to test the validity of the assumptions underlying 
the theoretical framework on empathic accuracy developed by Ickes and Simpson (1997). 
We translated their assumptions into three general research questions: (1) Is the level of 
empathic accuracy manageable? Can we dial it up or down? (2) If so, what factors are 
associated with partners’ dialing up/down their level of empathic accuracy? and (3) How 
is a partner’s level of empathic accuracy associated with his/her interaction-based 
situational well-being? 
The first two questions could not be confirmed by our results. More specifically, 
perceivers showed higher levels of empathic accuracy for their partner’s non-threatening 
thoughts/feelings in comparison to an unknown target’s non-threatening thoughts/feelings. 
However, to confirm the assumption that perceived threat – identified as a factor potentially 
linked to partners’ level of accuracy – is able to downgrade (dial down) the level of 
empathic accuracy, perceivers’ levels of empathic accuracy for their partner’s threatening 
thoughts/feelings should be lower than for their partner’s non-threatening 
thoughts/feelings. Women’s level of empathic accuracy showed a tendency in the predicted 
direction, but surprisingly, men’s level of accuracy indicated a tendency in the opposite 
direction.  
To test the third assumption, we investigated the role of perceived threat as a 
moderator of the association between empathic accuracy and partners’ short-term (or 
situational) well-being. In line with Simpson and Ickes’ theoretical model of empathic 
accuracy, we reasoned that the presence or absence of higher levels of perceived threat 
would determine if empathic accuracy is desirable or beneficial for short-term relationship 
well-being (e.g., relationship is perceived as stable, closeness increases) or harmful for 
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short-term relationship well-being (e.g., relationship distress and instability increases, 
closeness decreases). The first part of this reasoning was confirmed as higher levels of 
men’s empathic accuracy for their female partner’s not relationship-threatening feelings 
were associated with an increase in the men’s perceived relationship closeness, and higher 
levels of women’s empathic accuracy for their male partner’s not self-threatening feelings 
were associated with an improvement in women’s self-reported mood. The second part of 
this reasoning was barely confirmed as only one tendency in the predicted direction 
emerged: Men who showed higher levels of empathic accuracy for women’s relationship-
threatening thoughts experienced a decrease in relationship closeness. Furthermore, a non-
predicted result indicated that men who were more empathically accurate for the self-
threatening feelings of their female partner reported a decline in their perceived relationship 
closeness. 
Taken together, only partial support was generated for the central assumptions (cf. 
our three research questions) of the Simpson and Ickes’ empathic accuracy model. This 
could be due to some of the methodological aspects of our study, such as the limited 
variation in partners’ level of perceived threat, however, this could also be due to limited 
validity of the model (see below).   
	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The major goal of this doctoral dissertation was to investigate empathic accuracy 
during couples’ conflict along four main objectives. The results of this investigation were 
presented in each of the preceding chapters and are summarized in the previous section. In 
the sections that follow, we aim to provide a discussion of our findings across objectives 
and to present some general conclusions and theoretical implications.  
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  Ǥ The average empathic accuracy scores for couple-
based interactions within our sample ranged from 0% (even lower than the accuracy score 
expected by chance, which is 5%; Thomas et al., 1997) to 41%, and averaged around 21%, 
which is in line with previous studies (e.g., Verhofstadt et al., 2008).  
Furthermore, partners not only completed a video-assisted review task for their own 
interaction but also for that of an unknown couple (i.e., a standard stimulus task) in order 
to determine their baseline empathic accuracy. The average empathic accuracy scores in 
this task ranged from 1% to 47%, and averaged around 16.7%. These results confirm the 
acquaintanceship-effect: That partners’ scores for an unknown target were significantly 
lower than for their own partner, even when the readability of the targets were taken into 
account (see Chapter 5).  
In the current dissertation, we opted to make a distinction between partners’ 
empathic accuracy for thoughts and that for feelings. Our data suggested a trend of slightly 
higher accuracy scores for feelings than for thoughts, in both men and women, although 
this was not significant at the Į <.05 significance level. These findings may indicate that it 
is more difficult to infer specific thoughts in contrast to feelings/emotional states (for a 
possible explanation of this difference, see the discussion in Chapter 5). 
 Ǧ. In the Empathy Model devised by Davis (1994) 
empathic accuracy is considered as a situational variant of empathy – in addition to 
dispositional empathy – at the cognitive level – in addition to affective situational empathy 
such as empathic concern and personal distress (Davis, 1983). Situationally taking the 
perspective of one’s partner is considered as a necessary process in a relationship as it may 
trigger pro-relationship behavior during a couples’ interactions – in other words 
“understanding is at the heart of intimate relationships” (Pollmann & Finkenauer, 2009, p. 
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1512). So, generally, this literature suggests that empathic accuracy should be associated 
with both general relationship well-being, and more situational (i.e., post-interaction) well-
being.  
In the current dissertation, the association between understanding, more specifically 
empathic accuracy, the perception of understanding (i.e., assumed and perceived 
understanding), and general relationship well-being was investigated (Chapter 2). In line 
with the results of Pollmann and Finkenauer (2009), we can conclude that perceived 
understanding (but not actual understanding) is uniquely associated with general 
relationship well-being (i.e., dyadic adjustment). Important to note is that our study was the 
first to simultaneously investigate situational measures of actual and perceived 
understanding, as previous research only included general self-report measures of 
understanding. This finding, together with the finding that perceived understanding scores 
were not based on partners’ actual understanding performance, are considered as two of the 
main findings of this dissertation because they are vital for clinical practice (see below for 
the clinical implications of this finding).  
With regard to situational relationship well-being, our last research chapter 
indicated that actually understanding one’s partner’s feelings is in most interactions – but 
especially non-threatening interactions – important in order for partners to perceive 
closeness, and that this is especially true for men. However, this may also have a drawback 
because when men accurately inferred feelings in their female partner that could threaten 
their self-esteem (e.g., disappointment, frustration), they felt less connected to their partner.  
 In summary, these findings indicate that partners who feel understood in their 
relationships, during both mundane and conflict-based interactions, will experience higher 
levels of general relationship satisfaction and functioning. Additionally, men who succeed 
at accurately inferring the non-threatening feelings of their female partner during a conflict 
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interaction, will feel more connected with their partners afterwards. However, the same 
kind of accuracy during threatening episodes of conflict may trigger more inter-partner 
distance instead. So, these findings partially confirm the importance of actual 
understanding to both general and situational forms of well-being, and simultaneously 
reveal the importance of perceived understanding, and the role of the context in which 
accuracy occurs. 
ǤTaken together, the importance of actual understanding 
and feeling understood is apparent in intimate relationships. Yet, it is remarkable that 
empathic accuracy percentages remain rather low, even in close, stable and long-term 
relationships. What can possibly account for these counter-intuitive findings?  
As indicated by the title of this section, some potential explanations are suggested 
in the literature that look at accurate versus biased inferences. A perceiver’s inference is 
considered “biased” if this inference shows an overlap with the perceiver’s self-appraisals 
(e.g., assumed similarity or projection), idealization, or other kinds of judgements that are 
not based on the observable situational information (e.g., schema-consistent inferences; see 
the section on relationship duration below). In what follows, we present some examples of 
these biases, as deduced from our data.  
First, an example of assumed similarity:  
 I think my partner was thinking… “Probably the same as I was, namely that we fully
agree on this”
Second, a lot of projection was also observed in our data: 
 I was thinking: “What do we still have to talk about?”
 I think my partner was thinking…͞What further things do I have to discuss about
this subject?”
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It should be noted, however, that it is impossible to conclude from these examples whether 
bias might be a “good” or “bad” thing for empathic accuracy. Kenny and Acitelli (2002) 
demonstrated that (empathic) accuracy benefits from assumed similarity when partners are 
actually similar, however, bias may lead to inaccuracy if they are based on the need of the 
perceiver to see the target in a desirable way that is inconsistent with the true nature of the 
partner (West, 2008).  
Third, some examples of idealization were also present in the data: 
 I was thinking… “I am understanding as my partner cannot perform any better than 
she already does” 
Another important variable that may explain certain biases is pragmatism (Swann, 1984; 
West, 2008). These authors have suggested that an inference can only be defined as 
accurate if “it reflects the pragmatic needs of the perceiver” (West, 2008, p. 8) – in other 
words “an accurate belief is an instrumental belief” (Swann, 1984, p. 461). However, this 
variable has never been taken into account in relationship research, as most researchers 
collectively believe that it is pragmatic to accurately understand the partner’s mental state. 
So, thinking about the example of idealization, it might have been very pragmatic for this 
person to overestimate the efforts of his partner instead of thinking in a more nuanced way.  
As stated in the work of West (2008), intuition seems to suggest that the more biased 
an inference is, the more harmful it will be for a relationship, and the less accurate this 
inference will be. However, several studies have argued that the motivation to feel good in 
a relationship and to accurately understand one’s partner may co-occur (Gagné & Lydon, 
2004; Murray, Holmes, & Griffin, 2003). Ickes (2011) also emphasized that the percentage 
of the time individuals are empathic accurate encounters an apparent ceiling of 60% (the 
highest score that can be observed in the available data) suggesting an “evolutionary 
pressure to set a range of empathic accuracy that is high enough to enable us to deal 
͢
͢͞͞

effectively with others but safe enough to maintain the own [private mind]” (Ickes, 2011, 
p. 201).
In conclusion, the interplay between accuracy and bias can vary as they can co-exist 
perfectly but might also sum to zero (i.e., the more bias, the less accuracy), and their effect 
on relationship well-being is mostly determined by their pragmatism. However, it is 
important to note that biased inferences or motivated inaccuracy may be useful in the short-
term, but their long-term “pragmatism” is questionable.   
ǤEven more remarkable than these persistent biases is the 
fact that empathic accuracy seems to decline with increasing duration of a relationship – a 
fact that has been consistently demonstrated (Kilpatrick et al., 2002; Thomas et al., 1997), 
and was also confirmed in the present dissertation (where the association between empathic 
accuracy and relationship duration was described by r = -.22, p < .01). This is probably due 
to a decline in the accuracy motivation, for two reasons: (1) partners have accumulated 
confidence in the fact that the relationship will not dissolve when a misunderstanding 
occurs, and (2) partners often feel as if they already know what the other is thinking. The 
latter is demonstrated in the following examples of where negative or positive schema-
consistent inferences have been made (examples drawn from our data):  
 I was thinking… “Why are we discussing this problem again? He is not going to
change anyway”
 I think my partner was thinking… “We are so close, we can’t live without each other”
As these examples demonstrate, partners develop partner- and relationship specific 
schemas over time that may become quite predominant and rigid. Consequently, partners 
pay less attention to situational information or information that is inconsistent with their 
schemas, and make rapid and automatic inferences instead. In other words, we have 
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observed “the triumph of habit over scrupulous attention” (Kilpatrick et al., 2002, p. 389) 
in long-term relationships.  
Another possible explanation for the low percentages of empathic accuracy found 
in the current dissertation is described in the following paragraphs. 
ǯ
 
Three of the four empirical studies focused on specific aspects of conflict during 
the interaction. Our last empirical chapter also focused on the post-interaction outcomes of 
empathic accuracy during conflict. Taken together, these results increase our insight into 
the role of empathic accuracy in the context of couples’ conflict, addressing the overarching 
aim of this dissertation.  

Ǥ
ǤThe first chapter examined the association between empathic 
accuracy and conflict behavior, more specifically demand behavior (including assigning 
blame and pressure for change). This pattern of results suggests a potential risk of starting 
a conflict in which the initiator starts demanding too much. The findings of our first study 
(Chapter 2) illustrated that, as the conflict-initiating individual applied more pressure to 
change to their partner, his or her empathic accuracy declined. Our findings also showed 
that this kind of behavior has the potential to elicit a strong counter-response from a partner 
who had accurately inferred the conflict initiator’s feelings and motives and therefore 
reacted with counter-pressure for change. As discussed in this chapter, a conflict initiator 
who applies undue pressure to an interaction partner often winds up at an empathic 
disadvantage. A similar tendency was found in the second study, but this time for blame 
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behavior instead of pressure for change, again pointing at an empathic disadvantage for a 
conflict initiator who shows more blame behavior.  
It seems from this that conflict initiators who are too demanding towards their 
partner tend to be less sensitive to their interaction partners’ thoughts and feelings. This 
might be due to a reduction of the available cognitive resources as conflict interactions 
seem to be very demanding interpersonal processes with some specific communicative 
features. As stated in Chapter 4, communication during conflict is characterized by: 
Selective attention, continuous interpretation of intentions that give meaning to 
communication, routine and automatic inferences to keep up with the pace of interaction, a 
disorderly nature of communication, and (distressing) emotions. Taken together, if a 
conflict initiator is preoccupied with achieving his/her personally desired conflict outcome 
during this demanding type of communication process, then it is very likely that their 
cognitive resources might become exhausted. This may leave him/her with little or no 
resources to engage in accurate perspective-taking (tunnel vision). This explanation could 
also account for the generally low-to-moderate percentages of empathic accuracy found in 
our studies during the observed conflict interactions in contrast to previous research that 
found accuracy percentages of 30-35% for married partners during mundane interactions 
(Ickes, 2011).  
Ǥ Additionally, in our third study (Chapter 4), we reasoned that 
to be able to take the other partner’s perspective in order to understand his or her inner 
world during conflict, individuals must first adopt a so-called shared focus. However, this 
seems to be a challenging process during conflict, as previous research has found that 
couples were often, even routinely, thinking about different things, maintaining a shared 
focus just over half of the time (Sillars et al., 2000; Thomas et al.,1997). These findings 
were further elaborated upon in our study by the inclusion of an analysis of partners’ 
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cognitions during conflict. Although the results of this indicated that both partners were 
very aware of the interaction process, a lot of incongruence between their inferences of 
their partner’s thoughts and the partner’s actual thoughts emerged. For example, we 
confirmed the expected self-serving bias as both partners attributed constructive 
engagement more often to themselves than to their partner, and attributed negative conflict 
strategies more often to their partner than to themselves.  
Furthermore, the results showed a gender-specific pattern of errors, more 
specifically, women imputed a more negative and defensive outlook to their male partners 
than was suggested by the men’s actual thoughts. Although, men also showed over- and 
underestimations of different thought categories at the thematic level, they did actually have 
an accurate perception of women’s thoughts at the affective level. Finally, the results 
provided further insight into the occurrence of misunderstandings (i.e., empathic 
inaccuracy) as errors in terms of reading the affective tone (positivity and neutrality) but 
also the content (process and person appraisal) of a partner’s thoughts were associated with 
lower accuracy scores.  
So, at first sight, the data regarding partners’ direct perspectives indicated a high 
level of congruence in terms of content (i.e., percentages of the occurrence of specific 
categories), however, in terms of affective tone, we found a more pronounced incongruence 
between partners. Hence, although these results suggest a shared focus in terms of content, 
this shared focus seems to lack at the affective level of what partners were thinking during 
conflict. And despite this suggested shared focus, we could also observe a lot of 
misunderstandings that were associated with empathic inaccuracy, suggesting 
inaccurate/absent perspective-taking.  
 Ǥ As mentioned in the second paragraph of the section on conflict 
behavior, some characteristics of communication during conflict complicate the interaction 
͢
͟͜͞

process. The last of these concerned the presence of emotions related to the conflict, and 
the general affective atmosphere during conflict. These emotions have been described as 
often biasing online cognitions, influencing the availability of executive functions. This 
assertion was confirmed in our third study as individual’s levels of perceived threat during 
conflict (an implicit measure of the emotion “fear”) was negatively correlated with the 
amount of positive thoughts that person had, and positively correlated with negative 
thoughts (Chapter 4). Additionally, self-reported relationship satisfaction (seen as a 
measure of the general affective atmosphere) was positively correlated with positive 
thoughts, and negatively correlated with negative thoughts, experienced during the conflict 
interactions. These results suggest that both specific conflict-related emotions (i.e., 
perceived threat) and the general affective atmosphere (i.e., relationship satisfaction) can 
bias the affective tone of partners’ cognitions during conflict, which in turn is in line with 
sentiment override theory (Verhofstadt, Buysse, Ickes, De Clercq, & Peene, 2005; Weiss, 
1980).  
In the final experimental chapter, we also investigated whether perceived threat was 
linked to empathic accuracy – as an outcome of the executive function of perspective-taking 
(Chapter 5). We expected that individuals who were confronted with potentially 
threatening perspectives of their partner – defined as any thought/feeling that could lead to 
a destabilization of the relationship stability or the perceiver’s self-esteem – would show 
lower levels of empathic accuracy, triggered by a relationship/self-protecting motive. 
Despite the high face validity of this prediction, and the strong theoretical framework of 
the underlying model (see Chapter 5 for the Empathic Accuracy Model of Ickes & 
Simpson, 1997), our results could not confirm the predicted effect of perceived threat on 
empathic accuracy.  
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In summary, the integration of these results seems to indicate that communication 
in the context of a conflict interaction is a cognitively demanding process that hinders 
empathic accuracy by restricting or reducing partners’ perspective-taking capacities, and 
by biasing an individual’s own and inferred cognitions during the interaction.  

ǦǤIn the last empirical study 
of this dissertation, the predictions regarding empathic accuracy and situational well-being, 
stemming from the Empathic Accuracy Model (Ickes & Simpson, 1997), were tested 
(Chapter 5). We expected that empathic accuracy could be both beneficial and harmful for 
relationship well-being. We operationalized well-being as the perception of relationship 
closeness measured immediately after the conflict interaction task (i.e. situational or short-
term), so this measure does not tell us anything about relationship stability or well-being in 
the long-term. In addition to the model, we also included a measure of personal well-being, 
also measured immediately after the conflict interaction task. We expected that a 
perceiver’s self-esteem would also be influenced by the thoughts of the target partner – a 
hypothesis that is very plausible based on the findings of the study in Chapter 4 indicating 
that the occurrence of thoughts including person appraisals (of the target, the partner or the 
relationship) made up an average of 13.5% of the total reported thoughts. In the model, 
perceived threat is proposed as a moderator of the association between empathic accuracy 
and well-being, in that empathic accuracy for thoughts/feeling rated as not threatening to 
the relationship/self, might be associated with an increase in well-being, and empathic 
accuracy for threatening thoughts/feelings might lead to a decrease in well-being.  
The results indeed showed a pattern that matched the predicted direction for not 
threatening thoughts/feelings, however, three unexpected findings emerged. First, almost 
all of the significant associations found regarded empathic accuracy for feelings, but not 
empathic accuracy for thoughts (for potential explanations see the discussion in Chapter 
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5). Second, the results seemed gender-specific, because empathic accuracy was only 
significantly related to changes in relationship closeness for men and changes in mood for 
women. This indicates that for men empathic accuracy is associated with interaction-based 
relationship well-being, while for women it is related to their personal well-being. Men also 
indicated higher levels of perceived relationship threat than women. Together, these results 
suggest that men’s feelings about relationship closeness might be less stable than women’s 
feelings of closeness, since men seem to feel easily threatened at a relationship level, and 
their empathic accuracy was able to trigger an increase or decrease in this perception in a 
way that was not true for women, who instead experienced a shift in their mood. Third, 
some unexpected significant associations revealed that the perception of relationship or 
self-threat did not uniquely predict a change in either relationship or personal well-being, 
respectively, but instead influenced each other interchangeably. We found associations 
between empathic accuracy and either form of minimal versus maximal threat for both men 
and women. However, men only experienced changes in relationships closeness, even 
when high levels of threat were directed at a personal level, and, inversely women only 
experienced changes in mood, even when high levels of threat were directed at a 
relationship level. In other words, men experienced instability of their relationship (but no 
mood changes), even though their self-esteem was threatened whereas women experienced 
mood changes (but no relationship instability), even though their relationship was 
threatened. These findings further endorse our previously described gender differences. 

Ǥ As previously 
suggested, considerations of pragmatism possibly account for the fact that our findings are 
not totally in line with the model and its predictions, as this factor was not considered (either 
in the model, or in our research). However, perceived threat and pragmatism may be 
strongly related (West, 2008). We reasoned that the more the target’s thoughts are 
 


͟͟͞

perceived as (potentially) threatening, the less empathically accurate the perceiver will be, 
but we neglected the reasoning that perceptions for which accuracy can be threatening may 
be perceptions for which accuracy is pragmatic, and therefore required (e.g., in order to 
resolve the conflict, face recurring difficulties, or confront unwanted behavior). Although 
one of the aims of Chapter 5 was to untangle the effects of empathic accuracy on short-
term – which was the focus of our study – versus long-term well-being, we did not fully 
succeed in this aim. We did not consider that decisions (based on pragmatism) might be 
distressing or harmful in the short-term but serve the “higher goal” of effecting positive 
results in the long-term, therefore also serving the suggested relationship- or self-protecting 
motives. As West (2008) suggested, we still do not know how partners’ cost-benefit ratio 
when making inferences is negotiated. 
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Because the present research was conducted with samples consisting of 
predominantly well-functioning, non-distressed couples, we must be cautious when 
deriving clinical implications from our findings. Nevertheless, the present dissertation 
provides information that might directly enhance clinicians’ understanding of the 
perspective-taking process within couples, and thereby indirectly contribute to the 
evidence-based practice of assessing and alleviating misunderstanding and 
miscommunication in couples.   
According to the overall conclusion of this dissertation, it is not possible to either 
entirely promote or discourage empathic accuracy between partners since the effects of 
accuracy depend both on how and when it is applied. Accuracy is beneficial and even 
crucial for the relationship in the long-term, since it creates the opportunity for relationships 
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to develop and progress over time, becoming necessary if intersubjectivity is to be achieved 
(e.g., a shared cognitive focus, common communicative frames, emotional closeness; 
Ickes, 2003). However, during the course of a relationship a lot of moments pass where we 
are better off not knowing the inner world of our partner. Given this complexity, our 
findings may sharpen practitioners’ insight and awareness with regard to four key points 
during couple therapy. 
First, the fact that empathic accuracy has the potential to destabilize partners’ 
relationship well-being on the short-term (by uncovering differences in opinions, or 
benevolent misconceptions, etc.) does not mean that partners should avoid empathic 
accuracy. What accounts for the long-term effects of this potential destabilization – either 
relationship growth and reinforcement, or relationship conflict and potential dissolution – 
are partners’ abilities to cope with the challenges that are revealed. Therefore, therapists 
might find it useful to stimulate partners to achieve a “good-enough level” of accuracy: 
Enough accuracy to allow partners to uncover and recognize essential challenges that 
should be addressed for the sake of the relationship, but not too much accuracy, therefore 
protecting them from confrontation with every episode of threat or negativity in their 
partner’s mind. For these reasons it may be useful to raise awareness in couple therapists 
about the optimal level of empathic accuracy in relationships, and the pros and cons of 
levels of empathic accuracy that are too low/high. 
Second, it might also be important to adjust some of the existing couple therapy 
programs, especially those that solely focus on the amelioration of partners’ 
communication strategies, in order to improve actual understanding (e.g., Couple 
Communication Program (CC); Butler and Wampler, 1999; Relationship Enhancement 
(RE); Accordino & Guerney, 2003; Guerney, 1977). Although these programs have proven 
their value, as demonstrated in the abundant empirical evidence of their positive short-term 
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and long-term effects, the findings of the current dissertation suggest an important addition. 
We discovered that an individual’s sense of being understood within their relationship is 
not a positive consequence of actual understanding but rather a seemingly independent 
factor uniquely contributing to their relationship well-being. Perceived understanding has 
been highlighted as part of perceived responsiveness, and fosters validation and caring as 
subsequent features of responsiveness (Reis, 2014). The belief that the other partner has 
understood them, and that this will be accompanied by responsiveness, may account for the 
positive effect of perceived understanding. So, for couple therapists, it might be important 
to idiosyncratically assess when and after which behaviors/signals a partner feels 
understood, and how this feeling can be strengthened. 
Third, when low levels of empathic accuracy appear to be problematic within a 
relationship, either because there is a lack of actual understanding or because partners are 
experiencing a large discrepancy between their levels of understanding of each other, then 
training in perspective-taking might be appropriate. A lot of existing couple programs in 
this area focus on strengthening self-disclosure (i.e.,increasing the target’s readability; see 
Chapters 3 and 5; e.g., RE-program; Ridley & Sladeczek, 1992), or active-listening 
techniques such as paraphrasing, reflecting, summarizing (e.g., CC-program; Butler and 
Wampler, 1999) but an additional suggestion has been put forward by our findings. Our 
fourth chapter highlighted the fact that communication during conflict is multilayered, 
hence, during couple therapy, attention should be focused on these multiple layers as a 
possible cause of confusion and misunderstanding. More specifically, partners’ 
communication and interpretations may be based on the application of different cognitive 
frameworks, with for example, one partner focusing on relational aspects while the other is 
focusing on the discussed topic. Consequently, partners lack a shared cognitive framework 
and may even be talking “next to each other”. Awareness and explicit disclosure of the 
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framework one is using, can lead to a reduction in the number of misunderstandings and 
thus to increased accuracy.   
 Finally, it is also important that individuals are aware of how they attribute meaning 
to their partner’s messages during the interaction process, since the process of inference-
making is partially driven by the pre-existing relational schemas (see sentiment override; 
Verhofstadt et al, 2005; Weiss, 1980). If partners start to neglect objective information, 
they might (unconsciously) guide interactions in a “pre-expected” direction. Imagine that 
a partner is thinking: "This discussion will never be resolved". This idea may prevent further 
constructive behavior, regardless of the other partner’s intentions or behavior. Furthermore, 
this schema is also able to determine the function of empathic accuracy. For example, is a 
partner applying his/her accurate insights to better support the other partner (driven by an 
underlying focus on relationship goals), or is the partner using theses insights to assess their 
partner’s weaknesses and to figure out which buttons to push (driven by an underlying 
focus on individual goals)? So, besides the existing skill training programs, our findings 
suggest the inclusion of meaning making/cognition-focused interventions as well, in order 
to elicit micro-changes in partners’ meaning-making, and their cognitive schemas. 
Examples of these micro-changes are techniques such as de-automation of partners’ 
interpretations based on pre-existing schemas or triggering corrective experiences in 
partners, reframing, etc. These techniques trigger destabilization, and enhance adaptation 
of the existing impeding knowledge structures within the safe context of the therapy 
session, with the hope that – after sufficient repetition – more usable knowledge structures 
will be created (Luckner, & Nadler, 1997). 
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In each of the preceding chapters, specific limitations of each of the conducted 
studies have already been outlined. Therefore, the following paragraphs will only address 
some general limitations pertaining to this dissertation. 
The first limitation concerns the dyadic interaction paradigm. Although the validity 
of the paradigm has been widely documented – and many studies have used (a variation of) 
the paradigm – some important methodological reflections concerning each step of the 
paradigm should be made at this point. 
During the conflict interaction task, one of the partners was the designated conflict 
initiator, whose topic was introduced and discussed during the interaction. A first remark 
regarding this task is that one of the partners was “pushed” into the role of conflict initiator 
regardless of whether this partner is usually the “demanding” partner, or even feels 
comfortable in this role. This assignment of roles could have reduced the similarity of the 
situation with how conflicts about similar topics are dealt with at home, although our 
control variable suggested that partners perceived the interaction as moderate-to-very 
similar to conflicts they had previously experienced (M = 5.18; 1 = not comparable at all 
to 7 = totally comparable). Furthermore, the relevance of the topic was not taken into 
account, which implies that one (or both) partner(s) may not have been motivated to discuss 
or resolve the topic, and, as discussed in this dissertation, motivation also influences 
partners’ level of empathic (in)accuracy.  
Then, partners completed a video-review task in which they had to report their own 
thoughts/feelings and infer their partner’s thoughts/feeling at fixed time points, namely 
every 90 seconds. This procedure has been applied in previous research (Verhofstadt et al., 
2008; 2016) but, nevertheless, these pauses may appear totally at random for the 
participants. Indeed, this automatically generated stop-procedure did not factor in the 
͢
ͤ͟͞

course of the interaction, and stop points were generated in a way that is totally independent 
of partners’ natural lines of thought. Additionally, the target partner may not have recalled 
having any important thought/feeling at that fixed moment, and the perceiving partner 
might not be able to infer the target’s mental state at that particular point. However, he/she 
might have been more able to accurately infer the target’s thoughts/feelings, as they 
appeared a few second earlier or later. Additionally, accurately reporting thoughts/feelings 
does not only require empathic understanding – the ability to accurately infer thoughts and 
feelings of a target – but also empathic expression – the ability to translate these inferred 
thoughts and feelings into words and expressions that match the actual content and 
experience of the target. So, the question of whether the empathic accuracy score merely 
reflects the empathic performance or also reflects other abilities and performance skills 
seems relevant. Furthermore, it has been argued that the empathic accuracy score should 
be controlled for inferences based on assumed similarity or projection (Thomas et al., 
1997), and chance accuracy (Ickes et al., 1990). However, when considering calculating 
the corrected empathic accuracy scores, we concluded that it seemed unnecessary to correct 
the scores given the very high correlation (r > .90) between uncorrected and corrected 
scores found in previous work (Ickes, personal communication). Furthermore, participants 
frequently cited that the paradigm is quite time-consuming, and so this may have 
diminished their motivation and/or concentration towards the end of the task, and 
additionally, as perceivers did not receive any feedback on how they were performing, 
some frustration might have been triggered.  
The last step in the empathic accuracy design consists of the coding procedure 
which only encompassed three scoring levels (0 = different content from the actual thought 
or feeling, 1 = similar, but not the same content as the actual thought or feeling, and 2 = 
essentially the same content as the actual thought or feeling; Ickes et al., 1990). This 
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limited range of scores was designed to facilitate the coding procedure, and to enhance the 
interrater reliability, but this limited range impedes variation in the empathic accuracy 
scores, and involves collapse of a wide range of inferences into the middle category (a score 
of 1). Furthermore, it seems that although the coding procedure is quite easy, the procedure 
still requires many raters to achieve a sufficiently high level of interrater reliability. Ickes 
recommends that seven raters are involved in order to reach optimal reliability, although 
previous work demonstrated high reliability with five raters. Due to the large sample and 
the limited capacity of available raters, the current dissertation included only four raters, 
however, which seems to be the minimum number of raters to reach acceptable-to-good 
levels of reliability. On the other hand, this argument could be somewhat tempered as we 
applied a stricter standard of reliability (Intra Class Correlation, option absolute agreement) 
causing lower absolute reliability scores than those reported in previous work. 
A second important limitation of this dissertation, already mentioned in the 
individual chapters, concerns the sample characteristics. Although we used a large sample 
with some very important advantages compared to commonly-used samples in social 
psychological research, such as a wide variety of short-term to long-term relationships that 
can be considered as stable (cohabiting/married partners instead of dating partners), and a 
wide age variety (ranging from 19 until 76), the sample is somewhat limited in its 
generalizability as it consisted of mainly white, heterosexual, middle-class couples who 
were generally satisfied with their relationship and thus did not experience significant 
levels of relationship distress. Therefore, it is not clear to what extent our results could be 
generalized to other samples of partners, for instance partners in same-sex relationships or 
partners seeking couple therapy, so future investigation of our research questions will be 
important. Finally, we could not re-test/replicate our findings in other samples between the 
studies described here, as this dissertation only included one large sample.
͢
͜͞͠

		
Since this doctoral dissertation uncovered some interesting associations and, 
alternatively, did not find evidence for some intuitively expected associations, we can 
formulate some suggestions for further research. Besides the usual recommendations of 
using a more diverse and clinically-based sample, and implementing a longitudinal design 
in order to properly assess causal associations and long-term outcomes (see previous 
chapters), some additional methodological innovations are proposed, based on the 
limitations concerning the empathic accuracy paradigm.  
First, empathic accuracy has been defined as a performance measure resulting from 
a process of perspective-taking. Two decades of research have proven that accuracy is 
determined by the perceiver’s capacity, the target’s readability, and motivational processes 
(both personal and relationship motives), but less is known about the perceptual processes 
leading to empathic inaccuracy (e.g., biases, cognitive frames), and to (not) feeling 
understood (i.e., the basis of perceived understanding). Future research in this area should 
clarify which processes are useful in maintaining or increasing personal and relationship 
well-being (see our considerations about biases and perceived understanding above) and 
which are not. The latter could give us instructions on how to intervene in these inefficient 
processes in order to increase actual and perceived understanding. 
Since previous research, and the research in the current dissertation, has always 
been cross-sectional in nature, we recommend that future research use alternative 
experimental designs. The following remaining questions could be answered by the use of 
experimental (e.g., interventional) research: Is empathic accuracy trainable? And which 
strategies are most useful for this purpose? Although previous work has offered some 
suggestions such as raising the perceiver’s motivation (Ickes and Simpson, 1997) or 
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providing online feedback to a perceiver about their level of accuracy and their target’s 
actual thoughts/feelings (Marangoni, Garcia, Ickes, & Teng, 1995), no other available 
research has further elaborated on these questions. 
Our final recommendation involves some suggestions for adaptations of the 
empathic paradigm and the statistical analysis techniques used in this dissertation. First, we 
suggest that partners should interact during a longer period of time, in order to allow for 
more inference points during the video-review task. Furthermore, we also have our doubts 
about the fixed points at which participants had to infer things from their target, as this is 
simply too artificial. Future research should incorporate a more valid way of choosing 
inference points, and should also deal with the limitation of timing. More specifically, if a 
perceiver makes an accurate inference about their target’s inner world on time, this 
perceiver would be rated as very accurate, however, if this inference occurs a few seconds 
too early or too late, the perceiver would be rated as totally inaccurate. Hence, this coding 
procedure could be considered as a very strict assessment of accuracy as a perceiver might 
have an accurate sense of the inner world of their partner, but happen to be not precise in 
terms of timing (i.e., “timely accurate”). A final suggestion involves the use of a more 
innovative and dynamic analysis-technique called state space grids (Hollenstein, 2013; 
Lewis, Lamey, & Douglas, 1999). This technique enables researchers to represent a 
synchronous ordinal time series in a 2D fashion by use of visual “grids”. This would launch 
a completely new way of examining empathic accuracy, as this would permit us to analyze 
simultaneous processes as they evolve during the course of the interaction in a within-
person or within-dyad fashion. 
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Binnen partnerrelaties blijkt het accuraat kunnen inschatten van de gedachten en 
gevoelens van de partner van zeer groot belang om het coördineren van dagelijkse 
interacties en processen mogelijk te maken, alsook om op deze manier een bevredigende 
en stabiele relatie uit te bouwen en te handhaven (Ickes & Hodges, 2013). Dit roept echter 
allerlei vragen op, zoals bijvoorbeeld: “Hoe goed kunnen mensen elkaars gedachten lezen 
en gevoelens begrijpen?”, “Beschikken sommige mensen (bv. hulpverleners) over een beter 
empathisch vermogen dan anderen?” en “Betreft het hier een (te ontwikkelen) vaardigheid 
of eerder een persoonskenmerk?” 
Empirische studies tonen aan dat de empathische inschattingen (ook inferenties 
genaamd) die we maken bij het ontmoeten van onbekenden gemiddeld slechts in 22 procent 
van de gevallen correct zijn (Ickes, Stinson, Bissonnette, & Garcia, 1990). Deze score, 
uitgedrukt in een percentage, noemen we de empathische accuraatheidsscore. De 
ondergrens van deze score bedraagt 5 procent en dit is de gemiddelde accuraatheidsscore 
op basis van toeval (baseline accuracy). De beste “mind-readers” – die slechts uitzonderlijk 
voorkomen – halen een topscore van 55 procent wat betekent dat ook zij hun 
interactiepartner allesbehalve perfect kunnen inschatten.  

Het concept empathische accuraatheid is een interdisciplinair onderzocht fenomeen 
dat zijn oorsprong vindt in de klinische- en raadplegingspsychologie. Rogers (1957) 
definieerde de term accurate empathie als de therapeutische vaardigheid om gevoelig te 
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zijn voor de inhoud van de achtereenvolgende gedachten/gevoelens van een patiënt. Het 
concept accurate empathie kan beschouwd worden als voorloper van het concept 
empathische accuraatheid zoals gedefinieerd door Ickes et al. (1990), met als belangrijkste 
verschil dat Rogers het empathisch proces an sich benadrukte terwijl Ickes de mate van 
accuraatheid als uitkomst van dit proces centraal stelt. Empathische accuraatheid wordt 
hierbij gedefinieerd als “het begrijpen van iemands episodische gedachten en gevoelens 
zoals ze spontaan verschijnen tijdens het verloop van een natuurlijke interactie” (Ickes, 
1993, p. 588). 
De mate van empathische accuraatheid wordt geconceptualiseerd als de uitkomst 
van een interpersoonlijk, multidimensioneel en situatie-specifiek proces tussen een target 
(de persoon die de gedachten/gevoelens heeft) en een perceiver (de persoon die de 
inschattingen maakt). Het gaat dus over een dyadisch proces waarbij twee gesprekspartners 
interageren met elkaar of geobserveerd worden door een derde. De perceiver poogt via 
verschillende dimensies – observatie, geheugen, kennis, redeneren – tot een accurate 
inschatting van de innerlijke ervaringswereld van het target te komen (Ickes, 1997). Met 
andere woorden, de perceiver dient dus de beschikbare informationele cues van het target 
op te merken, te verwerken, om deze nadien te integreren in de situatie-specifieke context 
van de interactie en de potentieel beschikbare cues uit voorgaande interacties (indien de 
interactiepartners een gezamenlijke voorgeschiedenis hebben). 


Onderzoek naar het meten van empathische accuraatheid situeerde zich vóór 1990 
hoofzakelijk binnen opleidingen tot klinisch psycholoog/psychotherapeut. Daar werd 
nagegaan hoe accuraat studenten gedachten/gevoelens tijdens (gesimuleerde) 
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therapiesessies konden inschatten. Daarnaast werden twee onderzoeksparadigma’s 
ontworpen om empathische accuraatheid op een meer gecontroleerde en gestructureerde 
manier te meten. Deze twee onderzoeksparadigma’s worden hieronder kort besproken. 
In het standaard stimulus paradigma (SS-paradigma; Kagan, 1977) dienden 
participanten een standaard set van gefilmde fragmenten te bekijken, waarbij twee 
onbekende targets deelnemen aan een (on)gestructureerde interactie (bv. interview, 
therapeutisch gesprek). Deze videofragmenten werden vervolgens op bepaalde tijdstippen 
gepauzeerd, en dit op basis van de gedachten/gevoelens die de targets rapporteerden. 
Tijdens deze pauzes werd aan perceivers gevraagd om met behulp van enkele meerkeuze 
opties een correcte inschatting te maken van de gedachten/gevoelens van het geobserveerde 
target.  Met andere woorden, de accuraatheid van de inferenties werd in deze studie 
berekend op basis van de overeenkomst tussen de gedachten/gevoelens zoals gerapporteerd 
door het target zelf en zoals geïnfereerd door de perceiver. Echter, de perceiver diende hier 
niet zelf de geïnfereerde gedachten/gevoelens te genereren.  
Ickes en collega’s ontwikkelden begin jaren 1990 het zogenaamde dyadisch 
interactie paradigma (DI-paradigma). In het oorspronkelijk DI-paradigma is er steeds 
sprake van twee participanten die zowel perceiver als target zijn. Specifiek, in een eerste 
fase voeren de twee participanten onderling een conversatie die wordt gefilmd. Tijdens een 
tweede fase bekijken beide participanten, onafhankelijk van elkaar, hun conversatie 
opnieuw en rapporteren ze wanneer en welke gedachten/gevoelens ze hadden tijdens de 
conversatie. In een derde fase bekijken ze de opname nogmaals waarbij ze op vastgelegde 
momenten de gedachten/gevoelens van hun interactiepartner proberen te infereren. 
Tenslotte wordt de overeenkomst tussen de geïnfereerde en de effectieve 
gedachten/gevoelens door onafhankelijke codeerders beoordeeld, wat resulteert in een 
score tussen 0 en 100 (0 = 0% van de gemaakte inferenties is accuraat, 100 = 100% van de 
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gemaakte inferenties is accuraat). Variaties op het paradigma betreffen hoofdzakelijk de 
relatie tussen de interactiepartners (bv. vreemden, vrienden of partners) en het 
conversatietype (bv. natuurlijke conversatie, therapeutische sessie of conflict).  

Onderzoek toont aan dat er verschillende bronnen zijn waaruit men de nodige 
informatie kan halen om tot accurate inschattingen te komen van iemands 
gedachten/gevoelens. Verbale cues – wat letterlijk gezegd wordt – zijn de belangrijkste 
bron van EA (Hall & Mast, 2007), terwijl non-verbale cues – lichaamstaal, 
gezichtsuitdrukking, intonatie – als additioneel kunnen worden beschouwd. Meer specifiek, 
non-verbale cues zijn vooral van belang tijdens alledaagse conversaties, wanneer het target 
niets zegt, of zijn/haar gedachten/gevoelens (bv. verdriet) probeert te verbergen (Ickes, 
2006). Binnen de categorie non-verbale cues dragen vocale cues (bv. stemvolume) het 
meest bij tot accuraatheid, visuele non-verbale cues (bv. gesticulatie) het minst. 
Vanzelfsprekend speelt ook de geïndividualiseerde kennis over het target een belangrijke 
rol, waarbij vrienden en zeker partners elkaar accurater blijken te kunnen inschatten dan 
vreemden (Stinson & Ickes, 1992). Mensen ontwikkelen immers een persoon-specifiek 
schema dat hen inzicht verschaft in de structuur en inhoud van de herinneringen aan hun 
interactiepartner, wat het maken van inferenties faciliteert. Perceivers zijn daarnaast ook 
accurater voor schema-consistente gedachten (bv. vrouwen die aan mode denken) dan voor 
schema-inconsistente gedachten (bv. vrouwen die aan voetbal denken) (Gesn & Ickes, 
1999). Verder zijn ook sociale cognities of schema’s omtrent zichzelf, anderen, het eigen 
interactiegedrag, sociale rollen en stereotypen een belangrijke bron van empathische 
accuraatheid. Deze sturen immers de interpretatie van (non-)verbale cues, en dit zowel bij 
bekende als bij onbekende targets (Ickes & Hodges, 2013).  
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In het dagelijkse leven wordt vaak gezegd dat bepaalde personen beter zijn dan 
anderen in het inschatten van iemands gedachten/gevoelens. Dit zou betekenen dat 
empathische accuraatheid een stabiele trek of vaardigheid is die men bezit of ontwikkeld 
heeft. Indien deze lekenvisie klopt, zou het mogelijk moeten zijn om een lijst op te stellen 
met karakteristieken van een “goede” perceiver. Dit laatste bleek echter bijzonder moeilijk 
te zijn, aangezien onderzoek aantoont dat geen enkele persoonlijkheids- of andere stabiele 
trek of variabele eenduidig het niveau van empathische accuraatheid voorspelt (Ickes et al, 
2000). Dit voorgaand onderzoek naar predictoren van accuraatheid kan ingedeeld worden 
volgens enerzijds stabiele karakteristieken en anderzijds meer situationeel bepaalde 
motivatie van de perceiver of het target (zie Hodges, Lewis, & Ickes, 2015; zie Tabel 1). 
Ondanks het beperkte succes van het onderzoek naar stabiele predictoren van empathische 
accuraatheid, werden wel enkele veelbelovende relatie- en target karakteristieken gevonden 
die aangeven wanneer perceivers gemotiveerd zijn om empathisch (in)accuraat te zijn. In 
wat volgt bespreken we kort de predictoren die relevant zijn voor het huidig 
doctoraatsonderzoek, de overige predictoren worden gepresenteerd in Tabel 1 (voor een 
uitgebreid overzicht: zie Hoofdstuk 1 - General Introduction). 
ǦǤHet gebrek aan evidentie voor stabiele en eenduidige 
perceiver-karakteristieken gaf aanleiding tot het onderzoek naar target-karakteristieken. Dit 
onderzoek richtte zich op de individuele verschillen tussen targets die bepalen hoe moeilijk 
het al dan niet is voor een perceiver om de gedachten/gevoelens van een bepaald target te 
infereren.  
Ǥ Concreet betekent dit dat de accuraatheid van de perceiver in 
belangrijke mate afhangt van hoe “leesbaar”, transparant of doorzichtig (‘readable’) de 
gedachten/gevoelens van een target zijn in vergelijking met andere targets. Verschillende 
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studies operationaliseerden deze leesbaarheid via een objectieve index die de moeilijkheid 
om gedachten/gevoelens te infereren, nagaat (‘inferential difficulty’; Marangoni, Garcia, 
Ickes, & Teng, 1995). Deze index wordt door onafhankelijke observatoren bepaald en dit 
op basis van de (non-)verbale cues die uitgezonden worden door de targets (bv. verbale 
inhoud, gezichtsuitdrukking).  
 ǤNaast de onderzochte meer stabiele perceiver- en 
targetkarakteristieken werden ook situationele, in het bijzonder motivationele, aspecten 
beschreven als zijnde bepalend voor empathische accuraatheid. Met andere woorden, de 
mate waarin een perceiver gemotiveerd is om de gedachten/gevoelens van zijn/haar 
interactiepartner accuraat in te schatten, bepaalt onafhankelijk van andere factoren de 
accuraatheidsscore. 
Voor het huidige doctoraatsonderzoek waren vooral de bevindingen omtrent 
relationele motivatoren van belang. Binnen deze motivatoren wordt vervolgens het 
onderscheid gemaakt tussen korte termijn of proximale motivatoren – zoals zijn/haar 
partner willen begrijpen tijdens conflict (Kilpatrick, Bissonnette, & Rusbult, 2002) of 
bijstaan in stressperiodes (Verhofstadt, Davis, & Ickes, 2011) – en lange termijn of distale 
motivatoren – zoals betrokkenheid op de partner en relatiebehoud (Simpson, Oriña, & 
Ickes, 2003). Voornamelijk bij het tot stand komen en uitbouwen van relaties is 
empathische accuraatheid zeer belangrijk om de partner te leren kennen en om diens 
interesse en engagement accuraat in te schatten (Hodges et al., 2015). 
Maar niet alle relationele aspecten blijken partners te motiveren om accuraat te zijn. 
Zo blijken empathische accuraatheid en relatieduur negatief gecorreleerd, vermoedelijk 
omdat men binnen de relatie een partner-specifiek schema gaat ontwikkelen en steeds vaker 
vanuit dit schema automatische inferenties maakt en steeds minder aandacht schenkt aan 
de actuele cues. Daarnaast vond men ook een negatieve correlatie tussen empathische 
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accuraatheid en relatietevredenheid maar dan enkel in relatiebedreigende contexten (zie 
verder; Ickes & Simpson, 2001). 
We kunnen hier besluiten dat wat betreft de motivatoren perceivers controle hebben 
over het “meer” of “minder” accuraat zijn, afhankelijk van welke proximale of distale 
motivatoren en doelen op dat moment een rol spelen (zie Smith, Ickes, Hall, & Hodges, 
2011). 
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Partners dienen relatief accuraat te zijn in het inschatten van elkaars 
gedachten/gevoelens indien ze hun individuele en gezamenlijke gedrag effectief willen 
coördineren, dit omdat zij uiteenlopende wensen, verwachtingen en doelen kunnen hebben 
in de relatie. Deze coördinatie is noodzakelijk voor het handhaven van de 
relatietevredenheid en -stabiliteit (Ickes & Hodges, 2013). Een groot deel van het 
onderzoek naar empathische accuraatheid is dan ook uitgevoerd binnen intieme relaties. In 
wat volgt worden vier belangrijke onderzoekslijnen besproken, en belichten we enkele 
belangrijke onbeantwoorde vragen omtrent empathische accuraatheid binnen 
partnerrelaties. 

Op dagelijkse basis worden partners geconfronteerd met stressoren die hun 
oorsprong hebben buiten (individuele stressoren) of binnen (gemeenschappelijke 
stressoren) de relatie (Bodenmann, 2005). Hoe partners samen omgaan met deze dagelijkse 
stressoren werd bestudeerd in twee verschillende onderzoeksdomeinen: enerzijds in 
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onderzoek naar sociale steun (omgaan met individuele stressoren), en anderzijds onderzoek 
naar conflicten (omgaan met gemeenschappelijke stressoren). 
Zowel tijdens steun als conflict interacties dienen partners hun (gezamenlijke) 
acties goed te coördineren tijdens het omgaan met deze stressoren – acties met een grotere 
kans van slagen als partners meer empathisch accuraat zijn. De mate van empathische 
accuraatheid, gemeten tijdens een interactie waarbij een persoonlijk probleem van de 
partner werd besproken, blijkt inderdaad sterk geassocieerd met het verlenen van meer 
instrumentele steun (bv. advies verlenen) en minder negatieve steun (bv. de partner 
bekritiseren, het probleem minimaliseren; Devoldre, Davis, Verhofstadt, & Buysse, 2010). 
Ook tijdens conflict is de mate van empathische accuraatheid belangrijk voor een adequate 
probleemoplossing: partners moeten namelijk accommoderen – destructieve impulsen 
inhiberen en ombuigen in een constructieve houding – om tot een oplossing te komen en 
een verdere escalatie van het conflict te vermijden (Rusbult, Verette, Whitney, Slovik, & 
Lipkus, 1991). Zowel mannen als vrouwen vertonen meer accommodatief gedrag indien 
zij meer accuraatheid vertonen tijdens het conflict (Kilpatrick et al., 2002).  
Hoewel dit eerdere onderzoek suggereert dat empathische accuraatheid partners kan 
helpen om pro-relatie gedrag te tonen tijdens interacties, lijkt het ook aannemelijk dat 
partners gemotiveerd zijn om accurate inschattingen te maken omwille van meer 
"persoonlijke redenen". Een accuraat inzicht in de gedachten en gevoelens van de partner 
tijdens het conflict stelt ons immers in staat om te anticiperen op bepaalde reacties en om 
de partner te overtuigen of te “manipuleren”, en zo een beter (persoonlijk) resultaat te 
bereiken. Echter, voor zover wij weten, is onderzoek naar de bovenstaande assumptie nog 
niet uitgevoerd. 

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Zoals reeds blijkt uit deze introductie, ondersteunt veelvuldig onderzoek de 
intuïtieve overtuiging dat wederzijds begrip een cruciale rol speelt in intieme relaties, meer 
in het bijzonder, voor de mate van relationele tevredenheid en relationeel functioneren (zie 
Hoofdstuk 3). Echter, Pollmann en Finkenauer (2009) suggereerden dat het combineren van 
deze resultaten een belangrijk onderscheid uit het oog verliest, namelijk het onderscheid 
tussen objectief begrip (cf. empathische accuraatheid) en subjectief begrip (cf. 
gepercipieerd begrip, de mate waarin een target zich begrepen voelt door de perceiver). 
Slechts een paar studies hebben de unieke rol van gepercipieerd begrip onderzocht en 
vonden een positieve associatie met positieve relatie-uitkomsten, zoals relationeel 
functioneren, intimiteit en vertrouwen. Bovendien werd gepercipieerd begrip ook 
gevonden als voorspeller van relationeel welzijn op lange-termijn (Pollman & Finkenauer, 
2009; Reis, Clark, & Holmes, 2004). 
Echter, tot op heden werd nog geen integrerend onderzoek uitgevoerd naar de 
unieke rol van objectief en subjectief begrip binnen partnerrelaties. 

Zoals reeds vermeld in de inleiding kunnen we ons afvragen hoe goed partners in 
staat zijn om elkaar daadwerkelijk te begrijpen. Studies die deze vraag trachtten te 
beantwoorden suggereren dat partners slechts matig tot beperkt zijn in het afleiden van 
gedachten en gevoelens van de ander. Volgens Ickes (2011) bereiken gehuwde partners een 
gemiddelde empathische accuraatheidsscore van 30-35%. Ander onderzoek vindt nog 
lagere scores van gemiddeld 20% (Verhofstadt, Buysse, Ickes, Davis, & Devoldre, 2008; 
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Verhofstadt et al., 2016); wat logischerwijs betekent dat partners in 65-80% van de gevallen 
inaccuraat zijn tijdens het inschatten van de andere partner. 
Bijkomend kunnen we ons dus afvragen hoe deze misverstanden gecreëerd worden. 
Een aanzet tot het beantwoorden van deze vraag kan gevonden worden in de communicatie 
literatuur die in één van zijn axioma’s stelt dat alle communicatie zowel een inhouds- als 
betrekkings- of relationeel niveau heeft (Watzlawick, Beavin-Bavelas, & Jackson, 1967). 
Dit betekent dat partners niet alleen nadenken over de expliciete inhoud van een boodschap 
maar ook zullen nadenken over het proces van interactie en wat dit impliceert voor de 
onderlinge relatie. Een frequent geobserveerd misverstand tussen partners’ perspectieven 
tijdens een conflict is dan ook de inhoud-proces verwarring (Sillars, Roberts, Leonard, & 
Dun, 2000). Deze verwarring doet zich voor wanneer de ene partner de interactie 
interpreteert in termen van de schijnbare inhoud of het onderwerp, terwijl de andere partner 
nadenkt over het proces van de interactie en de bijbehorende relationele betekenissen. 
Bovendien kunnen misverstanden zich naast het thematische niveau, ook op het affectieve 
niveau situeren. De ‘sentiment-override’ theorie suggereert dat het algemene gevoel van 
relationele (on)tevredenheid een belangrijke impact heeft op situationele percepties en 
emoties (bv. Fincham, Garnier, Gano-Phillips, & Osborne, 1995; Verhofstadt, Buysse, 
Ickes, De Clercq, & Peene, 2005; Weiss, 1980). Meer specifiek, over de tijd heen 
ontwikkelt zich een algemeen gevoel omtrent de relatie dat wordt opgeslagen in een 
cognitief relationeel schema. Dit schema zal op zijn beurt de situationele gedachten en 
gevoelens tijdens interacties beïnvloeden op een zichzelf in standhoudende manier (bv. 
Fincham, 2001; Holtzworth-Munroe & Jacobson, 1985). Dit proces kan vanzelfsprekend 
opnieuw tot misverstanden leiden. 
Echter, op dit moment werd nog geen onderzoek gevoerd naar misverstanden die 
onderliggend zijn aan empathische inaccuraatheid. 
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Zoals besproken in de paragraaf omtrent motivationele predictoren van 
empathische accuraatheid (p. 252), heeft voorgaand onderzoek voornamelijk situationele 
en relationele factoren geïdentificeerd. Bovendien heeft eerder onderzoek ook aangetoond 
dat empathische accuraatheid de relatie zowel positief als negatief kan beïnvloeden. Deze 
waarnemingen gaven de aanzet tot de ontwikkeling van het Empathisch 
Accuraatheidsmodel van Ickes en Simpson (1997).  
Ǧ͘In de literatuur 
omtrent wederzijds begrip wordt reeds decennia lang een positieve associatie tussen begrip 
en relationeel functioneren verondersteld en waargenomen (zie Sillars & Scott, 1983). In 
dit overzicht wordt de veronderstelling dat congruentie tussen partners’ percepties (= een 
gedeelde perceptuele werkelijkheid) cruciaal is voor het relationeel functioneren, 
overvloedig gedocumenteerd. De auteurs verwijzen naar studies die positieve verbanden 
vonden tussen aanpassing binnen de relatie en het begrijpen van de partners' attitudes, 
verwachtingen en zelf-percepties (zie Sillars & Scott, 1983). De algemene conclusie van 
deze studies is bijgevolg dat meer begrip goed is voor relaties. Vervolgens werd een 
dominant advies met betrekking tot communicatie binnen koppels naar voren geschoven 
waarin het belang van zelfonthulling om wederzijds begrip te bevorderen, sterk gepromoot 
werd (Bochner, 1981).  
     ǦǤHoewel het 
hierboven beschreven dominant advies door veel clinici en onderzoekers werd 
onderschreven, hebben sommige auteurs hun bezorgdheid geuit. Zij poneerden dat het 
verhogen van de openheid en de vermindering van “relatie-bevorderende misvattingen” 
ook nadelig kan zijn voor de relatie (Bochner, 1981; Parks, 1981). Verschillende studies 
ondersteunden deze opmerking door het identificeren van omstandigheden waarin meer 
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begrip samenhangt met meer conflict en ontevredenheid (zie Hoofdstuk 1 & 4), zoals bij 
het onthullen van onoverbrugbare verschillen tussen partners’ perspectieven of 
goedbedoelde misvattingen of bij inzicht in kwetsende of gemene waarheden van het target.  
Ickes en Simpson poogden bovenstaande bevindingen te integreren in een 
theoretisch model dat rekening houdt met zowel de motieven van de partners als de 
verwachtte resultaten van empathische accuraatheid gegeven de situatie. Dit model maakt 
het mogelijk om de mate van empathische accuraatheid te voorspellen in bepaalde 
contexten en de verwachtte impact van deze mate van accuraatheid op zowel het relationeel 
als persoonlijk welzijn.
Ǥ Het model (Ickes en Simpson, 1997; 2001; 
zie Hoofdstuk 1 - General Introduction, p. 35) toont verschillende paden die het niveau van 
empathische accuraatheid voorspellen, alsook uitspraken doen over de korte-termijn 
effecten ten gevolge van het niveau van accuraatheid. Het centrale aspect dat bepaalt of 
empathische accuraatheid het individuele en/of relationele welzijn op korte termijn zal 
versterken of destabiliseren is de mate van ervaren bedreiging in de gegeven situatie 
(potentiële “gevarenzones”). Met andere woorden, indien de situatie niet als een 
gevarenzone wordt geïdentificeerd, dan zal de waarnemer zich in het algemeen niet 
bedreigd voelen, zal hij/zij hoge mate van empathische accuraatheid nastreven, en zal deze 
accuraatheid een positieve invloed hebben op het welzijn. Echter, indien de situatie als 
potentieel bedreigend wordt ervaren, kan een hoge mate van empathische accuraatheid 
ongewenste gevolgen hebben, en dit afhankelijk van hoe ambigu de gedachten en gevoelens 
van het target zijn (cf. leesbaarheid). Immers, rechtlijnige, eenduidige gedachten vergen 
niet veel moeite om accuraat af te leiden, met een matige tot hoge mate van empathische 
accuraatheid tot gevolg (bv. wanneer een partner bekent een affaire te hebben, dan kan de 
schadelijke inhoud niet vermeden worden door minder accuraat te zijn). Het model geeft 
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aan dat een perceiver die zich (zeer) bedreigd voelt – wat allicht het geval is in het 
voorbeeld – en zijn/haar partner accuraat inschat, instabiliteit zal ervaren op 
individueel/relationeel vlak (bv. instabiliteit van zijn/haar gevoel van eigenwaarde en/of 
relatie). Het laatste pad van het model beschrijft de situatie waarin gemotiveerde 
empathische inaccuraatheid het meest aangewezen zou moeten zijn. De rol van 
inaccuraatheid als beschermend mechanisme (op korte termijn) wordt hier duidelijk 
aangezien het model suggereert dat potentieel bedreigende ambigue gedachten/gevoelens 
van het target vermeden kunnen worden (indien de perceiver geen moeite doet om de 
ambigue gedachten/gevoelens accuraat in te schatten, dan zullen deze 
onduidelijk/ongekend blijven). Kortom, wanneer een perceiver mogelijk bedreiging ervaart 
zal zijn/haar niveau van empathische accuraatheid dalen, wat op zijn beurt het individueel 
en/of relationeel welzijn op korte termijn zal beschermen.  
Het model lijkt er dus in geslaagd om de complexe bevindingen en soms 
tegenstrijdige uitkomsten van empathische accuraatheid te integreren, zonder de 
belangrijke rol van empathische accuraatheid in partnerrelaties te ontkennen. Het meest 
innovatieve aspect van dit model is daarnaast de introductie van empathische 
inaccuraatheid als beschermingsmechanisme op kort termijn, wat impliceert dat perceivers 
gemotiveerd kunnen zijn – zonder uitspraken te doen over hoe bewust en autonoom deze 
motieven zijn – om inaccurate inschattingen te maken.  
Aangezien dit model tot op heden slechts beperkt empirisch geverifieerd werd, is 
het belangrijk om onderzoek uit te voeren naar de assumpties die ten grondslag liggen aan 
dit model.  
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De complexe rol van empathische accuraatheid in partnerrelaties blijkt uit het 
hierboven beschreven voorgaand onderzoek en onderstreept de noodzaak aan meer 
diepgaande kennis van het concept. Deze vaststelling vormde de basis voor onze 
grootschalige observationele studie genaamd de “UGent Family Lab Couple Study”, 
uitgevoerd in het kader van het huidige doctoraatsonderzoek. Deze studie combineerde een 
uitgebreide online vragenlijst sessie met een observationele sessie bestaande uit een 
geobserveerde dyadische interactie-taak en een video-review taak. Het doel van dit 
grootschalig onderzoek was om (1) de hieronder beschreven onderzoeksvragen te testen 
binnen een grote steekproef van koppels, (2) gebruik te maken van een multi-methodische 
benadering (nl. een combinatie van zelfrapportage, observationele gegevens, 
gedragscoderingen en online zelfrapportage items) en (3) zowel algemene als situationele 
maten van de relevante variabelen te integreren. 
We kozen ervoor om empathische accuraatheid in de context van koppelconflict te 
bestuderen omwille van vier redenen. Ten eerste zijn meningsverschillen en conflicten 
onvermijdelijk in intieme relaties aangezien elke partner zijn/haar eigen verwachtingen, 
doelstellingen, behoeften en perspectieven heeft. Conflict ontstaat dan ook wanneer een 
persoon deze doelen nastreeft op een manier die interfereert met de doelstellingen van de 
andere partner (Lewin, 1948). Hoe partners zich gedragen en wat ze denken en voelen 
tijdens een conflict is reeds decennia lang een belangrijk onderwerp van psychologisch 
onderzoek, aangezien conflict een belangrijk en frequent voorkomend domein van 
interactie is (zie: Bradbury & Karney, 2014). En hoewel intensief bestudeerd, bleven enkele 
belangrijke aspecten onderbelicht, zoals de rol van empathische accuraatheid tijdens 
conflict. Ten tweede is elkaar begrijpen cruciaal om een conflict effectief te bespreken en 
op te lossen. Partners moeten namelijk eerst een gezamenlijke focus omtrent de kern van 
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de zaak bereiken, om daarna het perspectief van de ander in te kunnen nemen en zijn/haar 
visie op het onderwerp te kunnen begrijpen. Echter, voorgaand onderzoek toonde aan dat 
dit een zeer veeleisend proces is tijdens conflict. Daarom is onze derde reden voor het 
bestuderen van conflict de schijnbare discrepantie tussen de noodzaak om elkaar te 
begrijpen enerzijds en conflict als “ideale” context om misverstanden te creëren en bloot te 
leggen anderzijds. Ten slotte kan conflict partners ook de kans bieden om verschillen in 
doelen of perspectieven met elkaar te verzoenen, maar als gevolg van deze tegenstrijdige 
doelen en perspectieven kan conflict ook leiden tot een hoge mate van relatie- of zelf-
bedreiging, wat op zijn beurt opnieuw efficiënte perspectief-name kan verhinderen. 
Samengevat, conflict binnen de relatie blijkt optimaal om onze onderzoeksvragen 
te bestuderen aangezien het effectief begrijpen van elkaar zowel van cruciaal belang, als 
een moeilijke uitdaging blijkt binnen deze context. 

Ǧ

ǯ
De eerste doelstelling van het huidige proefschrift was het onderzoeken van de 
associatie tussen partners hun niveau van empathische accuraatheid en hun conflict 
interactiegedrag, met name de mate waarin zij veeleisend gedrag stellen tijdens conflict 
met hun partner. Zoals hierboven beschreven heeft eerder onderzoek al aangegeven dat 
empathische accuraatheid een belangrijke rol speelt in het effectief omgaan met en oplossen 
van problemen. Echter, in tegenstelling tot relationeel-gericht probleemoplossend gedrag, 
kan ook meer individueel-gericht probleemoplossend gedrag baat hebben bij hogere 
niveaus van empathische accuraatheid. 
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Personen die een onenigheid of conflict initiëren, wensen over het algemeen 
bepaalde veranderingen in het gedrag, de opvattingen of de waarden van hun partner of 
wensen de status quo van de relatie te veranderen, en zullen daarom geneigd zijn om meer 
veeleisend gedrag te vertonen (Christensen & Pasch, 1993; Eldridge & Christensen, 2002). 
Daarnaast heeft onderzoek ook aangetoond dat het niveau van empathische accuraatheid 
deels afhankelijk is van situationele en relationele motivatoren. Met andere woorden, 
aangezien veeleisend gedrag van de conflict-initiërende partner wordt aangedreven door 
een motief om bepaalde verandering te bereiken, lijkt het waarschijnlijk dat dit motief ook 
aanleiding geeft tot het accuraat trachten in te schatten van de gedachten en gevoelens van 
de partner. Bijgevolg onderzochten we in Hoofdstuk 2 de veronderstelling dat partners met 
meer veeleisend interactiegedrag, mogelijks ook empathisch accurater zijn op een manier 
die hen in staat stelt om meer invloed uit te oefenen op hun partner en daarmee een betere 
uitkomst te kunnen bereiken voor zichzelf.  
Deze veronderstelling werd getest in twee empirische studies waarin koppels eerst 
een vragenlijst omtrent hun relationele tevredenheid invulden en daarna deelnamen aan een 
gefilmde conflict-interactie taak met bijhorende video-review taak. In Studie 1 vonden we, 
na controle voor relatietevredenheid, significante associaties met de twee subcategorieën 
van veeleisend gedrag, namelijk beschuldigen en het uitoefenen van druk tot verandering. 
De eerste associatie suggereerde dat partners die tijdens de conflict-interactie meer 
beschuldigden, hogere niveaus van empathische accuraatheid bereikten, onafhankelijk van 
het feit of ze al dan niet het conflict geïnitieerd hadden. De tweede associatie suggereerde 
een tweewegsinteractie, namelijk wanneer de perceiver het conflict geïnitieerd had, was het 
uitoefenen van druk tot verandering gelinkt met een lager niveau van empathische 
accuraatheid. Echter, deze negatieve associatie tussen druk uitoefenen en empathische 
accuraatheid bleek omgekeerd voor perceivers die het conflict niet initieerden. 
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In Studie 2 maakten we het onderscheid tussen empathische accuraatheid voor 
gedachten en empathische accuraatheid voor gevoelens en werd geslacht als voorspeller in 
het model opgenomen. Na controle voor relatietevredenheid lieten de analyses geen 
significante effecten zien. Wel werd een duidelijke trend gevonden in het voorspellen van 
empathische accuraatheid voor gedachten, namelijk indien de perceiver het conflict 
initieerde, dan was zijn/haar beschuldigend gedrag negatief geassocieerd met zijn/haar 
empathische accuraatheid. En opnieuw werd dit verband positief wanneer de perceiver het 
conflict niet initieerde.  
Samengevat lijken onze bevindingen aan te tonen dat wanneer een perceiver een 
conflict initieert en daarbij veeleisend gedrag (zowel beschuldigen als druk uitoefenen) 
stelt, dan blijkt deze perceiver minder accuraat te zijn in het "lezen" van de 
gevoelens/gedachten van de partner. Echter, wanneer de perceiver het conflict niet initieert, 
dan blijkt deze partner wel meer accurate conclusies te maken over de gedachten/gevoelens 
van de initiatie nemende partner en reageert deze partner ook met een “tegenaanval” van 
beschuldiging of druk tot verandering. Maar, aangezien beide studies elkaars resultaten niet 
volledig konden repliceren is verder onderzoek aangewezen, dat bij voorkeur niet cross-
sectioneel is van aard om de causaliteit van de variabelen te kunnen bepalen. 
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De tweede doelstelling van het huidige proefschrift focuste zich op de link tussen 
empathische accuraatheid en gepercipieerd begrip. Zoals reeds vermeld, is er geen eerder 
onderzoek voor handen dat onderzocht of het gevoel (niet) begrepen te worden door de 
partner (cf. waargenomen of gepercipieerd begrip) (gedeeltelijk) gebaseerd is op het 
werkelijke of objectieve begrip (cf. empathische accuraatheid) van de partner. Een tweede 
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vraag die we ons stelden is in hoeverre iemand zijn eigen accuraatheid kan inschatten (cf. 
verondersteld begrip). In Hoofdstuk 3 gingen we daarom na of er een verband was tussen 
de objectieve mate van begrip (empathische accuraatheid) en subjectieve maten van begrip 
(eigen verondersteld begrip en gepercipieerd begrip van de partner). Daarnaast 
onderzochten we ook de unieke associatie tussen relatietevredenheid en empathische 
accuraatheid enerzijds, en zich begrepen voelen anderzijds. 
Verrassend genoeg vonden we geen significant verband tussen het objectief 
begrijpen van de partner (of empathische accuraatheid) en beide scores van gepercipieerd 
begrip (m.a.w. eigen verondersteld begrip en waargenomen begrip door de partner). Dit 
betekent enerzijds dat perceivers hun eigen prestatie of hoe goed ze hun partner hebben 
ingeschat tijdens de conflict-interactie, niet accuraat kunnen beoordelen. Anderzijds 
betekent dit ook dat het gevoel begrepen te worden door de perceiver niet gebaseerd is op 
de realiteit of op hoe goed de perceiver er echt in geslaagd is de gevoelens en gedachten 
van zijn/haar partner in te schatten. Daarnaast vonden onze APIM analyses geen verband 
tussen objectief begrip en relatietevredenheid. Echter, de resultaten duidden wel op een 
positieve trend tussen het werkelijk begrip van vrouwen en hun relatietevredenheid. Verder 
vonden we dat het gevoel begrepen te worden wel geassocieerd is met relatietevredenheid, 
zowel voor mannen als voor vrouwen. Bovendien was het voor de relatietevredenheid van 
vrouwen ook belangrijk dat hun mannelijke partner zich begrepen voelde. 
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De derde doelstelling van dit proefschrift was om de eerder lage tot matige 
empathische accuraatheidsscores, alsook de potentiële misverstanden die ten grondslag 
liggen aan deze scores te onderzoeken. Meer in het bijzonder wilden we een diepgaandere 
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analyse van de inhoud van de gedachten uitvoeren ter aanvulling op een louter 
kwantitatieve analyse van empathische accuraatheid (cf. percentage score) door het 
categoriseren van directe en meta-perspectieven van partners tijdens een conflict-interactie. 
Directe perspectieven verwijzen naar de eigen continue stroom van gedachten, terwijl 
meta-perspectieven betrekking hebben op het inschatten van de gedachten van de partner. 
In Hoofdstuk 4 trachtten we met behulp van een inhoudsanalyse mogelijke misverstanden 
te identificeren (bv. inhoud-proces verwarring, misverstanden op affectief niveau door 
‘sentiment override’). Daarna werd de associatie tussen deze geïdentificeerde 
misverstanden en empathische inaccuraatheid onderzocht. 
 De analyse van de gedachten werd zowel op thematisch niveau (“Waarover gaan 
de gedachten?”) als op affect niveau (“Welke valentie hebben deze gedachten?”) gevoerd. 
Uit de analyse van de directe- en meta-perspectieven op thematisch niveau bleek dat zowel 
mannen als vrouwen vaak gedachten hadden aangaande het proces van interactie en 
aangaande persoonsbeoordelingen (van zichzelf, de partner of de relatie). Verder gaven 
partners’ eigen gedachten blijk van een zelf-bevestigende bias aangezien ze vaker 
constructief-engagerend gedrag aan zichzelf toeschreven dan aan hun partner. Er werd ook 
een onverwacht genderverschil gevonden in het feit dat vrouwen meer dachten dat hun 
partner zich defensief of vermijdend gedroeg, in vergelijking met hoe mannen dachten over 
hun vrouw. Tenslotte, onze belangrijkste bevinding op thematisch niveau wijst op een 
significant negatief verband tussen het maken van een verkeerde inschatting (over- of 
onderschatting) van de proces gedachten van de partner en empathische accuraatheid 
enerzijds, en een soortgelijke trend werd gevonden voor een verkeerde inschatting van de 
partners’ persoonsbeoordelende gedachten en empathische accuraatheid anderzijds. Op 
affectief niveau, bleken er vooral misvattingen te ontstaan bij vrouwen die het aantal 
positieve gedachten onder- en het aantal negatieve gedachten overschatten bij hun partner. 
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En bovendien bleken misvattingen omtrent de positiviteit en neutraliteit van de partner 
zijn/haar gedachten ook geassocieerd met lagere empathische accuraatheidsscores.  
Kortom, deze bevindingen tonen aan dat de lage tot matige empathische 
accuraatheidsscores niet alleen het gevolg zijn van misvattingen van moment tot moment, 
maar geassocieerd zijn met een algemene tendens van partners om elkaars gedachten op 
zowel inhoudelijk (thematisch) als affectief niveau te over- of onderschatten.  
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Het vierde objectief had als doel de rol van vermogen versus motivatie in 
empathisch (in)accuraatheid te onderzoeken. Zoals reeds beschreven in de paragraaf 
omtrent het Empathisch Accuraatheidsmodel, treed gemotiveerde empathische 
(in)accuraatheid op wanneer iemand “een motief heeft om wat zijn/haar interactiepartner 
denkt/voelt (in)accuraat in te schatten, wat resulteert in een empathische accuraatheidsscore 
die beduidend lager/hoger is dan de score van andere personen in dezelfde situatie” 
(Cuperman, Howland, Ickes, & Simpson, 2011, p. 216). De assumpties in dit model werden 
ook reeds onderschreven door theorieën binnen de sociale cognitie die veronderstellen dat 
cognitieve redeneer- en denkprocessen gestuurd worden door een accuraatheidsmotief (= 
motief om tot een accurate conclusie te komen) enerzijds en door een eigenwaarde-
regulerend motief (= motief om tot een wenselijke/eigenwaarde-versterkende conclusie te 
komen) anderzijds (Kunda, 1990). Indien deze redenering, en dus de onderliggende 
assumpties van het model valide zijn, moet het mogelijk zijn de volgende assumpties aan 
te tonen in de data van dit proefschrift: (a) partners’ niveau van empathische accuraatheid 
is modificeerbaar, (b) ervaren bedreiging is geassocieerd met het niveau van empathische 
accuraatheid (vermeerderen of verminderen) en (c) empathische inaccuraatheid kan 
EZ>E^d>/'^DEsdd/E'

ͣ͢͞

optreden als beschermingsmechanisme van individueel/relationeel welzijn op korte 
termijn. Deze drie assumpties werden expliciet getest in Hoofdstuk 5. 
In dit hoofdstuk werd enig bewijs gevonden voor de modificeerbaarheid van 
empathische accuraatheid aangezien de scores van partners fluctueerden over de zeven 
punten tijdens de interactie. Daarnaast werd enige aanwijzing gevonden voor een 
accuraatheidsmotief bij partners, aangezien ze significant hogere scores van accuraatheid 
haalden voor hun eigen partner dan voor een onbekende partner. Echter, dit kan ook 
evidentie zijn voor een effect van vertrouwdheid en van gedeelde geschiedenis (zie 
Hoofdstuk 5). Er werd echter geen evidentie gevonden voor een eigenwaarde-regulerend 
motief, aangezien de resultaten geen daling in partners’ accuraatheid aantoonden voor de 
gedachten/gevoelens met een hogere mate van bedreiging. Gepercipieerde bedreiging was 
met andere woorden niet geassocieerd met empathische accuraatheid. We vonden wel 
aanwijzingen voor gepercipieerde bedreiging als moderator van het verband tussen 
empathische accuraatheid en situationeel welzijn. Specifiek, hogere niveaus van 
empathische accuraatheid voor niet-bedreigende gevoelens waren voorspellend voor een 
toename in ervaren nabijheid voor mannen en een verbeterde stemming bij vrouwen. Er 
werden echter geen aanwijzingen gevonden voor een schadelijk effect van empathische 
accuraatheid voor bedreigende gedachten/gevoelens op situationeel welzijn.  
Deze bevindingen suggereren een complexe rol van empathische accuraatheid 
tijdens conflict in koppels en lijken te wijzen op de modificeerbaarheid van empathische 
accuraatheid. Echter, toekomstig onderzoek is nodig om het precieze samenspel van 
potentiële predictoren, accuraatheid en uitkomstvariabelen verder te exploreren en te 
integreren. 
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Op basis van de algemene conclusies van dit proefschrift, is het niet mogelijk om 
empathische accuraatheid eenzijdig te promoton enerzijds of empathische accuraatheid 
geheel te ontmoedigen anderzijds, aangezien de effecten van empathische accuraatheid 
afhangen van hoe en wanneer het aangewend wordt. Toch kunnen onze bevindingen, in 
hun complexiteit, vertaald worden naar vier belangrijke punten relevant voor therapeuten 
tijdens partnerrelatietherapie. 
Ten eerste, ondanks het feit dat empathische accuraatheid relatie/individueel 
welzijn op korte termijn kan destabiliseren (door o.a. het onthullen van verschillen in 
opvattingen, goedbedoelde misvattingen), betekent dit niet dat partners accurate 
inschattingen dienen te vermijden. Hoe partners deze korte-termijn destabilisatie omzetten 
in lange-termijn effecten – hetzij groei en versteviging, hetzij conflict of zelfs uiteen gaan 
– is afhankelijk van hun vaardigheden om om te gaan met de nieuwe onthulde uitdagingen. 
Bijgevolg kan het voor therapeuten nuttig zijn om partners te stimuleren tot het bereiken 
van een “goed-genoeg” niveau van empathische accuraatheid, voldoende accuraatheid om 
essentiële verschillen of uitdagingen te identificeren en aan te pakken in het belang van de 
relatie, maar ook voldoende inaccuraatheid om zichzelf en/of de relatie te beschermen tegen 
de confrontatie met iedere vorm van bedreiging of negativiteit in de gedachten van hun 
partner.  
Ten tweede kan het ook belangrijk zijn om een aantal van de bestaande 
therapieprogramma’s bij te sturen. Immers, vaak richten deze programma’s zich uitsluitend 
op de verbetering van communicatievaardigheden met als doel wederzijds (objectief) 
begrip te verbeteren (bv. Couple Communication Program (CC); Butler en Wampler, 1999; 
Relationship Enhancement (RE); Accordino & Guerney, 2003; Guerney, 1977). Hoewel 
deze programma’s hun waarde hebben bewezen, zoals blijkt uit de overvloedige empirische 
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bewijzen van hun korte- en lange-termijn effecten, suggereren onze bevindingen een 
belangrijke aanvulling. Onze resultaten toonden namelijk aan dat het gevoel begrepen te 
worden niet het automatische gevolg is van het feitelijk begrepen worden door de partner, 
en bovendien bleek gepercipieerd begrip uniek bij te dragen tot relationele tevredenheid. 
Therapeuten kunnen dus, naast het stimuleren van elkaar feitelijk te begrijpen, ook op zoek 
gaan naar momenten of factoren die het gevoel geven van begrepen te worden en exploreren 
hoe dit gevoel versterkt kan worden.  
Ten derde, wanneer lage niveaus van empathische accuraatheid effectief een 
probleem vormen binnen de relatie, bijvoorbeeld door een gebrek aan feitelijk inzicht of 
het ervaren van een groot verschil op vlak van empathische accuraatheid tussen beide 
partners, dan kan een training in perspectief-name geschikt zijn. Een groot deel van de 
bestaande therapieprogramma's op dit gebied zijn hierbij gericht op het verhogen van 
zelfonthulling (d.w.z. het verhogen van de leesbaarheid van het target, zie Hoofdstuk 3 en 
5), of het aanleren van actief-luisteren technieken. De resultaten van Hoofdstuk 4 wezen op 
het feit dat communicatie meerdere lagen heeft en er vaak misverstanden ontstaan door het 
verwarren van deze lagen, bijvoorbeeld één partner denkt na over mogelijke relationele 
aspecten, terwijl de andere partners zich focust op het besproken onderwerp. Tijdens 
partnerrelatietherapie kan bijgevolg aandacht besteed worden aan de boodschappen op 
beide niveaus, en kan psycho-educatie leiden tot het inzicht dat beide partners dienen te 
communiceren op een gelijk niveau en dit vanuit een gedeeld denkkader, wat op zijn beurt 
kan leiden tot een vermindering van het aantal misverstanden. 
Tenslotte is het ook belangrijk dat partners weten hoe zij betekenis attribueren aan 
(non)verbale signalen van de partner tijdens het interactieproces, aangezien het infereren 
van gedachten (gedeeltelijk) wordt gestuurd door de reeds bestaande partner/relationele 
cognitieve schema’s (zie ‘sentiment override’; Verhofstadt et al, 2005; Weiss, 1980). 
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Bovendien kunnen deze schema’s ook de functie van empathische accuraatheid bepalen, 
bijvoorbeeld, zal iemand zijn/haar accurate inzichten gebruiken om de partner beter te 
ondersteunen (aangedreven door een onderliggende focus op relatie doelen) of zal iemand 
zijn/haar accurate inzichten gebruiken om de zwakke plekken van de partner te 
identificeren en zo te weten waar hij/zij kan op inspelen om een bepaald doel te bereiken 
(aangedreven door een onderliggende focus op individuele doelen)? Naast de bestaande 
vaardigheidstrainingen kunnen cognitie-gerichte interventies ook nodig zijn zodoende 
micro-veranderingen in partners’ attributieprocessen en hun bijhorende cognitieve 
schema’s te initiëren.  

Een eerste algemene (methodologische) limitatie heeft betrekking op het dyadisch 
interactie paradigma. Tijdens de conflict-interactie taak werd één van beide partners 
aangewezen als conflict initiator (hij/zij die het onderwerp diende te kiezen en te 
introduceren). Een eerste opmerking hierbij is dat een partner “verplicht” werd in de rol 
van conflict-initiator, ongeacht of deze partner zich comfortabel voelde in deze rol en/of 
tijdens conflicten thuis deze rol zou opnemen, en bovendien weten we niet of deze partner 
al dan niet gemotiveerd was om zijn/haar onderwerp te bespreken of op te lossen. 
Vervolgens voltooiden beide partners een video-review taak, waarbij ze hun eigen 
gedachten/gevoelens en deze van hun partner op vaste tijdstippen dienden te noteren, 
namelijk om de 90 seconden. Deze procedure werd reeds toegepast in eerder onderzoek 
(Verhofstadt et al, 2008; 2016), maar desondanks zijn deze tijdsintervallen artificieel, 
aangezien dit soort automatisch gegenereerde stops geen rekening houdt met het verloop 
van de interactie en de natuurlijke gedachtegang van beide partners. Bovendien is het 
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mogelijk dat een partner zich geen gedachte/gevoel kan herinneren op dat bepaalde moment 
of niet in staat is om de gedachten/gevoelens van de partner op dat moment te infereren, 
wat misschien wel mogelijk was op een ander moment tijdens het interval. Tevens vereist 
het accuraat rapporteren van geïnfereerde gedachten/gevoelens niet enkel empathisch 
inzicht – het vermogen om accuraat gedachten/gevoelens af te leiden van een target – maar 
ook empathische expressie – het vermogen om deze geïnfereerde gedachten en gevoelens 
in woorden uit te drukken die overeenkomen met de beoogde inhoud en ervaring van het 
target. Dus, we kunnen ons de vraag stellen of de empathische accuraatheidsscore enkel de 
empathische prestaties weerspiegelt of ook andere vaardigheden. Als laatste haalden de 
deelnemers vaak aan dat het paradigma tijdrovend is, wat hun motivatie en/of concentratie 
negatief kan beïnvloed hebben, en omdat de perceivers geen feedback ontvingen over hoe 
ze de taak uitvoerden, kan dit bij sommigen frustratie uitgelokt hebben. 
De laatste stap in het paradigma bestaat uit het codeerproces dat slechts drie scores 
omvat (0 = andere inhoud van de werkelijke gedachte/gevoel, 1 = gelijkaardige maar niet 
dezelfde inhoud als de werkelijke gedachte/gevoel en 2 = hoofdzakelijk dezelfde inhoud als 
de werkelijke gedachte/gevoel; Ickes et al, 1990). Deze beperkte range van scores is 
ontworpen om de codering te vergemakkelijken en bijgevolg de interbeoordelaars-
betrouwbaarheid te verhogen. Echter, dit beperkt eveneens de mogelijke variatie in de 
scores van empathische accuraatheid, aangezien veel inferenties de score 1 krijgen. 
Bovendien blijkt dat, hoewel het codeerproces vrij eenvoudig is, de codering toch een 
voldoende aantal beoordelaars vereist. Ickes suggereert zeven beoordelaars voor een 
optimale betrouwbaarheid, eerder werk haalde een hoge betrouwbaarheid met vijf 
beoordelaars, maar door de grote steekproef en het beperkt aantal beschikbare beoordelaars, 
heeft het huidige proefschrift slechts vier beoordelaars opgenomen, wat toch het minimum 
aantal beoordelaars blijkt te zijn om een acceptabele mate van betrouwbaarheid te bereiken. 
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Anderzijds kan dit argument enigszins getemperd worden, mits we een strengere maat van 
betrouwbaarheid hebben toegepast dan voorgaand onderzoek.  
Een tweede belangrijke beperking van dit proefschrift werd reeds in de 
afzonderlijke hoofdstukken aangehaald, en heeft betrekking op de 
steekproefkarakteristieken. Hoewel we een grote steekproef verzamelden met een aantal 
zeer belangrijke voordelen ten opzichte van de gangbare steekproeven in sociaal-
psychologisch onderzoek, zoals onder andere een brede range in relatieduur en leeftijd, is 
de steekproef ook beperkt in zijn generaliseerbaarheid gezien de inclusie van voornamelijk 
blanke, heteroseksuele, middenklasse koppels die over het algemeen tevreden zijn over hun 
relatie. Verder toekomstig onderzoek is dus aangewezen ten einde onze bevindingen te 
kunnen generaliseren in andere steekproeven, bijvoorbeeld holebi partners of partners op 
zoek naar/in relatietherapie. 
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Overzicht van het Onderzoek naar de Bronnen en Predictoren van Empathische Accuraatheid 
 
 Specificatie Verband met EA 
Perceiver karakteristieken   
Interpersoonlijke 
sensitiviteit 
Vaardigheid decoderen non-
verbaal gedrag 
/ 
Interpersoonlijke perceptie / 
Dispositionele empathie Niet eenduidig 
Empathie voor emoties + (enkel bij SS-paradigma én 
hoog expressieve targets) 
Cognitief vermogen en stijl Intelligentie + verbaal IQ (enkel bij ƃ) 
Sekse en gender Geslacht Niet eenduidig: Ƃ > ƃ 
Gender + (Ƃ & activatie vrouwelijke 
genderrol  
Ontwikkelingsstoornissen ASS/PDD - (sterker bij ongestructureerde 
interactie) 
Target karakteristieken   
Leesbaarheid Transparantie (IDI) Lage IDI > Hoge IDI 
Sekse en gender Geslacht 
 
Niet eenduidig (ƃ: makkelijker 
leesbaar; Ƃ: duidelijkere non-
verbale signalen) 
Motivationele aspecten   
Situationele motivatoren Geld 
 
 
+ (bij nadruk op verbale cues) 
/ of - (bij nadruk op non-
verbale cues) 
Garantie op succes bij 
aantrekkelijke Ƃ  
+ 
 
Motivatoren afkomstig van 
perceiver 
Nood om bij sociale groep te 
horen/verbondenheid  
+ 
Veilige hechting + (niet relatie-bedreigende 
context) 
- (relatie-bedreigende context) 
 Angstige hechting - (niet relatie-bedreigende 
context) 
+ (relatie-bedreigende context) 
Vermijdende hechting - (beide contexten) 
 
Motivatoren afkomstig van 
target 
Andere geslacht + 
Fysieke aantrekkelijkheid + 
Relationele motivatoren   
 Conflictsituatie (niet relatie-
bedreigend) 
+ (accuraatheidsmotief; gevolg 
(1) accommodatie indien 
wederzijds begrip of (2) 
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escalatie indien blootleggen 
van onoverkomelijke 
meningsverschillen)  
Conflictsituatie (relatie-
bedreigend) 
+ (accuraatheidsmotief; gevolg: 
(tijdelijke) instabiliteit 
relatie/zelf) 
-  (beschermingsmotief; 
gevolg: stabiliteit (op KT) 
wordt behouden) 
 Sociale steun + (= meer instrumentele steun 
en minder negatieve steun) 
 Relatieduur + (ontstaan/begin relatie) 
-  (langdurige relatie) 
Noot. / = Geen verband; + = meer accuraatheid; - = minder accuraatheid; tabel overgenomen uit Hinnekens 
et al. 2015. 
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3a. Raw data 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
* Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [x] YES / [ ] NO 
If NO, please justify: 
 
* On which platform are the raw data stored? 
  - [x] researcher PC 
  - [ ] research group file server 
  - [x] other (specify): back-up on external hard drive 
	

ͤ͞͞

* Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of another person)?
- [x] main researcher
- [x] responsible ZAP
- [ ] all members of the research group
- [ ] all members of UGent
- [ ] other (specify): ...
3b. Other files 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
* Which other files have been stored?
- [x] file(s) describing the transition from raw data to reported results. Specify: R syntax
file
- [x] file(s) containing processed data. Specify: Three datasets containing the data of a
large survey + observational study (file 1: coding-data empathic accuracy = raw data
stored by coder and calculated (total)scores; file 2: coding-data demand/withdrawal
behavior = raw data stored by coder and calculated (total)scores; file 3: survey data = raw
data and calculated (total)scores of the questionnaires).
- [x] file(s) containing analyses. Specify: R output files
- [ ] files(s) containing information about informed consent
- [ ] a file specifying legal and ethical provisions
- [ ] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this content should be
interpreted. Specify: ...
- [ ] other files. Specify: ...
* On which platform are these other files stored?
- [x] individual PC
- [ ] research group file server
- [x] other: back-up on external hard drive
* Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention of another person)?
- [x] main researcher
- [x] responsible ZAP
- [ ] all members of the research group
- [ ] all members of UGent
- [ ] other (specify): ...
4. Reproduction
===========================================================
* Have the results been reproduced independently?: [ ] YES / [x] NO
* If yes, by whom (add if multiple):
- name:
- address:
- affiliation:
- e-mail:
	

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
	͞
 
Name/identifier study: Empathic accuracy and observed demand behavior in couples.  
Author: Hinnekens, Céline, Vanhee, Gaëlle, De Schryver, Maarten, Ickes, William, & 
Verhofstadt, Lesley 
Date: September 2016 
 
 
1. Contact details 
=========================================================== 
1a. Main researcher 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Céline Hinnekens 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent 
- e-mail: celine.hinnekens@ugent.be/celine_hinnekens@hotmail.com 
 
1b. Responsible Staff Member (ZAP)  
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Lesley Verhofstadt 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent  
- e-mail: lesley.verhofstadt@ugent.be 
 
If a response is not received when using the above contact details, please send an email to 
data.pp@ugent.be or contact Data Management, Faculty of Psychology and Educational 
Sciences, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium. 
 
2. Information about the datasets to which this sheet applies  
=========================================================== 
* Reference of the publication in which the datasets are reported: 
 
Hinnekens, C., Vanhee, G., De Schryver, M., Ickes, W., & Verhofstadt, L. L. (2016). 
Empathic accuracy and observed demand behavior in couples. Frontiers in Psychology, 7. 
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01370 
  
* Which datasets in that publication does this sheet apply to?: This dsfs applies to the 
study that is reported in the publication stated above. 
 
3. Information about the files that have been stored 
=========================================================== 
3a. Raw data 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
* Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [x] YES / [ ] NO 
If NO, please justify: 
 
* On which platform are the raw data stored? 
  - [x] researcher PC 
  - [ ] research group file server 
  - [x] other (specify): Online data-depository: 
https://figshare.com/s/1dd9ca870d12284ddfb6 under the name “Empathic Accuracy and 
Observed Demand Behavior in Couples + back-up on external hard drive    
	

ͤ͞͠

 
* Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of another person)? 
  - [x] main researcher 
  - [x] responsible ZAP 
  - [ ] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [x] other (specify): Visitors of the document on figShare 
 
3b. Other files 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
* Which other files have been stored? 
  - [x] file(s) describing the transition from raw data to reported results. Specify: R syntax 
files + word-file + SPSS syntax files  
  - [x] file(s) containing processed data. Specify: Two datasets containing the data of a 
large survey + observational study (file 1: coding-data empathic accuracy = raw data 
stored by coder and calculated (total)scores; file 2: coding-data demand/withdrawal 
behavior = raw data stored by coder). 
  - [x] file(s) containing analyses. Specify: R output files  
  - [ ] files(s) containing information about informed consent  
  - [ ] a file specifying legal and ethical provisions  
  - [ ] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this content should be 
interpreted. Specify: ...  
  - [x] other files. Specify: word-file describing the variables and measurement 
     
* On which platform are these other files stored?  
  - [x] individual PC 
  - [ ] research group file server 
  - [x] other: Online data-depository:   
https://figshare.com/s/1dd9ca870d12284ddfb6 under the name “Empathic Accuracy and 
Observed Demand Behavior in Couples + back-up on external hard drive    
 
* Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention of another person)?  
  - [x] main researcher 
  - [x] responsible ZAP 
  - [ ] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [x] other (specify): Visitors of the document on figShare    
 
 
4. Reproduction  
=========================================================== 
* Have the results been reproduced independently?: [ ] YES / [x] NO 
 
* If yes, by whom (add if multiple): 
   - name:  
   - address:  
   - affiliation:  
   - e-mail:     
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	͟
 
Name/identifier study: “I think you understand me.” Studying the associations between 
actual, assumed, and perceived understanding within couples. 
Author: Hinnekens, Céline, & Verhofstadt, Lesley 
Date: December 2016 
 
1. Contact details 
=========================================================== 
1a. Main researcher 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Céline Hinnekens 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent 
- e-mail: celine.hinnekens@ugent.be/celine_hinnekens@hotmail.com 
 
1b. Responsible Staff Member (ZAP)  
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Lesley Verhofstadt 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent  
- e-mail: lesley.verhofstadt@ugent.be 
 
If a response is not received when using the above contact details, please send an email to 
data.pp@ugent.be or contact Data Management, Faculty of Psychology and Educational 
Sciences, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium. 
 
2. Information about the datasets to which this sheet applies  
=========================================================== 
* Reference of the publication in which the datasets are reported: 
 
Hinnekens, C., & Verhofstadt, L. L. (2016). “I think you understand me.” Studying the 
associations between actual, assumed, and perceived understanding within couples. 
Manuscript submitted for publication. 
  
* Which datasets in that publication does this sheet apply to?: This dsfs applies to the 
study that is reported in the publication stated above. 
 
3. Information about the files that have been stored 
=========================================================== 
3a. Raw data 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
* Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [x] YES / [ ] NO 
If NO, please justify: 
 
* On which platform are the raw data stored? 
  - [x] researcher PC 
  - [ ] research group file server 
  - [x] other (specify): back-up on external hard drive    
 
* Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of another person)? 
	
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
- [x] main researcher
- [x] responsible ZAP
- [ ] all members of the research group
- [ ] all members of UGent
- [ ] other (specify):
3b. Other files 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
* Which other files have been stored?
- [x] file(s) describing the transition from raw data to reported results. Specify: word-file
+ SPSS syntax files
- [x] file(s) containing processed data. Specify: The datasets contain the data of a large
survey + observational study (coding-data empathic accuracy = raw data stored by coder
and calculated (total)scores).
- [x] file(s) containing analyses. Specify: Output files APIM (web application; word-
files)
- [ ] files(s) containing information about informed consent
- [ ] a file specifying legal and ethical provisions
- [ ] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this content should be
interpreted. Specify: ...
- [ ] other files. Specify:
* On which platform are these other files stored?
- [x] individual PC
- [ ] research group file server
- [x] other: back-up on external hard drive
* Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention of another person)?
- [x] main researcher
- [x] responsible ZAP
- [ ] all members of the research group
- [ ] all members of UGent
- [ ] other (specify):
4. Reproduction
===========================================================
* Have the results been reproduced independently?: [ ] YES / [x] NO
* If yes, by whom (add if multiple):
- name:
- address:
- affiliation:
- e-mail:
	
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
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͠ 
 
Name/identifier study: Empathic accuracy and cognitions during conflict: An in-depth 
analysis of understanding scores.  
Author: Hinnekens, Céline, Sillars, Alan, Verhofstadt, Lesley, & Ickes, William  
Date: December 2016 
 
1. Contact details 
=========================================================== 
1a. Main researcher 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Céline Hinnekens 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent 
- e-mail: celine.hinnekens@ugent.be/celine_hinnekens@hotmail.com 
 
1b. Responsible Staff Member (ZAP)  
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Lesley Verhofstadt 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent  
- e-mail: lesley.verhofstadt@ugent.be 
 
If a response is not received when using the above contact details, please send an email to 
data.pp@ugent.be or contact Data Management, Faculty of Psychology and Educational 
Sciences, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium. 
 
2. Information about the datasets to which this sheet applies  
=========================================================== 
* Reference of the publication in which the datasets are reported: 
 
Hinnekens, C., Sillars, A., Verhofstadt, L. L., & Ickes, W. (2016). Empathic accuracy and 
cognitions during conflict: An in-depth analysis of understanding scores. Manuscript 
submitted for publication. 
  
* Which datasets in that publication does this sheet apply to?: This dsfs applies to the 
study that is reported in the publication stated above. 
 
3. Information about the files that have been stored 
=========================================================== 
3a. Raw data 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
* Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [x] YES / [ ] NO 
If NO, please justify: 
 
* On which platform are the raw data stored? 
  - [x] researcher PC 
  - [ ] research group file server 
  - [x] other (specify): back-up on external hard drive    
 
* Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of another person)? 
  - [x] main researcher 
	
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  - [x] responsible ZAP 
  - [ ] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify):  
 
3b. Other files 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
* Which other files have been stored? 
  - [x] file(s) describing the transition from raw data to reported results. Specify: word-file 
+ SPSS syntax files 
  - [x] file(s) containing processed data. Specify: The datasets contain the data of a large 
survey + observational study (coding-data empathic accuracy = raw data stored by coder 
and calculated (total)scores).   
  - [x] file(s) containing analyses. Specify: SPSS output files  
  - [ ] files(s) containing information about informed consent  
  - [ ] a file specifying legal and ethical provisions  
  - [x] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this content should be 
interpreted. Specify: Coding Manual of ICCS  
  - [ ] other files. Specify: 
 
* On which platform are these other files stored?  
  - [x] individual PC 
  - [ ] research group file server 
  - [x] other: back-up on external hard drive    
 
* Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention of another person)?  
  - [x] main researcher 
  - [x] responsible ZAP 
  - [ ] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify):  
 
 
4. Reproduction  
=========================================================== 
* Have the results been reproduced independently?: [ ] YES / [x] NO 
 
* If yes, by whom (add if multiple): 
   - name:  
   - address:  
   - affiliation:  
   - e-mail:     
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
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Name/identifier study: The manageability of empathic (in)accuracy during couples’ 
conflict: Relationship-protection or self-protection? 
Author: Hinnekens, Céline, Loeys, Tom, De Schryver, Maarten, & Verhofstadt, Lesley  
Date: December 2016 
 
1. Contact details 
=========================================================== 
1a. Main researcher 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Céline Hinnekens 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent 
- e-mail: celine.hinnekens@ugent.be/celine_hinnekens@hotmail.com 
 
1b. Responsible Staff Member (ZAP)  
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Lesley Verhofstadt 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent  
- e-mail: lesley.verhofstadt@ugent.be 
 
If a response is not received when using the above contact details, please send an email to 
data.pp@ugent.be or contact Data Management, Faculty of Psychology and Educational 
Sciences, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium. 
 
2. Information about the datasets to which this sheet applies  
=========================================================== 
* Reference of the publication in which the datasets are reported: 
 
Hinnekens, C., Loeys, T., De Schryver, M., & Verhofstadt, L. L. (2016). The manageability 
of empathic (in)accuracy during couples’ conflict: Relationship-protection or self-
protection? Manuscript submitted for publication. 
  
* Which datasets in that publication does this sheet apply to?: This dsfs applies to the 
study that is reported in the publication stated above. 
 
3. Information about the files that have been stored 
=========================================================== 
3a. Raw data 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
* Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [x] YES / [ ] NO 
If NO, please justify: 
 
* On which platform are the raw data stored? 
  - [x] researcher PC 
  - [ ] research group file server 
  - [x] other (specify): back-up on external hard drive    
 
* Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of another person)? 
  - [x] main researcher 
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  - [x] responsible ZAP 
  - [ ] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify):  
 
3b. Other files 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
* Which other files have been stored? 
  - [x] file(s) describing the transition from raw data to reported results. Specify: word-file 
+ SPSS syntax files 
  - [x] file(s) containing processed data. Specify: The datasets contain the data of a large 
survey + observational study (coding-data empathic accuracy = raw data stored by coder 
and calculated (total)scores) + R syntax files.   
  - [x] file(s) containing analyses. Specify: R output files  
  - [ ] files(s) containing information about informed consent  
  - [ ] a file specifying legal and ethical provisions  
  - [ ] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this content should be 
interpreted. Specify:  
  - [ ] other files. Specify: 
 
* On which platform are these other files stored?  
  - [x] individual PC 
  - [ ] research group file server 
  - [x] other: back-up on external hard drive    
 
* Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention of another person)?  
  - [x] main researcher 
  - [x] responsible ZAP 
  - [ ] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify):  
 
 
4. Reproduction  
=========================================================== 
* Have the results been reproduced independently?: [ ] YES / [x] NO 
 
* If yes, by whom (add if multiple): 
   - name:  
   - address:  
   - affiliation:  
   - e-mail: 


